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Suzan-Lori Parks’s The America Play and Its  
Deconstructive Ontology 
 
Rachel A. Naor 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I intend to showcase Suzan-Lori Parks’s repetitious, supplemental virtuosity, 
which is a testament to the fluid, indeterminate condition of her concepts.  I seek to 
demonstrate that in textualizing the quality of absence in the written dialogue, Parks’s 
The America Play becomes uniquely deconstructive.  For indeed, through the absent 
“presence” of an historically mythified president and a gravedigger’s skewed identity, the 
play becomes a stage for splinters of historicized, differentiating, repeating signifiers that 
supplement, even as they redefine, their referential signified.  Performing deconstructive 
thinking, Parks’s textuality is accommodated by a content through which she calls 
attention to the structures of metaphysics in our discourse, stressing our inability to erase 
them, and our need to question them through continual self-reflexive thinking.  I hope to 
show that Parks’s genius is apparent in her unique mastery of language.  This kind of 
mastery is revealed through her drama’s connection to conceptual possibilities, which are 
hypostatize, staged through the materiality of her drama’s textual configuration.  In 
consciously imbuing her pages with representational temporal spaces akin to Derrida’s 
différance, Parks shows how the supplemental perpetuity of metaphysical signification 
phenomenally attests to the conceptual, idealized absence it supplements.  I speak here of 
idealization that underlies the structural signified, always already a supplemented absent, 
which carries metaphoric trappings of  phenomenological substance in a form of the 
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signifier, returning through a morphemic ideality in the assuredness of its infinite return.  
I read Park’s intent in The America Play as inherently deconstructive because Parks 
dramatizes the enigma of the trace; that is, the enigma of its impossible, yet, relentless 
repetition.  In examining the trace and its historical “genesis” through the Idea in the 
Kantian sense, I will show how Parks’s Rep & Rev, repetitions and revision, textually 
performs its impossible repetition, which is always metaphysical.  In self-reflexively 
showing the impossibility of metaphysical presences, Parks establishes a need for a 
persistent practice of deconstructive interrogation, questioning self-assured, 
metaphysical, dogmatic thinking.  
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Part I 
 
Introduction 
 
The crux of my research concentrates on what I identify as Suzan-Lori Park’s 
dramatization of deconstructive poetics in The America Play.  Specifically, I intend to 
show how she manipulates Jacques Derrida’s understanding of spatiotemporal1 elements 
of language production.  I will place particular emphasis on the elements that make 
possible the production of metaphysical2 discourse in the play, a discourse which, as 
Derrida suggests, is always substantiated through processes of idealization 3 and its 
reemergence in the economies of the “trace.”4  Parks, I argue, creates structure and 
context in which she embeds the trace so as to perform the ways in which it propels the 
differential impetus of différance itself.5  What we gain through an analysis such as this is 
an understanding of the ontological qua temporal and spatial lingual structures of 
thinking in the play, which, as Derrida shows, are never unearthed at their primordial 
topology6.  This point of origination is the absence that Derrida identifies as “presence.”7  
According to Derrida, this absence is what the discourse of metaphysics supplements. 
I seek to demonstrate that in textualizing the quality of absence in the written 
dialogue, Parks’s play becomes uniquely deconstructive.  For indeed, through the absent 
“presence” of the mythified president and the gravedigger’s skewed identity, the play 
becomes a stage for splinters of historicized, differentiating, repeating signifiers that 
supplement, even as they redefine, their referential signified.  Performing deconstructive 
thinking, Parks’s textuality8 is accommodated by a content through which she calls 
attention to the structures of metaphysics in our discourse, stressing our inability to erase 
them, and our need to question them through continual self-reflexive thinking.   
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Hence, demonstrating sensibility to textual deconstructive performance, Parks 
manipulates her signs in showing the inherent absence of their signified.  In consciously 
imbuing her pages with temporalizing spaces akin to Derrida’s différance, Parks shows 
that the physical-poetic-ecstatic of signification is both phenomenal and metaphoric in 
staging the absent, incomplete dialectics of idea/idealization, which make metaphysical 
signification possible.  I speak here of the idealization that underlies the structural 
signified, always already a supplemented absent, which carries metaphoric trappings of  
phenomenological substance in a form of the signifier, returning through a morphemic 
ideality in the assuredness of its infinite return.  This kind of idealization and the 
impossibility of its tenable hypostatization mark Parks’s textual impulse. 
I read Park’s intent in The America Play as inherently deconstructive because 
Parks dramatizes the enigma of the trace; that is, the enigma of its impossible, yet, 
relentless repetition.  The undecipherable origin of repetition, or, for that matter, the 
untenable presence of all philosophical aporetics9, is the deconstructive nexus—the 
undecideable. What I will attempt to do is show how Parks creates textuality that 
comments on a content, which reveals the abyss of the unknowable in the bottomless 
structure of the genesis of origin.  In this, I will necessarily encounter difficulties of 
course.  Yet, it is impossible to analyze Parks’s oeuvre, in discerning a consciousness to 
problems of metaphysics, without examining her practices of Rep & Rev (repetition and 
revision),10 which underlie the problematic of revealing the origin of the trace or, rather, 
repetition as such.  An analysis of Derrida’s core notions proves to be invaluable: 
différance, play, the supplemental, all propelled through the temporal and spatial 
pathology underlying the enigmatic repetition of the trace. I intend to show how, through 
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a rigorous textual economy, in a collapsing dialectic to content, Parks succeeds in 
accommodating a deconstructive way of thinking.  
Moreover, I identify a-traditional textuality in the writing of both Parks and 
Derrida as their “ethical moment;” that is, an attempt at what Wittgenstein describes as 
our “urge to thrust against the limit of language . . . .,” which is for Wittgenstein the first 
demand on our ethical awareness: “This thrust against limits of language is ethics.”11 
Therefore, the ultimate purpose of this project is to demarcate textual activity, which 
hypostatizes temporality, through the sign’s idealized spatiality in showing how 
ontological structures of metaphysical discourse occur.12  Indeed, when we consider the 
kind of dogmatic thinking that metaphysics perpetuates, an economy of ethics becomes 
significant.  Both Parks and Derrida, I argue, fissure an opening for an ethic that is 
demarcated by heterogeneity of possible resolutions within the limit of the irresolvable; 
that is, through the energy of “play.”13  “Play” is the impetus that pervades Parks’s 
writing in The America Play.  I find that a discussion of Parks as participating in the 
postmodern parlance might be invaluable in showing the necessity of averting inculcation 
of metaphysics while creating a subversive metaphysical model.14  
My interest in Parks’s work is a response to what I perceive to be an affirming 
and disaffectingly vicarious, seemingly precarious lingual expression, antithetical to 
fundamentals of traditional prescriptions of thinking.  Although Parks’s works are 
exercises in performative rebellion against traditional dramaturgy and its philosophical 
heritage, her works also attest to the insurmountable presence of a combination of the 
same self philosophical heritage and specimen of black consciousness.  It seems as if 
Parks’s works are marked by a-traditional intensity that gains its energy through a 
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pathological relation to persistent specie of metaphysic.  Further, the irreconcilable 
dialectic of heterogeneity of possibilities, represented through any structure of change, on 
the one hand, and consciousness to lingering ontological heritage, on the other, situate 
Parks’s early works on the differential, liminal space divulged through the practice of 
deconstruction.  This space is crucial in exploiting the possibilities within the impulse of 
a sustained opening, a fundamental state of ethics, which ultimately results in structures 
of suggested uncertainty.15 Moreover, being cognizant of difficulties in demanding a state 
of incertitude must be concurrent with a realization that such a state might offer a vital 
opening for persistent inquiry.  Hence, I view Suzan-Lori Parks’s works as readying the 
ground for questioning, an activity that arguably is not foreign to Jacques Derrida.16 My 
intention is to consort Suzan-Lori Parks’s works with Jack Derrida’s deconstructive 
understanding, which is already, so I argue, inherent in her work.  
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1 Heidegger’s statement in Being and Time that when talking “about Dasein’s having a ‘spatio-temporal’ 
character, we could not mean that this entity is present-at-hand ‘in space and also in time’” (418), is 
sufficient to set the locum within which Derrida complicates Husserl’s understanding of pure ideality, of 
untainted, spatiotemporal conceptuality.  In Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, 
Derrida shows that paradigmatically pure idealities such as geometry are revealed through “bound” 
idealities such as language, making any claim to gaining an opening for spatiotemporal possibilities 
problematic.  Nonetheless and as we are about to discover, Derrida’s indebtedness to Husserl begins at the 
same spatiotemporal locum (my emphasis).  
2 Traditionally metaphysics refers to those principles or events that are unexplainable and whose reality we 
must assume, as Emanuel Kant does for example, with the notion of God.  For Derrida, metaphysics 
constitutes concepts that philosophy has never been successful in disambiguating, “(essence, existence, 
substance, subject,) . . . . transcendentality, consciousness, God, man . . . .” (Jacques Derrida, “Structure, 
Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” [SSPDH hereafter] in Writing and Difference [WD 
hereafter] Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University Press, 1978. translation of L’ecriture et la différance  
(Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1965) p.280.  Forth coming is an extrapolation on Derrida’s “metaphysics of 
presence,” which, in effect, defines the deconstructive project.  I intend to prove that The America Play is 
deconstructive insofar as it attempts to interrogate our perception of inculcated, normative notions of 
history and our participation in historicity as a perpetuity within which identities are acquired.  History for 
Parks, as I think it is for Derrida, is a metaphysical fountainhead.  However, the fact that her protagonist is 
black complicates the totalities with which American metaphysics is propagated and internalized.    
3 A very quick and introductory note here on a term that in actuality makes philosophy as such possible: 
ideality is the process through which individuals explain an event or a principle in which case the origin, 
the constitutionality of this phenomenon or principle, is unknown.  In critiquing Hussel’s 
phenomenological project, Derrida shows that idealization, the process through which phenomenological 
(eidetic) reduction occurs, is far removed from the origin it attempts to reveal  and, hence, doubly removed 
from non-ideal, that is, the Idea.  In his Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: an Introduction as well as in Speech 
and Phenomenon, Derrida shows how the non-ideal, as that which Derrida identifies in the Origin as the 
Idea in the Kantian sense (a thought of complete, unified, transcendent reality, which is never phenomenal 
but gives phenomenology the gift of its propagation) never gains substantiation, and always remains the 
absence through which idealization is perpetuated.  For example, geometry is the empirical effect of the 
Idea, while its proto-constitution, the way it came into being, is never known and therefore must be 
explained or idealized.  Moreover, idealization is the discursive sustenance promulgating, through 
spatiotemporal structures, in a movement of self-constitution and collapse, the relentlessly repetitious 
reemergence of the Derridean trace.  Our proposition focuses on idealization as pervasive, pathological 
structure of all metaphysical discourse.  We will, in effect, side with Derrida’s ultimate verdict: idealization 
rather an objective, ideal “presence” as such is at the core of phenomenological conceptual absences.  In the 
body of my dissertation I intent to explicate on how the Idea and the ideal are connected in underscoring 
the problematic of origin as such. The absent origin is crucial to our understanding of Parks’s drama, even 
as it underlies her consciousness to temporal and spatial elements seminal to her textual innovation.     
4 Since it is the structural element with which deconstruction functions and with which différance recovers 
its spatiotemporal elements, the trace is significant to any poststructural understanding insofar as it attempts 
to historicize ontology itself.  The trace is the element through which Derrida deconstructs Husserlian 
phenomenology.  For indeed, idealization is the sustenance that the trace— a none-empirical, metaphoric 
sedimentation of the Idea—needs to reassure its “ad-infinitum return.”  Moreover, as it repetitiously 
returns, it supplements the lack of  presence, a desire for which it was perpetuated in the first place; 
supplementation, it must be stressed here, occurs through signification that substitutes as it displaces the 
absence of “presence.”  Yet, the trace is not a phenomenological intentionality ordered by consciousness, or 
an absence inherent in “any gesture of ideation or perception, but the necessary temporal relation of the 
non-phenomenal content of the Kantian idea to its representation” (Alexander Argyros, “The Seam of the 
Trace,” Boundary 2 10.2 (1982): 59-76) p. 63.  The complexity of the trace is due to its temporal 
divisionary complication through which impetus it perpetually collapses and reemerges, a condition 
attesting to its own metaphysical state.  Since in The America Play, as I argue, Parks’s repetitions and 
revisions emulate the repetitious behavior of the deconstructive trace, the trace is the element on which I 
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intend to base my argument, explaining extensively the conditions of its arrival and its activity within the 
corpus of my dissertation.  
5 A neologism of the amalgamation of difference, the spatial dynamic through which signifiers are added to 
what is already there, and deference, the temporal dynamic through which signifiers are added to something 
that is missing, is the “stage, scène” on which Saussure’s structural differential gains ontological 
dimensions.  The production of language and its differential impulsion is introduced through the dual 
temporality of its signifiers and these signifiers’ multiple referential relation to their signified.  The absent 
present is the third dimension which différance supplements.  In this dissertation, its inscription will vary in 
concert with the ways Derrida’s translators and interpreters present it; for the most part, however, we shall 
be following David Allison’s translation in inscribing the word as differance.  Decisively for Derrida, the 
letter “a” reigns at the top of a conceptual pyramid in announcing that its temporal and spatial differentials 
are irreducible to their elements in isolation and/or conjointly.  The anomalous inscription of difference as 
differance, calls our attention to the supplementary nature of the sign through an inscriptional expression, in 
intending a certain disturbance of “metaphysics [which] treats the sign only as . . . . a site of the transition, 
the bridge between two moments of full presence” (“The Pit and the Pyramid” in Margins of Philosophy, 
Trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) p.71.  As we shall see, supplementation, 
rather than presence defines Parks’s dramaturgy in The America Play.  In fact, she creates the environs 
within which she can stage the Derridean spatiotemporal differential to its onto-lingual potential. 
6 Here yet again the consideration is the origin of a phenomenon, grasped through the Idea, which, as 
Derrida proves, never comes before ideality even if its effect is present. The “proto-ness,” that is, 
constitutionality as such, is never recoverable.  Insofar that it attempts to reveal the origin of a 
phenomenon, phenomenological reduction finds its definition through the non-phenomenal (Idea), which is 
said to be “prescription of complete givenness for a content which itself is infinite” (“Seam of the Trace” 
63); that is, irreducibility which finds its definition only through the reducible, or, vice versa, reducibility 
that finds its definition through the irreducible, of which completeness (presence) is tenably lacking.  I plan 
to prove that through incomplete dialectic of textuality and content, Parks’s play-text complicates core 
epistemologies of concepts such as history and identity in performing their always already absent origin.  
7 The term “presence” is the ultimate referent in Derrida’s interrogation of metaphysics.  Derrida identifies 
“presence” as “the metaphysics of presence,” claiming that determining being as presence will ultimately 
result in metaphysics.  The problem with philosophy is—Derrida echoes Heidegger here—that it always 
attempts to comprehend the structures of being as in their full presence, that is, as having all of their 
substances present.  Since a fullness of a phenomenon or a principle is not attainable, philosophy created 
structures of thinking so as to supplement the lacking reality (presence) of those phenomena or principles to 
become the discourse of metaphysics.  Parks shows the unlikelihood of presence as such in structures of 
history and identity.        
8 In analyzing the fabric (textum) of Parks’s textual drama through the “play” of her signifiers, we follow 
Derrida’s understanding of the textual.  For Derrida, textuality is an abstraction, a paradigm, an idea, 
which, through its intelligible design, affects an explanation of the possible perfomativity of the textual as 
referential, differential phenomenon.  Hence, when Derrida declares , “there no outside the text,” he means 
that the textual, the abstractive mode as a system of references, as a “general text,” underlies multiple 
possibilities of interpretive references in rejecting a concept of the text as limited to the sum of its 
signifiers— that is, substantiating meaning through a singular referral to any referent.  Rudolph Gasché 
explains it in this way: “‘There is no extra-text’ means just this: nothing outside the text can, like a last 
reason, assume a fulfilling function (Erfüllungsfunktion) of the textual referrals.  It certainly does not permit 
the conclusion that there is noting else but the text, or for that matter, that all is language” (The Tain of the 
Mirror, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) p. 281.  Derrida vents his frustration on the same 
point: “the concept of a text I propose is limited neither to the graphic, not to the book, not even to 
discourse, and even less to the semantic, representational, symbolic, ideal, or ideological sphere.  What I 
call ‘text’ implies all the structure called ‘real,’ ‘economic,’ ‘historical,’ socio-institutional, in short: all 
possible referents. . . . That does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book, as 
people have claimed, or have been naïve enough to believe and to have accused me of believing.  But it 
does mean that every referent, all reality has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to 
this ‘real’ except in an interpretive experience.  The latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in a 
movement of differential referring.  That’s all” (Limited Inc [hereafter LI], Ed. Gerald Graff. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988) p. 148.  We hope to show that Parks’s The America Play exemplifies 
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a deconstructive, textual, written performance of the differential, supplemental impulse inherent in 
metaphysical language.  
9 According to classical philosophy, the word aporia denotes a state of puzzlement, while when understood 
rhetorically, aporia denotes a state of doubt.  Derrida’s works are rife with aporias, with philosophical 
concepts for which total reduction, answer, is not viable.  In “‘Genesis and Structure’ and 
Phenomenology,” Derrida says, “The question of the possibility of the transcendental reduction cannot 
expect an answer” (WD 167).  In fact, Derrida never answers the multiple questions he raises, “the question 
of the text,” “the question of writing,” “the question of language,” “the problem of metaphor,” “the 
question of the margin,” “the question of ontological subordination,” “the question of history. . . .” (Ralph 
Shain, “Situating Derrida between Hegel and Kierkegaard” Philosophy Today 44.4 (2000): 388-403) p. 
388.  Derrida’s deconstructive project is not an attempt to propound a theory in solving philosophical 
questions or, for that matter, doing away with them. Rather, at the outset, deconstruction puts forth 
questions, suggesting that although its reductive efforts are impossible, that is, unlikely to succeed, a 
possibility of a positivist turn is embodied in its mere attempt.  Parks’s dramaturgy is deconstructive insofar 
that her play-texts are informed by an open endedness in rejecting possibility of defined resolutions to 
questions of history and identity by disquieting her own innovative attempts to try.   
10 Rep &Rev or repetition and revision are at the heart of Parks’s early work.  She adopts the repetition 
with slight revision “integral to the jazz esthetic” whereby “with each revisit the phrase is slightly revised” 
(Parks, Suzan-Lori. “Elements of Style” in The America Play and Other Works. New York: Theater  
Community Group Inc, 1995) p. 9. Parks explains: “I’m also asking how the structure of Rep & Rev and 
the stories inherent in it—a structure which creates a drama of accumulation—can be accommodated under 
the rubric of Dramatic Literature where, traditionally, all elements lead the audience toward some single 
explosive moment” (ibid). Akin to deconstructive philosopheme, Parks’s textual and dramatic aesthetic 
seeks to depart from the monolithic prescription of suggested resolutions, marking illusionist and 
representational drama. That is, in perpetually repeating words, phrases, and structures, minutely revised 
through textual and contextual differentials, Parks’s text performs (stages) the inherent plurality engendered 
in a changing repetition. The impulse is multiple because the effect is change; says Parks, “it’s not just 
repetition but repetition with revision. And in drama change, revision, is the thing. . .”  (ibid).  I plan to 
show how Parks’s repetitious textuality is akin to Derrida’s idea of iterability and how Parks creates a 
dramatic mise-en-abyme in staging heterogeneity of possibilities.  
11 From Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis p. 68, in Richard Rorty’s “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the 
Reification of language.” (The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Ed. Guignon, Charles. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993.  337-353.) p. 351. 
12 I am aware that considerations of space and time readily lend themselves to identifying structures of 
theatrical performance.  Moreover, there is very little doubt that Derrida’s trace can be potently identified 
as the element that impels theatrical performance to its constitutionality, even as it plays upon sustained 
temporal absences.  What is more, Parks’s dramatic texts map the ways in which temporality can be 
substantiated in the theatrical space in undercutting the putative purity with which Western thinking 
upholds its conception of temporality as “presence.”  To be sure, Derrida’s ground breaking essays on 
Antonin Artaud, “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation” and “La Parole Soufflée” 
(WD 232-250, 169-195 respectively) transform theater from its conventional anticipation of pure 
presentation to its acceptance as a necessarily self- reflexive process, which comments on its inability to 
obtain the purity of its own presentation as such.  As I have stressed, however, in this dissertational project 
I intend to treat the idea of performance not as a process through which theater becomes; rather I mean to 
relate Parks’s play to the offshoot of the term’s conventional understanding; that is, to its evolutionary 
reemergence within literal theory in emphasizing structures of performativity.  Hence, I intent to investigate 
The America Play’s textual performative economies in attempting to show how the play’s contents 
dialectically accommodate its textual schemes, which dramatize the spatiotemporal structure of Derrida’s 
différance on the page.  W. B. Worthen traces performativity to Parks’s noticeable textual play, which is 
always, so he argues, performance’s volatile “antecedent” ("Citing History: Textuality and Performativity 
in the Plays of Suzan-Lori Parks." Essays in Theatre/Etudes Théâtrales, 18.1 (1999): 3-22) p. 4.  My 
proposition focuses on the insurmountable difference between conceptuality, which underlies textual 
structures, and materiality, which evidences such textuality.  From its inception, the textual for Derrida is 
an outcome of the performative.   
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13 Play is always a play of absence and presence, says Derrida.  A statement that seems to underlie the 
repetitious perpetuity that marks The America Play with a rigorous substitution of presences through signs 
that always already evidence the absences they supplement.  This is, in effect, the deconstructive practice in 
which reducibility of absences in a quest to reveal presences is declared as impossible and, yet, through 
which such practice an inherent possibility of reduction is revealed.  However, more than anything else, 
Derrida attributes the notion of play to Nietzsche whose “Over-man’s” forgetful exuberance escapes the 
metaphysical forcefulness of the definition of “man and humanism . . . . [participating in] the joyous 
affirmation of . . . . a world of signs without fault . . . . without security” (SSPDHS, 292-3) and with 
“laughter . . . . ‘beyond’ metaphysics . . . . [and] the house and the truth of Being” (“The Ends of Man” in 
Margins of Philosophy, Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) p. 163.  The 
reference here is to Heidegger, who views language as “the house of being.”  As we explicate the 
deconstructive understanding of language, we shall notice that Derrida shows language as a house of cards 
with persistent resilience. 
14 As Derrida shows us, subverted metaphysics can occur only as, yet, another specimen of metaphysics. 
Just as postmodern thinking, according to Jean-Francois Lyotard, must precede modern worldview with its 
consciousness of challenges to the tradition.  When I claim that Parks participates in the postmodern ethos 
by creating a subverted metaphysical model, I intend to stress the fact that her drama is a dialogue of self 
reflexivity and “skepsis.”  According to Rayment-Pickard, skepsis is a deconstructive activity that although 
borrows its persistent questioning of philosophical aporias from the tradition, it rejects the Skeptics’ 
anticipation of resolution.  (Hugh Rayment-Pickard, “Derrida and Fidelity to History.” History-of-
European-Ideas 28 (2002): 13-20).  In this way, Parks questions metaphysic of history and identity, even as 
she self-reflexively comments on her inability to offer resolutions.  Concurrently, Parks’s art can be viewed 
as representing postmodern avant-garde as that which leaps over both hurdles of the representational 
impetus of mimetic naturalistic theater and the extreme response of Artaudian modern theater.  She, in 
effect, comes closer to the intelligent epistemological economy that Matei Calinescu sees Umberto Eco as 
identifying in postmodern avant-garde.  That is, Eco’s “insistence that the postmodernist rediscovery of the 
past or of the ‘already said’ cannot be innocent and that this lack of innocence must be fully acknowledged. 
Irony, playfulness, parodic and self-parodic nostalgia are some of the ways of doing so” (Five Faces of 
Modernity: Modernism, Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism. Durham: Duke University Press, 
1987) p.277.  The kind of pastiche Parks recreates in The America Play erodes self-valorizing American 
nostalgia by parodying the memory of a president.  
15 Forwarding Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition in ascribing postmodern architecture as a “commitment 
to surface and to the superficial,” Fredric Jameson denotes that “It was . . . . precisely to the superficial . . . . 
that a certain French poststructuralism invited us . . . . this is the moment . . . . in which aesthetics gives 
way to ethics . . . .” (Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
 Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984) p. xvii.  I connect 
Parks’s seeming playful “superficiality” to an economy of heterogeneity, which is, to my view, at the cusp 
of ethical practice.   
16 In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida argues that within “A community of the question . . . . [in 
assuring that] the discipline of the question . . . . previous to irony, to maieutics, to epoché, and to doubt, an 
injunction is announced: the question must be maintained.  As a question.  The liberty of the question must 
be stated and protected.  A founded dwelling, a realized tradition of the question remaining a question.  If 
this commandment has an ethical meaning, it is not in that it belongs to the domain [Derrida’s emphasis] of 
the ethical, but in that it ultimately authorizes every ethical law in general” (Writing and Difference, [WD 
hereafter] Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University Press, 1978) p. 80.  Similarly, in “The Origin of the Work 
of Art,” Heidegger contends that, “The answer to the question, like every genuine answer, is only the final 
result of the last step in a long series of questions.  Each answer remains in force as an answer only as long 
as it is rooted in questioning” (Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Krell. Harper San Francisco: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1993) p. 195.  Maybe this is why Derrida stresses that “. . . . the question is always 
enclosed; it never appears immediately as such, but only through the hermetism of a proposition in which 
the answer has already begun to determine the question.  The purity of the question can only be indicated or 
recalled through the difference of a hermeneutical effort” (WD 80).  In Of Grammatology, Derrida is 
emphatic in saying that “the question of the meaning of being, the being of an entity and of the 
transcendental origin of the world . . . . must be patiently and rigorously worked through, the critical 
movement of the Husserlian and Heideggerian questions must be effectively followed to the very end, and 
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their effectiveness and legibility must be conserved” (Of Grammatology [OG hereafter] Trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spviak. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. (translation of De la Grammatologie (Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1967) p. 50.  In Speech and Phenomenon (SP hereafter), Derrida stresses, “old signs, 
enjoining us to continue indefinitely to question presence within the closure of knowledge. . . . heard in the 
openness of an unheard-of question that opens neither upon knowledge nor upon some nonknowldge which 
is a knowledge to come.  In the openness of this question we no longer know.  This does not mean that we 
know nothing but that we are beyond knowledge (and its ethical, aesthetic, or religious system). . . . Such a 
question will legitimately be understood as meaning nothing, as no longer belonging to the system of 
meaning”  (Trans. David B. Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) p. 102-3.  Going 
through the breadth of Parks’s dramaturgy, approaching it with an inherent need to “look for answers,” we 
immediately realize that answers to questions as those concerning history and identity, if viable at all, 
remain open.   
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Deconstruction 
 
Forthwith, we must understand the philosophical elements that impel Suzan-Lori 
Parks’s dramaturgy.  We must first identify the absence of originary detritus marking the 
textual matrices of Parks’s The America Play, which, arguably, can be recognized 
through the deconstructive precepts of Jacques Derrida.  Yet, at the outset, I must stress 
that I see Parks’s texts as performing the deconstructive discontent, making a stark, 
pathologically deconstructive critique of her work superfluous and unnecessary.   
Deconstruction, Derrida’s project, calls our attention to the production of 
metaphysical language by problematizing the schismatic, paradoxical state of its textual 
materiality and its lexicological immateriality therein.  Yet, before I expatiate on Parks’s 
work through the textual, yet, philosophical enigma deconstruction reveals, let me 
discuss, some philosophical rudiments guiding its practices cursorily.  
 I think that Jonathan Culler describes deconstruction best when he argues that “It 
[deconstruction] is a practice of reading and writing attuned to the aporias that arise in 
attempts to tell us the truth.  It does not develop a new philosophy framework or solution 
but moves back and forth, with the nimbleness it hopes will prove strategic, between 
nonsynthesizable moments of a general economy.”1  “Nonsynthesizable moments” are 
those occurrences in a life of a concept escaping the grip of centripetal thinking; for 
Derrida’s deconstruction such thinking is logocentric.2  Christopher Norris explains 
Derrida’s neologistic coinage by observing that “To think logocentrically is to dream of a 
                                                 
1 (On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. New York: Cornell University Press, 
1982) p. 155.   
2 For Derrida, the term underlies the pervasiveness with which the voice of reason, phoncentricm, the logic 
within the voice, the essence of all presences, the “absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the 
meaning of being, of voice and ideality of meaning,” functions within the philosophical tradition (OG 
p.12).  
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‘transcendental signified,’ of a meaning outside and beyond the differential play of 
language . . . . Deconstruction defines its own project by contrast as a perpetual reminder 
that menaing is always the sign of a sign, that thought cannot escape this logic of endless 
supplementarity.”3  Specifically, deconstruction is about shattering Hegelian completing 
dialectic, dreaming its origin in Plato’s binaries: “Derrida also claims that deconstruction, 
as a process applied to the text ‘leaves a track in the text,’ opens up the dialectics of 
closure, and results in the placing or revealing of a ‘fold’ in the Aufhebung of the concept 
itself.”4  Traditionally, Derrida argues, meaning for philosophy is always already invested 
in and restricted to reason, which is idealized5 therein.  Derrida reveals these structures of 
idealization as metaphysical; that is, not as meaningless, but, as Emmanuel Kant points 
out, never truly discernible and, hence, never truly knowable, demanding, therefore, 
inquiry as to their absent, yet, idealized presence; for indeed, for every idealized, absent 
concept there is an opposition, which is ultimately marginalized.  Hence, deconstruction 
interrogates the hierarchies defined through kinds of idealization that metaphysical 
thinking promulgates, exposing while de-legitimizing the privileged status a concept has 
in a binary relation. Yet, unlike Hegelian systematically reconciling dialectics (gained 
through the movement of  Aufhebung6), deconstruction as a specie of interrogation rejects 
                                                 
3 (Derrida, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) p. 85-86. The deconstructive supplement as I see it 
materializing in Parks’s The America Play is significant to my thesis and will be discussed at greater length 
therein. 
4 (Irene Harvey, “The Différance between Derrida and de Man.” Silverman, Hugh J., and Aylesworth, Gary 
E. eds. in The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction and Its Differences. Contemporary  Studies in Philosophy 
and Literature. Vol. 1. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990) p. 77.     
5Processes of Husserlian idealization are significant to Derrida’s deconstruction of phenomenological 
reduction.  As I progress, I intend to elaborate on the meaning of the ideal and its propagation in both 
phenomenological and deconstructive discourses.  
6 This is Hegel’s “famous speculative concept of ‘sublation’ or ‘supersession’ in which each new element 
‘lifts up’ and retains what is valuable in what comes before at the same time that it surpasses it . . . . the 
system fulfills itself in concepts of totality—the Absolute . . . . [in] connect[ing] to its beginning, giving 
itself the circular shape of reconciliation” (Ralph Shain, “Situating Derrida Between Hegel and 
Kirkegaard.” Philosophy Today 44.4 (2000): 388-403) p. 398.   
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the possibility of a complete reduction of an aporia, an irresolvable philosophical 
problem but, which makes evident, in the practice of interrogation itself, that a reduction, 
an answer, is viable.  I think that John Caputo is accurate in saying that “Deconstruction . 
. . . is the endless, bottomless affirmation of the absolutely undeconsructible,” even as he 
“gathers,” if possible at all, the impetus of deconstruction: “Every time you try to 
stabilize the meaning of a thing, to fix it in its missionary position, the thing itself, if there 
is anything at all to it, slips away . . . . A ‘meaning’ or a ‘mission’ is a way to contain and 
compact things . . . . gathering them into unity, whereas deconstruction bends all its 
efforts to stretch beyond these boundaries, to transgress these confines, to interrupt and 
disjoin all such gathering.”7  When in Speech and Phenomena Derrida contends that “‘the 
look’” cannot “‘abide’” and that “the thing itself always escapes” (104), he suspects the 
whole of phenomenology, in fact, the whole of philosophy for its metaphycalization of 
“meaning”; that is, the metaphysicalization of presence.  I extrapolate on Derrida’s 
understanding of metaphysics as “the metaphysics of presence,” the determination of 
being as presence, to greater degree therein.  For now, it will suffice to say that the 
anticipated tenability of deconstructive disquietude, as that which Caputo identifies, 
marks deconstruction beyond the limits of its practices.8  
Derrida’s understanding of binary opposition is an elementary point.  
Nonetheless, it is significant in understanding Derrida’s deconstructive departure point.  
Derrida explains, “. . . . for contrary values (good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, 
                                                 
7 (Deconstruction in a Nutshell: a Conversation with Jacques Derrida, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1997) p. 31-32, 42. 
8 Derrida explains: “Far from being a methodical technique, a possible or necessary procedure, unrolling 
the law of program and applying rules, that is, unfolding possibilities, deconstruction has often been 
defined as the very experience of the (impossible) possibility of the impossible . . . .” (On the Name, Ed. 
Thomas Dutoit, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) p. 43.  The dialectic cannot abide and is indeed 
impossible, making deconstruction unique in realizing its success in its failure.   
 13
inside/out etc.) to be in opposition, each of the terms must be simply external to the other, 
which means that one of these oppositions (the opposition between inside and outside) 
must be accredited as the matrix of all possible opposition.”9 Inside/outside is the 
metaphoric, metaphysical inscription in defining essence, center, in short, the core of 
concepts, their substantive, and therefore, privileged presence, which deems its opposite, 
its supposed exteriority, as margin.  Plato’s dual conception, in which intelligible 
essences transcend the phenomenal world, pervades western thinking, forcing a discourse 
that must supplement the interiority it can only assume as having.  Although 
deconstruction always already resides within the opposition itself in “dislocating 
displacing, disarticulating, disjoining, putting ‘out of joint’ the authority of the ‘is,’”10 
residing within and overturning the binaries, Derrida stresses, falls short.  In Positions, 
Derrida emphasizes that he is “. . . . attempting to pursue . . . . a kind of general strategy 
of deconstruction.  The latter is to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of 
metaphysics and simply residing within the close field of these oppositions, thereby 
confirming it . . . . we must traverse a phase of overturning.  To do justice to this 
necessity is to recognize that in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing 
with a peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis (Derrida’s emphasis), but rather with a violent 
hierarchy.”11  Yet, the metaphysics of the in/out hierarchy, although displaced through 
Derrida’s explication on the nature of structure,12 pervades Derrida’s own thinking.13  
                                                 
9 (“Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination, Trans. Barbara Johnson, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981) p. 103.  
10  (“The Time is Out of Joint, Trans. Peggy Kamuf, in Deconstruction is/in America, ed. Anselm 
Haverkamp. New York: New York University Press, 1995, pp. 14-41) p. 25. 
11 (Positions, Trans. Allen Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981) p. 41.    
12 Derrida argues that the center of the structure is, in effect, outside the formal elements of the structure, 
prompting “classical thought . . . . [to] say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside  
it.  The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not 
part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere.” (“Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
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Derrida admits that all elements of a deconstructive intervention reside in the “neglected 
cornerstones”14 of an already existing system.  A quintessential binary for Derrida’s 
deconstructive paradigm (this word, as it is uttered or written in referencing 
deconstruction, must be simultaneously qualified) is that of speech and writing, 
reemerging in Derrida’s discussion of Saussurean structural linguistics and the 
binarization of the sign itself in Of Grammatology and Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s 
understanding of speech (specifically as the voice) and writing in Speech and 
Phenomenon.  In fact, Derrida contends that from Plato to Saussure the valorization of 
the spoken word as a-representational, intentioned, unhindered, natural, birthed of the 
soul, the reigning monarch of all insides, was situated in antithetical dialectic to the 
written sign, the prosthetic, “the exteriority that one attributes to utensils; to what is even 
an imperfect tool and a dangerous and maleficent technique.”15  The assumed purity, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Human Sciences,” 278-93 (SSPDHS hereafter) in Writing and Difference, Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: 
University Press, 1978) p. 279. 
13 Joshua Kates argues that Derrida’s discussion of binaries in Of Grammatology functions itself as 
logocentrism and phonocentrism. (“Deconstruction as Skepticism: The First Wave” 
 Journal-of-the-British-Society-for-Phenomenology 33.2 (2002): 188-205) p. 202.  Derrida, of course, 
admits to the unlikelihood of escaping the metaphysical grip: “There is no sense in doing without the 
concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—
which is foreign to this history” (SSPDHS) p. 280.  For the purpose of our proposition, we shall soon find 
out that the deconstructive trace finds its tenuous space within a stratum of exteriority, defined, according 
to Derrida, through the opening of a concept upon its non-self, delimiting a possibility of interiority 
altogether.  As we introduce the trace, we shall attempt as best we can to elucidate its pathologically 
problematizing behavior.    
14 (Memoires: for Paul de Man, Trans. Lindsay, Culler, Cadava, & Kamuf, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989) p. 72.  Derrida continues to argue that “the spot for efficiently inserting the 
deconstructive lever is the cornerstone . . . . this one derives its privilege from the fact that it is 
indispensable to the completeness of the edifice” (ibid).  If deconstruction finds its sustenance in the 
weaknesses it reveals in the putatively complete systems it claims to undermine, its own a-systemic system 
can hope for nothing more than self-deconstruction.  Thus, it comes to no surprise that on more then one 
occasion, Derrida discusses the unlikelihood of escaping metaphysical discourse; that might amount to 
admittance that his own philosophical discourse is metaphysical thereof.  
15 (OG 34), the “maleficent” in the written sign, according to Derrida’s reading of Saussure’s Course in 
General Linguistics, is due to its kinship to “the fatal violence of political institution,” and the bringing 
about of  “a break with nature” and apparent “fall” into culture.  What is more, the “‘natural’” phonic mark 
was replaced by the “‘artificial’” graphic mark so “that the latter managed to usurp the main role” (OG, 
36).  
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truthfulness of speech is the byproduct of the perennial inside, the essence, philosophy 
historically attributes to its aporetics.16   
We must remember that the inside/outside dichotomy is already inherent in the 
structure of the Saussurean sign as signified/signifier (signatum/signas), which, although 
are said by Saussure to be the “two sides of the same leaf,” are historically fissured by an 
insoluble breach that is as ancient as Heraclites.  Simply put, at the outset, the signified, a 
sign’s putative meaning, resides in arbitrary relation to the signifier, the empirical, 
phenomenological component of the sign, even as it gains its definition through 
differential perpetuity.  Derrida notes: “Arbitrariness can occur only because the system 
of signs is constituted by the differences of the terms and not by their fullness. The 
elements of signification function not by virtue of the compact force of their cores but by 
the network of oppositions that distinguish them and relate them to one another. 
‘Arbitrary and differential’ says Saussure ‘are two correlative qualities.’”17  There is very 
                                                 
16 In dislodging the speech/writing opposition in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Derrida’s references Socrates’ 
oxymoronic depiction of speech in The Phaedrus, in showing that Socrates himself views writing as primal. 
Socrates tells Phaedrus that he is thinking of a “discourse that is brother to the written speech . . . . better 
and more effective than the other . . . . the sort that goes together with knowledge and is written in the soul 
of the learner” (Dissemination 148). Inscription in the intelligible, phenomenon disembodied through the 
transcendent, empirical episteme that propounds revelation in the infinite are all servile subjects in the 
supplemented kingdom of Logos.  
17 (“Différance” in Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs [SP hereafter], 
Trans. David B. Allison. Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 129-160) p.136.  Derrida 
does away with the duality of the sign altogether: “Every signified, he claims, is already a signifier, and any 
entity or point of fixity outside the differential economy of language that would somehow exceed the chain 
of signs and arrest the movement of freeplay is prohibited by the trace” (Michael MacDonald, “‘Jewgreek 
and Greekjew’: The Concept of the Trace in Derrida and Levinas.” Philosophy Today (1991): 215-25) p. 
222.  Discussion as to the trace’s “prohibiting” properties is forthcoming.  For now, let us mention that 
conjoint to Saussure’s structural thinking and just as crucial in overturning the logical positivist view of 
language is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s game theory.  Language games are games, so he argues in his later 
writings, through which language performs within contexts affectuating a desired end.  In the end of his 
Logical Investigations, admitting to his failure in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein emphasizes the relational and 
arbitrary nature of language in this way: “So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point 
where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. –But such a sound is an expression only if it occurs 
in a particular language game . . . .” This is a far cry from Wittgenstein’s summation in the Tractatus that 
“what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence” 
(Richard Rorty, “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of language”  in The Cambridge Companion 
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little doubt as to Saussure’s influence on Derrida’s thinking.  To be sure, when 
considering structural influence, the “post” in the term post (structural) testifies both to 
indebtedness and to dissimilitude; however, we need realize that the latter manifests 
through the monumentality of the structural signified: “There has to be a transcendental 
signified for the difference between signifier and signified to be somewhere absolute and 
irreducible” (OG, 20).  Hence, the fundamental structure of the Saussurean sign hinges on 
the immutable, transcendent meaning that its signified upholds, that is, “an 
undecomposable unity,” which emerges through the understanding that “The formal 
essence of the signified is presence . . . .” (OG 18).18    As we continue to explore 
Derrida’s early thinking, we shall notice that the “formality” he attributes to definition of 
certain concepts is seminal.  
We need, therefore, remember that my proposition predominantly concentrates on 
the spatiotemporal economies underlying the textual appearance of signs, that is,  both in 
their metaphoric ideality (presence) and their empirical reality as they materialize on the 
page in a reiteratively simultaneous movement of semantic, morphemic, and syntactic 
“primordial” supplementation, even as they reverberate with absent phonemic echoes.19  
                                                                                                                                                 
to Heidegger. Ed. Guignon, Charles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 344, 353.  When 
Samuel Beckett’s Clov fulminates Hamm for asking him the meaning of the word “yesterday”; the allusion 
to Wittgenstein is uncanny: “That means that bloody awful day, long ago, before this bloody awful day.  I  
use the words you taught me.  If they don’t mean anything any moer, teach me others.  Or let me be silent” 
(Endgame, The Wadsworth Anthology of Drama, Ed. W. B. Worthen, 4th ed. Boston: Wadsworth, 2004) p. 
560.  Philosophy of language is first philosophy for both Wittgenstein and Derrida. The difference is, as 
Shain proposes, in Wittgenstein’s attempt to “dissolve philosophical questions” and Derrida’s posture that 
such attempts are doomed to fail (388).   
18 Derrida connects the transcendence of Hussrel’s speech [voice] to the “signified, which is always ideal 
by essence . . . . [and which] is immediately present in the act of expression.  This immediate presence 
results from the fact that the phenomenological ‘body’ of the signifier seems to fade away at the very 
moment it is produced . . . . It phenomenologically reduces itself, transforming the worldly opacity of its 
body into pure diaphaneity.  This effacement of the sensible body and its exteriority is for consciousness 
the very form of the immediate presence of the signified” (SP 77).    
19 We must not forget that phonemes are both utterances and written linguistic units.  Derrida’s 
deconstruction is that of the privilege of the former in showing the textual pertinence of the latter.  In 
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Hence, in addition to its manipulation of Saussure’s structural thinking, the 
deconstructive trajectory includes an epistemological inquiry into ontological rudiments 
qua temporality and spatiality inherent in metaphysical signification as such.  In fact, in 
explaining Derrida’s poststructural, deconstructive philosopheme, I aim to demonstrate 
how time, space, and signification contribute the differential basis of the metaphysical 
concepts deconstruction interrogate.  Moreover, the emphasis rests on those concepts’ 
origin in demonstrating that there is an insurmountable rupture between origin of a 
concept and its regeneration as a metaphysic.  Structures of origin or “pure presence,” as 
Derrida examines and critiques them, specifically, through considerations of Husserlian 
phenomenological eidetic reduction,20  “substantiate” the core of Derrida’s 
deconstruction of western metaphysics.  Hence, the teleology, yet as it must be, non-
teleology of the deconstructive project finds its “non-originary origin” in the sustained 
temporal and spatial openings inherent in the idea of signification as predominantly 
textural.   I intend to connect this conceptual opening to what I believe is deconstruction’s 
viable/nonviable teleology, which is, in my view, its ethical preparedness.21   
                                                                                                                                                 
viewing textuality as fundamentally spatial, inasmuch as it is contiguous to Husserlian intersubjetive 
temporality (of which discussion is forthcoming), Derrida structurally imbues signs with ontological 
elements that mark investigation of language as prerequisite to all philosophical thinking.  Indeed, in 
discussing indication, (that component in the Husserlian theory of language schemata, antithetical to the 
univocal, intersubjective “pure expression,” which, when I discuss Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s 
expression/indication hierarchical binary, I intend to explain) we discuss the impulse that assures the sign’s 
temporal connection to its topological, thus, spatial realities.  As Argyros remarks, “That the sign is always 
indicative means that it never escapes the spatiality of its actual or imagined inscription, proclaiming its 
phenomenality” (71).  
20 It might be worth differentiating here between Edmund Husserl’s eidetic reduction, aiming to reduce a 
phenomenon to its origin, and his transcendental reduction, a phenomenological reduction that brackets 
considerations of origin and concentrates on what is shown.   
21 Yet again the same conceptual openness needed for “the question,” is applicable to consideration of 
decision making, or, lack thereof, “undecidability.”  Derrida describes three cases: “that which resists 
binary or even triplicity. . . . The other defines the limits of decidability, of calculability or of formalizable 
completeness.  The third remains heterogeneous both to the dialectic and to the calculable . . . . [it] opens 
the field of decision or decidability.  It calls for decision in the order of ethical-political responsibility . . . . 
A decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the calculable program that would destroy all 
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Presence 
 “Pure presence,” a Husserlian fundament, is a pervasive tenet in the metaphysic, 
or rather, philosophy of the occident.  For Derrida, presence is metaphysic’s first 
condition.  In Speech and Phenomenon, he says that philosophy “is always a philosophy 
of presence” (63).  The emphasis is on what Derrida coins as “the metaphysics of 
presence,” which is the “matrix” of philosophy and “is the determination of Being as 
presence in all senses of this word.  It could be shown that all the names related to 
fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable 
presence—eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia,(essence, existence, substance, subject) 
alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man and so forth.”22  In listing a litany of 
philosophical core concepts, Derrida suggests that presence is the conceptually 
                                                                                                                                                 
responsibility by transforming it into a programmable effect of determinate causes.  There can be no moral 
or political responsibility without this trial and this passage by way of the undecidable. . . . a decision is 
structured by this experience and experiment of the undecidable. . . . In none of these three meanings is any 
completeness possible for undecidability.  The effect of the latter is precisely to render all totalization, 
fulfillment, plenitude impossible” (LI 116).  Therefore, openness in the indeterminable space between 
undecidability and the not-yet-made decision seems to be the condition for Derridean ethics.  Derrida’s is 
an adamant decision about the significance of indecision.  In “The Ends of Man,” Derrida speaks of the 
impossibility of deciding between two viable deconstructive structures: either that of the Heideggerian 
deconstruction of ontotheology in using the lingual rubric of its own discourse or that of structural 
differential schismatic strategy.  Moreover, synopsizing his memorable breakthrough talk at John Hopkins, 
SSPDHS, Derrida points to the irreconcilable binary of interpretation of interpretation “The one seeks to 
decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin . . . . [while] The other . . . . affirms play and tried to 
pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who . . . . has dreamed of 
full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play” (292). Deciphering is a rudimentary 
prerequisite for constructing a decision; hence, deconstruction is a sustained consciousness to pitfalls of 
decision construction and adherence to its lack thereof; specifically, through non-decision-making practices 
in rejecting the justifiability of tenable choice altogether and reinforcing the heterogeneity inherent in 
practices of “play.”  It might be necessary to stress here that Derrida works within the institution of 
philosophical and political realities and that raking incalculable havoc is not part of the deconstructive 
design.  Thus, the political possibilities of deconstruction must not be limited to specie of anarchical 
postmodernism.  I think that Norris is apt in saying, “I would err that we err more grievously by 
assimilating Derrida to a strain of post-modern irrationalism whose effects he has done nothing to endorse” 
(Derrida, 169).  I intent to pursue this limitedly in showing that the textual spaces Suzan-Lori Parks 
manipulates are inherently deconstructive, that is, spaces resistant to homogenous conceptualization.  This 
kind of resistance is akin to deconstructive contestation, which functions within philosophical and dramatic 
tradition, and is, consequently, ethical.  
22 (SSPDHS 279) 
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ubiquitous, yet, absent, represented-as-self-evident totality, which deconstruction 
ultimately attempts to reveal and disquiet.23  Derrida proposes that in determining being 
as presence, that is, in viewing reality as having all of its properties continuously present, 
we, in effect, ascribe phenomena and principles substances that they cannot sustain.24    
Richard Rorty claims that Martin Heidegger is Derrida’s “anxiety of influence.” 
Indeed, there is no assessing the significance of Heidegger’s assault25 on Western 
metaphysics and on presence as such, disclosed in his explication on the temporal 
structures of being, which, in effect, reveal presence as the philosophically privileged 
mode of temporality.  In discussing the privilege of presence, Derrida emphasizes, “From 
Parmenides to Husserl, the privilege of the present has never been put into question.  It 
could not have been.  It is what is self-evident itself, and no thought seems possible 
outside its element.  Nonpresence is always thought in the form of presence...or as a 
                                                 
23 Derrida identifies such totalities, presences, in the imbrication of constructed binaries, marking a 
privilege of the inner, essential as rudiment to metaphysical thinking.  He notes that “All metaphysicians 
from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in this way, conceiving good to be before 
evil, the positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the simple before the complex, the 
essential before the accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just one metaphysical 
gesture among others, it is the metaphysical exigency, that which has been the most constant, most 
profound and most potent” (LI 93). 
24 Dorothea Frede uses the term “substance ontology” in describing a kind of ontology that propounds a 
view in which “what is real is that which underlies properties, what “stands under” (sub-stantia) and 
remains continuously present throughout all change” (“Introduction” in Charles Guignon Ed. The 
Cambridge Companion for Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1993) p. 4. 
25 In discussing “decentering” and rethinking the “structurality of a structure,” really in rethinking presence, 
Derrida squarely attributes the assault on metaphysics to Heidegger in addition to “the Nietzschean critique 
of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of Being and truth, for which were substituted the concepts of 
play, interpretation, and sign (sign without present truth); the Freudian critique of self-presence, that is the 
critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-possession; and more 
radically, the Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, of the determination of Being as 
presence” (“SSPDHS”) p. 280.  And then again in “Differance,” Derrida traces his interrogation of 
presence to Heidegger, “The latter [Heidegger] provokes us to question the essence of the present, the 
presence of the present” (155).  Nonetheless, we must also stress that indebtedness to classical ontology 
does not escape Heidegger, who emphasizes that in “taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to 
destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which 
we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which have guided us ever since . 
. . . we have nothing to do with a vicious relativizing of ontological stand point . . . We must, on the 
contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that traditions . . . .” (Being and Time, Trans. John Macqurrie 
& Edward Robinson, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1962) p. 44.   
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modalization of presence.  The past and the future are always determined as past presents 
or as future present.”26  Echoing Heidegger’s enterprise in attempting the destruktion of 
metaphysics in his own processes of deconstruction, Derrida, indeed, follows by 
concentrating his offensive on presence, even as he alters Heidegger’s ontological project 
in permeating presence as such with structural linguistics’ concept of differentiation.  
Nonetheless, Heidegger initiates the suspicion of “presence” in identifying the impulse 
guiding the whole of Western ontology as theological, renaming it onto-theology.27  
Since the conceptualization of tenably immutable presence, be it an event or a principle, 
is impossible and the discursive meditation on such absent and lacking concepts is, as it 
must be, theological.  Hence, when dealing with metaphysical concepts, absence and not 
presence structures their meaning, their signified, and ultimately their transcendental 
state.  What is more, the site of the absent presence is always already deluged with the 
“over abundance of the signifier.”  Thus, the centrality, or, if you will, the totality of 
presence is putative at best; for it “could not be thought of in the form of a present being, 
that the center had no natural site, that it was not a-fixed locus but a function a sort of 
nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitution came into play” (SSPDHS 278-
80).  The point is, Derrida stresses, that “From the moment that there is meaning there are 
nothing but signs.  We think only in signs” (OG 50, Derrida’s emphasis).  The absent 
presence is the absent reality of fulfilled desire for “full presence,” for “fundamental 
                                                 
26 (“Ousia and Gramme in Margins of Philosophy, Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 
p. 34. 
27 In his introduction to Derrida’s Speech and Phenomenon David B. Allison notes, “Ontology and 
theology are united in their insistence upon a common ground and universal account of being, a first cause 
and a final reason to things. For the tradition of Western metaphysics, this unity has always been asserted 
under the title of absolute and non empirical reality, a transcendent being of principle that would subtend 
the empirical order by virtue of its role as cause and form . . . . Despite the impurity of language and 
communication, the possibility of an ideal and identical meaning has always been absolute referent in the 
form of an ideal content of signification, what Derrida elsewhere calls a “transcendental signified” (SP 
xxxix). 
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immobility and reassuring certitude” (SSPDHS passim).  “Certitude,” “fundamental” 
centrality are components of the discursive impetus through which metaphysical thinking 
hypostatizes within the pathologies of dogmatic thinking; for indeed and as Heidegger 
propounds, as soon as we are self-assured in the homogeneity of our understanding, that 
is, that the phenomenon revealed to us is revealed in its totality [in its total substantive 
presence], concealment occurs.  Worth noting here is the fact that coinciding with the 
adamant conviction that complete “unconcealment” [revealing] of an event occurs, is the 
calcification of thinking, which is, as it must be, dogmatic.28   
It is that self-assuredness, a natural gesture to all dogmatic thinking, that Derrida 
is out to dismantle; the kind of self-assuredness, a resolute adherence to the meaning of 
metaphysical signified, which is always transcendental.  The deconstructive “strategeme” 
is, therefore, to self reflexively call attention to sustained absences philosophy 
promulgates, by “call[ing] play the absence of the transcendental signified as 
limitlessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of onto-theology and the 
metaphysics of presence” (OG 50, Derrida’s emphasis).  Thus, in the deconstructive 
                                                 
28 In explicating the possibilities of thinking, the dialectic of “clearing” and “concealing” is germane to 
Heidegger’s understanding of how a work of art is meaningful for a community in establishing “open 
region . . . . truth” as basis for uncalcified, self-reflexive thinking, significant to deconstructive 
understanding and to our own proposition.  Henceforth, discussing the “clearing” or an “open region” a 
work of art creates for a community, Heidegger explains that “World  and earth [the “world” feature 
propounds cultural mastery in making the work full faceted and consistent; in contrast, the “earth” feature 
resists human mastery and  possibility of coherence in remaining hidden] are always intrinsically and 
essentially in conflict, belligerent by nature. Only as such do they enter the strife of clearing and 
concealing” (“The Origin of Work of Art” in Basic Writings, Ed. David Farrell Krell. Harper San 
Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993) p. 180.  In so thinking, clearing, the movement that assures that 
things are revealed to us “as such and such,” gains a self-reflexive dimensionality in understanding that 
such openness, “truth,” is available to us only when we realize that its hidden totalities remain concealed.  
The upshot is that lack of self-reflexive pathologies, will invariably create a kind of thinking that is self-
assured and dogmatic.  Don DeLillo’s “postmodern” sunsets are such community defining Heideggerian 
events, through which a community gains opening to the possibility of thought and contemplation.  As the 
community gathers to view the sunset, Jack Gladney, DeLillo’s doomed protagonist, tells us, “The sky 
takes on content, feeling, and exalted narrative life . . . . some are scared . . . . some determined to be elated 
but most of us don’t know how to feel, are ready to go either way . . . . the spirit of these warm evenings is 
hard to describe.  There is anticipation in the air . . . . but it is not . . . . with coherent precedents, a history 
of secure response . . . .” (White Noise, New York: Penguin Books, 1985) p. 324. 
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trajectory, “Play is the disruption of presence.  The presence of an element is always a 
signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the 
movement of a chain.  Play is always of absence and presence” (SSPDHS 292).29  It 
might be necessary to add here that the signification that “orders the displacement and 
substitution . . . .,” of a point in time that “has always already exiled, [with] the 
overabundance of the signifier,” is supplemental.  Notably, this signification’s 
“supplementary character, is thus the result of a finitude, that is to say the result of a lack 
which must be supplemented . . . .” a kind of signification, which “vicariously stands in 
for presence due to its primordial self-deficiency” (ibid 280, 290), pervasive to all 
metaphysics.  
If we persist with the ontological sensibilities of my argument in suggesting that 
the undercurrents of textuality are, indeed, temporal and spatial, we can, at the get go, 
discern that Derrida’s idea of the supplemental nature of discourse is indispensable.  For 
indeed the supplement “stands in” place of “presence,” a temporal impossibility; thus, the 
supplement substitutes temporal absence, even as it adds, through written inscription, to a 
topology of perpetually growing signification.  In Of Grammatology, deconstructing 
Rousseau’s assertion that “Languages are made to be spoken, writing serves only as 
supplement to speech,” Derrida explain the double life of “the concept of the supplement 
. . . .,” 
                                                 
29 Semiotically speaking, the notion of play is used in Derrida’s early writings restrictively.  He does not 
mean, as he mentions in Limited Inc, “this notion of ‘free play,’ [which] is an inadequate translation of the 
word jeu, which I used in my first texts, but sparingly and in highly defined manner” (115-16).  Rather, he 
speaks of play in a system of conceptual absences and presences before their opposition occurs.  Per our 
n13, “play” is also related to Nietzsche’s participation in an unbridled process of becoming, different from 
participation in traditional processes of Being.  
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The supplement adds itself, it is surplus, a plenitude enriching another 
plenitude, the fullest measure of presence.  It cumulates and accumulates 
presence.  It is thus that art, technè, image, representation, convention, etc., 
come as supplement to nature . . . . This kind of supplementarity determines 
all conceptual oppositions within which Rousseau inscribes the notion of 
Nature to the extent that it should be self-sufficient.   
           But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace.  It intervenes or 
insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void.  If it 
represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of presence.  
Compensatory [suppléant] and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a 
subaltern instance which takes-(the)-place [tient-lieu].  As substitute, it is 
not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no relief, its 
place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness.      
                                                                                                (144-5)30                                                          
  In discussing presence as such and in understanding the deconstructive 
disenchantment antithetical to it, we must adhere to its philosophical (historical) 
conceptualization as immediate, complete, essential, and, most of all, interior to the 
“exterior addition,”31 of the supplement.  Thus it comes to no surprise that Derrida’s 
vanguard attack on presence per se was initiated through his interrogation of Husserlian 
phenomenology.  Let me note here that when I discuss Derrida’s analysis of origin and 
                                                 
30 To be sure, Derrida here discusses his morphemic, semantic and conspicuously non-phonemic neologism 
différance.  For now, so as to adhere to a certain cohesively and progressively developing argument, I 
choose to refrain from introducing Derrida’s notion of the supplementary impetus.  Let us just take note 
that the movement of différance supplements signs that are already there spatiallyf and that it also 
supplements signs’s temporally deferred primordial absence.  
31 This is a definition of the supplement from “(Robert’s French Dictionary)” (OG 145). 
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repetition, I will touch upon Husserl’s understanding of the retentional and protentional 
elements marking the temporality of the subject and the significance of his understanding 
of the presence of the “living present,” which is a crucial referent in Derrida’s 
deconstruction of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction and, in effect, the deconstructive 
project itself.  For now, however, keeping in mind the spatiotemporal structures the 
supplemental activity of a concept demands and as we persist with our investigation of 
how spatial and temporal rudiments underlie language production in assuring its 
conceptual and empirical textual regeneration, it might be sufficient to mention that when 
discussing sense as an intersubjective phenomenological dynamic, we are indeed dealing 
with the temporality of the subject.  That is, inasmuch as processes of perception are 
temporal—whereby the subject relates to past experiences, even as it anticipates others 
through teleological impulse—attempts to attribute to them a durational temporality, 
which we can identify as “presence” will fail.  What is more, although seen as isolated, 
Husserl’s subject is always conscious of something outside itself, pointing to a persistent 
temporal exigency, propelled, and this is decisive, by signification, which radicalizes 
temporal nondefinition through its spatial, metaphoric and ultimately empirical, 
possibilities.32  Although Derrida sides with Heidegger in viewing Husserl’s 
                                                 
32 Discussing Husserl’s “absolute subjectivity,” Derrida contends that such impenetrable conception of the 
subject falters as soon as “we conceive presence on the basis of difference and not the reverse” (SP, 84n9); 
that is, if in constituting a concept of a subject we first, as we must, partake in language’s structure of 
differences, any conception of the subject as presence must be questioned.  As we shall see, Derrida 
persists in following Husserl’s view in showing that subjectivity can be strictly understood through 
intersubjective analysis of the subject’s intrinsic temporal differential to a temporality other than its own.  
Hence, I am hoping to set the stage here in showing the process through which the self affecting nature of 
the subject’s differentiated temporality becomes the engendering, repeating nexus from which subjectivity 
springs forth as the ultimate effect of signification.  Derrida’s différance and its repeating trace are the 
inextricable, quasi-transcendental impulses on which I will be focusing in attempting to discuss the 
simultaneous association of time, space and signs.  If only perfunctorily, let me add here that Husserlian 
understanding of historicity also functions on the basis of sense as fundamentally temporal.  Husserlian 
historicity is understood as emerging from the teleological dictates of “origin and traditions of ideal objects 
[as] process of handing down and the endurance of this process, a heritage, [which] guarantee ‘the 
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transcendental ego as, yet, another form of subjective idealism, Derrida departs from 
them both by imbuing the temporality of the subject with signs.  Hence, when 
propounding, even as he analyzes “originary” absences, Derrida spatially, or, if you will, 
textually subsumes them with signs that comment on their conceptually absent content.  
The upshot is that the empirical, phenomenological appearance of the text dramatizes its 
textually supplemental nature, performing as the orphaned offspring of its own floating, 
absent lexicological values.33  Moreover, through concentrated self-reflexive economy, 
deconstruction adopts Heidegger’s “as”34 structure in explaining the metaphysical 
impulse; yet, deconstruction differs by actively calling attention to its suspicion of the 
tools of its own trade—language.  The effect is massively important because it forces any 
analysis of philosophical aporetics to consider the problematic of the referential and 
differential nature of language, even as the said analysis must considers the ontic and 
                                                                                                                                                 
possibility of historicity, i.e., the always intersubjective consciousness of history’ . . . . In other words, 
historicity is always a sense-history.  It operates on the level of sense and is related to the problems of 
language, ideality, truth and humankind in its Living Present—the source of all sense and history” (Preface 
to Edmund Husserl’s the Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (Origin hereafter), Trans. John P. Leavey 
JR. New York: Nicolas Hays, Ltd., 1978) pp. 10-11.  The key word is “Living Present,” Husserl’s term for 
enduring, intersubjective self-presence, immersed in structures of handed down, determining heritage that 
is always already processed intersubjectively, or if you will, temporally.  The emphasis is on the 
spatiotemporal movement underlying thinking, that is, the sustained, spatial gap between thinker and 
thought, the object of its thinking.  Historicity, therefore, must involve the consciousness of the subject to 
something outside itself, processed, according to Husserl, within the subject, yet, determined by processes 
outside the subject.  When relating Parks’s work to the concept of historicity, I will discuss historicity once 
more and will present Heidegger’s understanding of it.  For now, however, we must adhere to an 
understanding that when we consider thought and language, we must be aware of primordial lingual, 
referential, differential performative parameters within the onto-phenomenological scheme of things.    
33 In “The Supplement of the Copula,” while arguing that Nietzsche’s attack on language as arbitrary and 
supplemental still leaves him entrapped in metaphysics such as “the arbitrariness of the sign in order to 
posit the contingent and superficial exteriority of language to thought, the secondariness of the sign in 
relation to the idea,” Derrida also calls our attention to the textual exigency of Nietzsche’s text.  He 
stresses: “At any given moment, then, Nietzsche has to appeal to philosophical schemes, (for example, the 
arbitrariness of the sign, or the emancipation of thought as concerns a language), in his critical operation 
against metaphysics.  This is not an incoherence for which a logical solution is to be sought, but a textual 
strategy and stratification that must be analyzed in practice” (Margins of Philosophy, Trans. Alan Bass. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) pp. 178-9.  For Nietzsche’s ground breaking piece “On Truth 
and Lying in the Extra Moral Sense,” look in Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, Eds. Sander 
Gilman, Carole Blair, David Parent.  New York: Oxford UP, 1989, 246-57.  
34 “As” for Heidegger is the prerequisite construct for all extrapolation, which, so he argues, is ultimately 
metaphysical.   
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ontological elements of its own discourse, facing, as it must, an insurmountable, 
irreconcilable abyss between its signs and their supplemented semantics therein.  If it can 
viably exist, the emerging deconstructive paradigm is that metaphysical language is 
supplemental and that its supplementarity always already occurs in a temporality that is 
never recoverable, or, if you will, irreducible.  Radically, therefore, an aporia such as 
subjective transcendence (presence) is irreducible to its elemental state.   
Markedly, like the metaphysical structures that Derrida attempts to agitate, the 
concept of the supplement,35 inasmuch as it impels conceptual oppositions, is quasi 
transcendental and is, therefore, aporetic.  However, unlike the presences metaphysicians 
from Plato to Husserl and beyond have been promulgating, Derrida calls attention to the 
temporal impossibility of his deconstructive concepts,36 and in so doing, sustains an 
opening in “show[ing] the interiority of exteriority,37 which amounts to annulling the 
ethical qualification and to thinking of writing beyond good and evil” (OG 314).38  In 
                                                 
35 Representing metaphysical discourse as supplemental does not in any way foil the genesis of the 
supplement par exellance—differance, of which discussion is forthcoming.   
36 Discussing Rousseau’s understanding of language—speech as its “natural” authentic component, writing 
as supplemental and as “changing the spirit of language”—Derrida explains his understanding of the 
supplement, “It is the strange essence of the supplement not to have essentiality: it may always not have 
taken place.  Moreover, literally, it has never taken place: it is never present, here and now.  If it were, it 
would not be what it is, a supplement, taking and keeping the place of the other . . . . Less than nothing and 
yet, to judge by its effects, much more than nothing.  The supplement is neither a presence nor an absence.  
No Ontology can think its operation” (OG 314).  To be sure, Derrida discusses a formidable void, which, as 
we shall persistently see, is the primordial spatiotemporal movement marking his and Husserl’s 
understanding of ideality as such. 
37 Again, the inside/outside binary is a pervasive metaphor in the deconstructive interrogation of Western 
metaphysics.  Dichotomized concepts in their essential, interior purity, on the one hand, their inessential 
exteriority on the other are deconstructed in showing that definition of the privileged concept inextricably 
hinges upon its marginalized other, simultaneously making the latter just as crucial, disquieting, finally, 
their juridical status and, hence, causing the collapse of classificatory hierarchies.  
38 Thus, in interiorizing the metaphysical perennial margin (the outside), that is, in creating conceptual 
outside’s own spatial inward distance, in effect, essentializing it, Derrida displaces the hierarchical 
dichotomy of the traditional binary, reinventing a space resistant to the concept of stagnating thinking—
presence.  Hence, considerations of ethics away from a value laden hierarchy, readjusts, reassesses the 
whole of the project of ethics.  Derrida’s choice of words, “beyond good and evil,” is not accidental.  In my 
view, Derrida purposely echoes Nietzsche here in affirming the a-traditional practice of textual exuberance, 
as that which ultimately results in agitating given, metaphysical thinking.  The question is of the textual as 
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comparison, the totalities put forth through conceptually hierarchical binaries such as 
intelligible/phenomenal, nature/culture, essential/accidental to name just a few, 
impossibly hold a conceptually enduring, immutable temporality in the present.  
Henceforth, metaphysical signification substitutes essential temporal improbabilities of 
the lexicological tenets it carries, promulgating them as self evident.  For indeed, 
metaphysics is always “metaphysics of presence,” that is, metaphysics of topological and 
sequential absences, represented through textual, “general language” and phenomenal, 
written, supplementarity, which precariously stands in for their temporally indeterminate 
origin.  
 
Origin, Repetition, and Spatiotemporal Sign/Life of the Trace 
 Here we continue to delineate the deconstructive trajectory in revealing temporal 
and spatial pathologies as they manifest through textual dramatics—all aiding in 
revealing a conceptual and phenomenal edifice within which deconstruction interrogates 
the temporal economies underscoring Western metaphysics, or, if you will, the privilege 
of presence in conceptual philosophical aporetics.  Derrida staunchly connects western 
writing to a temporal impulse by arguing that its inherent phenomenal linearity is 
accommodated by an understanding that a word such as “history [for example] has no 
doubt always been associated with a linear scheme of the unfolding of presence, where 
the line relates the final presence to the original presence . . . .”  To be sure, in relating 
                                                                                                                                                 
evidencing the supplemental nature of philosophical discourse: “No matter how much philosophy may try 
to suppress its textuality, in other words, it can never avoid being ‘a kind of writing’ (as argued famously 
by Richard Rorty)” (Niall Lucy, A Derrida Dictionary.  Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004) p. 85. 
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“final presence to original presence,” the phenomenon of language’s textual linearity 
relates to its lexicological content as they both partake in a specific temporal design:  
If one allows that the linearity of language entails this vulgar and mundane 
concept of temporality (homogeneous, dominated by the form of the now 
and the ideal of continuous movement, straight or circular) which 
Heidegger shows to be the intrinsic determining concept of all ontology 
from Aristotle to Hegel, the meditation upon writing and the 
deconstruction of the history of philosophy become inseparable.  
                                                                                              (OG 85-6)  
Following Derrida’s ‘meditation upon writing,’ our sensibilities must persist in 
investigating signification as a fundamental ontological structure, that is, in its temporal 
and spatial underpinnings as it reveals the instabilities of presence as a deconstructive 
absence, or, better yet, an absence as the genesis of a conceptual site of uninterrupted 
substitution of ‘the original presence.’  In effect, the problematic of the absent origin is at 
the heart of deconstruction and for that matter at the heart of all of philosophy;39 
                                                 
 
39 Derrida proves that phenomenology bases its philosophical exigency, in effect, its philosophical 
livelihood on “an irreducible nonpresence as having a constituting value, and with it a nonlife, a 
nonpresence or nonself-belonging of the living present, an ineradicable nonprimordiality” (SP 6-7).  This 
is, as we shall continue and see, the pervasive proto-absence at the spatiotemporal defining locum of sense.  
Hence, at the outset in Speech and Phenomena, Derrida sets the stage for the deconstructive critical core, if 
indeed we can term it as such, claiming that not only is reducibility of a phenomenon to its origin 
unavailable for the busi-ness of phenomenology, the origin’s non-origin, its non-primordial reality, is 
irreducible to its former likeness, even as it defines it.  Yet, stresses Derrida, this is exactly the lifeline of 
the phenomenological enterprise, its inability to obtain the reduction it seeks first of, repeatedly and 
concurrently failing and birthing its teleological impulse: “Teleology is the threatened unity of sense and 
being, of philosophy and ontology.  However, this teleology, which never ceased to ground and animate 
Husserl’s thought, cannot be determined in a philosophical language without provisionally breaking this 
unity for the benefit of phenomenology” (Origin 151).  When discussing the intricacies of origin in line 
with Derrida’s discourse of the trace, I will clarify the significance of the so called “non-origin” to the 
deconstructive critique of phenomenological reduction.  For now, we may keep in mind that difference and 
deferral are the predetermining, quasi transcendental movements underscoring the definition of origin 
(nonpresence) through its non-origin (nonself), even as they are both absent and simultaneously make 
reducibility of a phenomenon to its presence improbable.  
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however, deconstruction’s emphasis is on relating ‘originary’ absences to signification 
and its underlying spatiotemporal structures to economies of metaphysical thinking.  
In discussing structures of a phenomenon’s origin—as the ultimate specie of 
immutable, durational “pure” presence—we must consider several key elements in 
Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological investigation and how, in turn, these 
propel deconstructive interrogation, even as the latter fails to purify its own discourse 
from the intrinsic transcendence it uncovers in the former.40  For that, we must discuss 
the trace—its primordial kinship to origin, the intriguing enigma of its perpetual 
repetition, its inherently spatiotemporal relation to signification, and, finally, its 
simultaneous precipitating influence and emergence in the discourse of metaphysics in 
the form of idealization—all elements, as I shall attempt to illustrate, thematize Suzan-
Lori Parks’s drama. 
 
Origin and the Idea in the Kantian Sense 
 To understand the way deconstruction, the system of the trace really, functions, 
we must understand Derrida’s de-eliding of the Husserlian quest to reveal the origin of a 
                                                 
40 As we progress in understanding the deconstructive project, I believe that we shall have very little doubt 
as to deconstruction’s quasi transcendental tendencies, particularly when taking into account the enigmatic 
reemergence of Derrida’s différance.  Just the same, when considering the teleological projects of both 
phenomenology and deconstruction, dissimilaritude prevails.  The reference here is to deconstruction’s 
self-referential practices.  Hence, it comes to no surprise when in “Ousia and Gramme” Derrida 
categorically states that “To criticize the manipulation of determination of these [metaphysical] concepts 
from within the system always amounts, and let this expression be taken with its full charge of meaning 
here, to going around in circles: to reconstituting, according to another configuration, the same system” 
(MP 60, Derrida’s emphasis).  Thus, at the outset, Derrida warns us that we will end up doing metaphysics; 
yet, the difference is in deconstruction’s persistent self-reflexivity in admitting that a viable teleological 
variant for its own enterprise is unlikely.   
For purposes of our proposition, the self-referential impulse is neither foreign to Parks nor to the ultimate 
interrogatory concept of all theatrical performances—the dichotomy of reality and representation.  That is, 
it might be helpful to mention that when relating the self-referential impulse of deconstruction to Parks, we 
must also meditate upon theater as a persistent state within which performances, in a meta-theatrical 
impetus, comment on their state self-referentially in treading upon the cusp of representation and its 
irreconcilable, yet, inseparable relation to reality.   
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phenomenon.41  In so doing, we must unfailingly adhere to the defining onto—
spatiotemporal—logical sediments that assure the regeneration of metaphysical and 
deconstructive discourses both.  We are yet again dealing with the mammoth-like notion 
of presence—its purity, and above all its primordial viability, that is, its source, or, if you 
will, its “origin.”  The idea of origin, we must also keep in mind, and as we have already 
made clear, births the impetus through which the philosophical conception of temporality 
is invariably connected to the concept of presence as continuous and unchanging.  The 
spatial addition to the nonoriginary origin of the temporal schemata is gained through 
both metaphoricity and empirical materiality of signifiers, functioning in the world, 
outside the purity of intersubjective temporality, as the actuality that births the possibility 
of all ideal purities whatsoever.    
In Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, Derrida calls attention to the 
fact that although geometry is created in an empirical event, its “proto-constitution,” the 
                                                 
41 Even as full conception of origin as such remains a phenomenological unknown in conditioning, as we 
shall see, phenomenology’s teleological project, I believe that Argyros is accurate in observing that it was 
through phenomenology that Derrida “first conceived the project of criticizing the whole of Western 
philosophy as the systematic repression of a certain kind of irrationality which, far from being accidental 
and therefore excisable, is the very condition of possibility for thought” (64).  Calling attention to 
weaknesses in Husserl’s phenomenological project is by no means an attempt to deem phenomenology or 
for that matter “all of philosophy” irrelevant.   On the contrary, “the respect for the great texts. . . .” says 
Derrida, “is the condition of [my] work. . . . the way I tried to read Plato, Aristotle and others is not a way 
of commanding, repeating or conserving the heritage. . . . [rather] it is an analysis which tries to find out . . . 
. the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity within their own corpus” (“Villanova Roundtable,” in 
John D. Caputo ed., Deconstruction in a Nutshell: a Conversation with Jacques Derrida.  New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1997) p. 9.  What is more, throughout Speech and Phenomenon, Derrida once 
and again expresses his veneration for Husserl’s, “tormented . . . . contested from within by its own 
description of the movement of temporalization,” phenomenology (6).  Since Derrida’s own deconstruction 
is heavily indebted to Husserlian “tormented temporalization,” Derrida’s admiration should not surprise us.   
Parks’s reverence to philosophical and literary heritage is just as distinct.  Commenting on the topic of 
American theater, she conspicuously and auspiciously echoes T. S. Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent,” in saying that “we should embrace the Great Tradition warmly and thoroughly reading . . . . 
Aristotle . . . . immersing ourselves in Shakespeare . . . . [while caring for] the Tradition of the Next New 
thing . . . . Each tradition always has the sound of the others within its earshot, the color of the other’s 
within its light, the smell of the others within its own intoxicating scent . . . . [Yet, Parks emphasizes] . . . . a 
great piece of writing is a revolutionary act” (“Tradition And The Individual Talent” Theater 29.2, 1999) 
pp. 26-7, 31.  
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history of its creation, is concealed to phenomenology; in fact, Husserl invites us to re-
historicize geometry’s constitutionality through phenomenological retrospection.  Hence, 
it is significant to note that Derrida’s critique in the Origin is of the viability of 
uncovering the constitutionality of an origin such as that of a familiar empirical gesture as 
geometry.  The difficulty is rooted in any attempt to connect imperceptible origin to its 
emergence as an ideal.  As it touches our argument, Derrida is out to complicate the idea 
of “the production of geometrical exactitude by idealization” (106).42  Yet, he must, as 
must I, take a short detour through Husserl’s explication on the line between non-
geometry and geometry; that is, what are the transformational processes that instituted 
geometrical reality in the first place?  If, as Husserl claims, geometry occurs through 
“pure thought” and “a passage to the limit (my emphasis)” how, Derrida asks, are we to 
understand a passage to the limit as both simultaneously creating geometry and 
distinguishing it as such?  As we shall see, “passage to the limit” is paradoxically a-
temporal dynamic, which finds its “origin” in conception of infinitude—the mother of all 
temporal definition.  As we shall also see, the Husserlian “passage to the limit” is at the 
heart of phenomenological ambiguity, a metaphysical shrug resolved, at best, through the 
language of the ideal; that is, the language that is said to perpetuate matrices of origin-al 
purity,  even as its own status as belonging to categories of the ideal is questioned.  
Complicating geometry’s status as pure ideality in discussing geometry’s “exact ideality 
[which] has been produced without the essential aid of sensibility or imagination [and 
                                                 
42 It might be worth remarking here that when we discuss the concept of phenomenological ideality, we are 
indeed in step with our investigation of temporal and spatial rudiments marking both deconstruction and 
phenomenology’s discourses.  In fact, we need realize that in discussing the problematization of origin-al 
economies in concepts such as history and identity in the plays of Suzan-Lori Parks, we are in effect 
dealing with structures of discursive idealization, which, as we shall see, are propagated through the 
repeating impetus of the deconstructive trace in the temporal and spatial flux of différance.   
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which] broke away by a leap from every descriptive mooring, [Derrida remarks:] It is 
‘pure thinking’ [the first philosophical thought] that is responsible for the leaping 
advance of idealization and for geometrical truth as such . . . . [nonetheless] In its most 
concrete [my emphasis] determinations, the operation is always presented as a ‘passage 
to the limit’ [which] . . . . hides the idealizing act from a genealogical description” 
(Origin  133-34).  Thus, in evidencing the becoming of geometrical presence, the 
impeding irreconcilability mounts through the absence of intuitable sensibility of the leap 
and the passage, resulting in lacking integrity of its “genealogical description,” 
culminating in phenomenological paralysis. 
Hence, concerning the origin-al world and according to what in Husserl’s view is 
“apodictic,”43 Derrida observes “That [my emphasis] this pregeometrical world is a world 
of things disposed of according to anexact44 space and time . . . . That these things must 
have been ‘corporeal’ . . . . but since culture already had to have left its mark on the 
world (because language and intersubjectivity must have preceded geometry [Derrida’s 
emphasis]), corporality does not exhaustively overlap thinghood . . . . space and time . . . . 
That material qualities . . . . must be necessarily ‘related’ to the pregeometrical 
spatiotemporal shapes by a supplementary eidetic determination” (Origin 122-3).  
Derrida methodologically undermines Husserl’s conception of transcendent, ideal (pure) 
                                                 
43 For Husserl, when assuring the reality of a phenomenon, apodictic evidence is a specie of evidence that 
manifests through a phenomenon’s complete, substantive presence, showing of itself to consciousness.  In 
this context, Derrida details things in the protogeometer’s (the first geometer’s) world, which, according to 
Husserl, are beyond question.  In fact, we might recount three phenomenological orientations: apodictic, 
certainty registered in the experience of the subject; the second phenomenological orientation, which 
concentrate on discovering essences through eidetic abstraction, and the third level of phenomenological 
orientation  in which things move toward transcendental phenomenology, culminating in bracketing 
problems of origin and in the connection of the ego’s consciousness through  intentionality to 
constitutionality of a phenomenon.  
44 As I understand it, the semantic value of “anexact” is unlike that of inexact.  The former suggests, I 
believe, an intuitive rather then scientific inexactitude. 
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mathematical objects45 in showing that the thing’s “thinghood,” its objective reality, is 
contingent on element outside its purity.  And so, in claiming that “the protogeometer 
always already had at his disposal anexact spatiotemporal shapes and essentially ‘vague’ 
morphological types46, which can always give rise to a pregeometrical  descriptive 
science” (123, Derrida’s emphasis), Derrida reveals the constitutionality of geometry as a 
discourse about geometry and argues that as such it should be called “geography” 
instead.47  Appropriately, the suggested word-play here is on spatial/lingual inscription 
                                                 
45 We can, I believe, accepts Leonard Lawlor’s assertion that “Husserl’s privilege of the mathematical 
object is the source of Derrida’s concept of presence, being as presence, as it appears in Speech and 
Phenomena: ob-ject that is close by or in front of a regard (a Vor-stellung)” (Derrida and Husserl: The 
Basic Problem of Phenomenology, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002) p. 105.  For our 
explication on the problematic of origin, I see Derrida’s The Origin as specifically isolating the conceptual 
purity of presence through its objective ideality par excellence—geometry.   Furthermore, we must follow 
Derrida, who points to possible weaknesses in Husserl’s view of “objective idealities” as isolated from all 
subjective, psychologistic empirical intervention.  Hence, according to Husserl, the differences are between 
“ideal objectivity and real object . . . . The objectivities of the understanding are on ‘higher level’ than those 
of receptivity . . . . the real object has its individual place in the objective time of the world, the irreal object 
is, with respect to the other, totally free, i.e., ‘timeless’” (Origin 71).   We mention here the core of 
Husserl’s transcendental philosophy, which is, in effect, phenomenology and its modes of idealization.  In 
scrutinizing phenomenological transcendental design, Derrida is out to show the impossibility of sustaining 
feasible divisibility between Husserl’s transcendental and psychologistic view of the subject and its 
“understanding/receptivity” of objectivity.  Moreover and as it specifically pertains to our proposition, 
Derrida shows that although Husserl discounts language as having objectively ideal pathologies, any 
understanding/constitutionality of objective ideality comes to its possibility through language first of all.  
We might also note, as does Derrida, that “This ideality of the object, of the mathematical thing itself, is not 
the non-reality of the noema [which] characterizes the type of intentional inclusion of every noema in 
conscious lived experience [of both ideal and empirical intended existence].” Derrida goes as far as to 
suggest “that this non-reality of the noema may be what permits the repetition of the sense as the ‘same’ 
and makes the idealization of identity possible” (Origin  66-7, Derrida’s emphasis).  Our intention in 
mentioning the Husserlian noema here is in stressing that it is unlike the “non-reality” of the absent 
constitutionality of ideal objects, an absent constitutionality of which explication is forth coming.    
46 The semantic measure of  the expression “‘vague’ morphological types” itself suggests viable 
ambiguities in the discourse of the pre-geometrical world whereby “Every morphological, i.e., 
pregeometrical, determination works according to the qualitative gradations of sensible intuition: more or 
less smooth surface, sides, lines, or more or less rough angles [all, Derrida argues, emanating from 
Husserl’s “somewhat enigmatic” remark that] before exactitude emerges, ‘proceeding from the factual, an 
essential form becomes recognizable through a method of variation.’ [Derrida then connects the term 
‘variation,’ as mentioned in Origin of Geometry, to its appearance in contexts of other Husserlian works, 
arguing that] By imaginary variation we can obtain inexact but pure morphological types: ‘roundness,’ for 
example, under which is constructed the geometrical ideality of the circle” (Origin 123-24, Derrida’s 
emphasis).  Derrida persistently attempts to relate ideas of “purity” to “‘vague’”-ness as manifested through 
all morphological possibilities, which, as we shall see, is the underlying impulse of the language of ideality, 
or if you will, the language of metaphysics.  
47 Derrida is emphatic about the “geographical” designation here in saying that this analysis is particular to 
the “origin of what precedes and conditions geometry, it is not to be confused with the origin of geometry 
 34
reinvested in the compounded term, geo-grapheme.  The ready to hand cultural field 
within which “the philosopher”48 performs “the passage to the limit” is accessible to 
phenomenological conception only through “the thought of infinity as an Idea in the 
Kantian sense” (SP 101).49  For now, as we progress in our attempts to discuss the 
temporal and spatial rudiments underlying deconstruction consciousness and how, in 
turn, these, aid in destabilizing the metaphysical structures deconstruction interrogates, 
several questions must be considered: what is “passage to the limit”?  Moreover, what 
makes the protogeometer “leap” from non-geometry to geometry?50 And most 
significantly (as it concerns our proposition), what makes that non-phenomenal passage, 
                                                                                                                                                 
itself and all of its related possibilities; it only authorizes what we earlier called a ‘geography’” (Origin, 
125).  Earlier in Origin Derrida preemptively leads us to the origin of his suspicion, which is not geometry 
per se but the discourse of its ideality: “No doubt geometrical truth is beyond every particular and factual 
linguistic hold as such, one for which every subject speaking a determined language and belonging to a 
determined cultural community is in fact responsible.  But the objectivity of this truth could not be 
constituted without the pure possibility of an inquiry into a pure language in general” (76-7, Derrida’s 
emphasis).  Hence, insofar that we are dealing with objective ideality (the possibilities of objective truth), 
we must contend, Derrida argues, with the possibilities of the ideality of language as such.  Although 
Husserl views language as absolutely necessary for the indiscernibly transformational passage to the limit 
to occur, he rejects language as having objective possibilities and views its ideality as limited to its 
anticipated repeating behavior, identifying it as “morphological ideality.” The conceptuality of language as 
viably infinitely repeating is crucial to the Derridean trace and, thus, to our proposition—the repetition of 
the trace, “strangely” manifesting through its signifying dramatics, which are promulgated through its  
inherent spatial and temporal lack.    
48 According to Husserl, the protogeometer is “the philosopher who did not yet know geometry but who 
should be conceivable as its inventor” in response to which Derrida remarks that “Thus the institution of 
geometry could only be a philosophical act [as Husserl relates it to and much in step with] “‘Platonizing 
geometry’ . . . . ‘the school of Plato’ . . . . ‘Platonic idealism’” (Origin 127).   That Derrida calls our 
attention to semblance of Husserlian idealization to Platonic eidos (ideal forms) is not surprising; to be 
sure, such transcendence is the defining impulse guiding philosophy’s conception of being as presence, 
which is the absent core defining phenomenology and as such, both Heidegger and Derrida note, 
phenomenology is the only possible philosophy.     
49 Derrida brings Husserl’s own words, from Ideas I §143, p. 366, in pointing out that by Husserl’s own 
admittance, reconcilability of consciousness’s conceptual finitude and any account of objective ideality 
must take a detour through the Idea in the Kantian sense: “Although the transcendent thing belonging to 
Nature cannot be given ‘with complete determinacy and with similarly complete intuitability in any limited 
finite consciousness,’ ‘as Idea (in the Kantian sense), [its] complete giveness is . . . . prescribed . . . . 
(Origin 139).  And still from Ideas as quoted by Derrida, Husserl discusses differences between exact and 
descriptive concepts in arguing that “‘Exact concepts have their correlates in essences, which have the 
character of ‘Ideas’ in the Kantian sense’” (Origin 134, Husserl’s emphasis) 
50 In the Origin, Derrida quotes Husserl as asking: “‘how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all 
sciences) proceeds from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a formation produced within the 
conscious space of the first inventor’s soul, to its ideal Objectivity?’” (76). 
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the seeming genesis of the movement of idealization, affect, through spatiotemporal 
structures, the metaphoric hypostatization of the Derridean trace?  For possible answers, 
we must discuss, even as we attempt to elucidate, Derrida’s suggestion that Husserl’s 
phenomenological project finds its definition and its conceptually teleological completion 
through its fundamental connection to the Idea in the Kantian sense.  
First, of importance is Derrida’s contrast between Kantian intuitive and 
Husserlian constitutive understandings51 of “ideal objects of mathematics,” the paradigm 
for all ideal objectivity, stating that, “Undoubtedly, Husserl’s production (Leistung) also 
involves a stratum of receptive intuition.  But what matters here is that this Husserlian 
intuition, as it concerns the ideal objects of mathematics, is absolutely constitutive and 
creative: the objects or objectivities that it intends did not exist before it; and this 
“before” [Derrida’s emphasis] of the ideal objectivity marks more than the chronological 
eve of a fact: it marks a transcendental prehistory” (Origin 40).52  At the outset, it is the 
                                                 
51 Necessary clarification here, even when discussing deconstructive thinking, no matter if at issue is a 
philosophical constitutive or intuitive conceptuality of reality, it all functions within the framework of 
Logos, an understanding of universally initiating and self-initiating reason.  For Derrida, as Lawlor notes, it 
is “sense” which without “existence would be without order; it would be merely chaos, merely wild” 
(Derrida and Husserl  27).   We must stress that the deconstructive attack is on logos inasmuch as 
traditional metaphysicians, language positivists, view language as evidencing the preeminence of logic, 
failing, henceforth, to question the legitimacy of any epistemology that avoids considering the complicated 
relation of logic and language.  For indeed, “how can we justify the decision which subordinates a 
reflection on the sign to logic? What gives a theory of knowledge that authority to determine the essence 
and origin of language” (SP 7)?  
52 What is at issue, are objective/subjective epistemological perceptual antitheses.  That is, do we discover 
what is already there or do we, at every turn, constitute it?  Better yet, if we constitute it how can we 
account for our conscious participation in it?  Cormac McCarthy’s cosmic figure, “the judge,” reveals the 
aporia: “The universe is no narrow thing and the order within it is not constrained by any latitude in its 
conception to repeat what exists in one part in any other part.  Even in this world more things exist without 
our knowledge than within and the order in creation which you see is that which you have put there, like a 
string in a maze, so that you shall not lose your way.  For existence has its own order and that no man’s 
mind can compass, that mind itself being but a fact among others” (Blood Meridian or The Evening 
Redness in the West.  New York: Vintage International, 1985) p. 245.  The intricate connection between 
determinate, objective universe and openings for subjective teleology is the crux of Heidegger’s concept of 
Ereignes.  For our immediate concern, however, we must emphasize that the phenomenological shift is 
constitutive.  In examining Derrida’s “interpretative itinerary” in the Origin, Argyros is correct in 
observing that “Husserl rejected totally the possibility that geometry descended ready-made from a τότίος 
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non-phenomenal state of “transcendental prehistory” that Derrida attempts to complicate, 
showing, in effect, that an absent is the impulse through which the phenomenal project 
becomes manifest.53  Yet, as Derrida argues in Origin, absent “pre-history” culminates, as 
already mentioned, in concrete, substantive empirical event such as geometry; whereby 
an account of its constitutionality and possibility reveals itself as “idealization, which has 
for its correlate an infinite Idea, [and which] always decisively intervenes in the difficult 
moments of Husserl’s description.  The phenomenological status of its evidence remains 
rather mysterious” (106).  It is this “idealization,” the language describing the mystery of 
the transcendental “prehistory” and possibility of geometry that is shown by Derrida to be 
sanctioned by the Idea in the Kantian sense.54  Thus, our questions, as to what validates 
Husserl’s claim that “pure thought” or “passage to the limit” produced geometry, will 
                                                                                                                                                 
ούράνιος, that it did not share, with the rest of the transcendental world, constitution by the transcendental 
ego.  That this original constitution maybe shielded from our eyes because of the rampant growth of 
science and philosophy, which forgetting their origins, build conclusion upon unfounded conclusion, that is 
what Husserl called the crisis of European thought.  For Husserl, only phenomenology could purge science 
and philosophy, and by restoring them to their proper course, check their headless proliferation.  Only 
phenomenology is capable of descending the layers of sense deposited by science, of which geometry is 
paradigmatic, and by illuminating its origins, of relocating its telos” (62-63).  In the Origin, Derrida shows 
that such phenomenological de-sedimentation of “European” thinking falls prey to the same ambiguous 
sedimentation of western thinking.  For indeed, constitutionality of geometry is always relegated to the 
cryptic “passage to the limit,” while, at the same time, phenomenology’s teleological impulse is 
complicated by the viability of its completion, which will ultimately prove to have a terminable affect on 
the phenomenological project.  
53 As it concerns deconstruction and its defining absences, we must stress here that deconstruction 
“simulates” Husserl’s crucial understanding of “the movement of temporalization and of the constitution of 
intersubjectivity [the core of which is] irreducible nonpresence as having a constitutive value” (SP 6).  In 
his introduction and at the outset, Derrida is clear as to the definitive, constitutive task absences are 
designated in creating intersubjective temporal purities for Husserl and essential differences that are 
problematically pure for Derrida.  Already in Origin Husserlian intersubjective temporality as the presence 
of the “living present” is pervasive in understanding the ideality of the transcendental subject.  Temporality 
looms grand, unavoidable, and formidable.  We follow the development of the Idea in showing the 
juridical, formative economies its absent temporality carries.   
54 Derrida is very clear about the Kantian Idea’s influence on Husserl’s teleological design: “What this 
idealization of anticipation at once authorizes and prescribes is the presence for consciousness of an Idea in 
the Kantian sense” (Origin 134, Derrida’s emphasis).  We might need to add a cursory note here that 
although Derrida views sustained Kantian structural antinomies such as immanence (intuition) and 
transcendence as irreconcilably aporetic, both Derrida’s own disturbances of ‘presence’ and Kant’s notion 
of the inaccessibility to the noumena (the thing in and of itself) seem to suggest that a complete 
epistemological elucidation as to the nature of reality is unlikely, arguing, in effect, that the supplemental 
nature of perception and thinking make it so.   
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arrive at a “mysterious” impasse, commencing through Husserl’s association of “passage 
to the limit” with the Kantian Idea.  What is more, and this is a decisive point for Derrida, 
the language propagating “the content of the idea,” that is, the possibility of geometry, is, 
as it must be, specie of ideality in the first place.  Therefore, the pure, non-contingent 
mathematical ideality, “paradigmatic” to the objectivity of geometry, is always already 
contingent on repeating pathologies specific to language of the ideal, which is, as we 
shall see, the point of departure for the Derridean trace.  
As we discuss the language of the ideal, we must understand the impact of the 
Idea in the Kantian sense on phenomenology and, most importantly, on our 
understanding of the deconstructive trace.  Certainly, at stake is a concept of the infinite 
as a teleological gesture in assuring the completion and viable repetition within the 
boundaries of the subject’s conceptuality of the finite in, finally, underlying the temporal 
mooring of the subject’s experiences.  Discussing the Idea in the Origin, Derrida 
observes: “. . . . for Husserl, as we know . . . . finitude can appear precisely in its 
primordiality only given the Idea of an infinite history” (105-6, Derrida’s emphasis).  
However, Derrida contends, “Husserl never made the Idea itself the theme of a 
phenomenological description.  He never defined its type of evidence within 
phenomenology, whose “principle of all principles” and the archetypal form of evidence 
is the immediate presence of the thing itself ‘in person’ . . . . the finite thing.  
Phenomenology would thus be stretched between the finitizing consciousness of its 
principle and the infinitizing consciousness of its final institution, the endstiftung 
indefinitely deferred [différée] in its content but always evident in its regulative value. . . . 
But this evidence of the Idea as regulative possibility is absolutely exceptional in 
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phenomenology . . . . nothing appears in a specific evidence.  What does appear is only 
the regulative possibility of appearing and the finite certainty of infinite 
phenomenological determinability, i.e., a certainty without corresponding evidence” 
(137, 138, 139, Derrida’s emphasis).  The Idea’s “regulative”55 impetus is essential to the 
completion of any phenomenological shrug; however, the Kantian Idea is persistently, 
though enigmatically un-evidenceable, a state contributing to and, paradoxically, 
obviating any possible complete phenomenological reduction.  
In “‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology,” Derrida pronouncedly delimits 
phenomenology’s inherently paradoxical indissoluble finite/infinite dialectic in 
demarcating the Kantian, programmatic, yet, imperceptible Idea as the absent core of 
Husserlian phenomenology, which without, the phenomenological language, the 
supplemental language of the Idea, ultimately, the language of idealization, will cease to 
exist:   
It is the infinite opening of what is experienced, which is designated at 
several moments of Husserlian analysis by reference to an Idea in the 
Kantian sense, that is the irruption of the infinite into consciousness, 
which permits the unification of the temporal flux of consciousness just as 
it unifies the object and the world by anticipation, and despite an 
irreducible incompleteness.  It is the strange presence of this Idea which 
also permits every transition to the limit and the production of all 
exactitude. 
                                                                                                   (WD 162)  
                                                 
55 As to the “regulative,” principle, juridical, or, its Derridean coinage, de-jure structure of phenomenology, 
the inside/outside binary suffuses Husserl’s analysis in “this separation between de facto and de jure, 
existence and essence, reality and intentional function . . . . which defines the very space of 
phenomenology” (SP 21), which culminates through the Idea as the formal, yet, non-empirical edifice of all 
idealities.   We here speak of Heideggerian ontic/ontological binary, which overtakes, even as it fractures 
all binaries.   
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           In my view, these might be some of the most important words in the Derridean 
cannon insofar as we admit to our56 sustained kinship to metaphysics; that is, to our 
conception of non-phenomenological infinitude as the ultimate condition for our 
comprehension of finitude and, therefore, the plausibility of any given conceptual 
completion.57  We are indeed again dealing with absences; here, however, the 
significance lies in the defining perpetuity such an absence provides and, most 
importantly, the language substituting the putative intelligibility of “infinite” “pre-
history.”  Here we are reaching a limit, or, if you will, the language that sanctions “the 
passage to the limit” altogether—the language of idealization.   
            In Speech and Phenomenon, discussing the concept of the supplementation of an 
origin, Derrida notes that the supplementary, “this substitution . . . . is ideal.  As the ideal 
is always thought by Husserl in the form of an Idea in the Kantian sense, this substitution 
of ideality for nonidentity, of objectivity for nonobjectivity is infinitely deferred” (100).  
Here the unsettling query persists: what causes deferment’s “ad-infinitum return?”  And, 
yet again, in concert, if deferment as such is always already infinite, how can we explain 
                                                 
56 We must unfailingly admit, as does Derrida, that deconstruction dwells within the discourses it 
interrogates and, albeit self reflexively, internalize the weaknesses and contradictions it divulges through 
persistent resistance to the viability of closure.  As Barbara Johnson emphasizes in “Nothing Fails like 
Success,” the success of deconstruction is revealed in its failure. (SCE Reports, No. 8, fall 1980). 
57 Derrida explains, “It is not by chance that there is no phenomenology of the Idea.  The latter cannot be 
given in person, nor determined in an evidence, for it is only the possibility of evidence and the openness of 
“seeing” itself; it is only determinability of every intuition in general, the invisible milieu of seeing 
analogous to the diaphaneity of the Aristotelian Diaphanous, an elemental third, but the one source of the 
seen and the visible: ‘by diaphanous I mean what is visible, and yet not visible in itself, but rather owing its 
visibility of the colour of something else.’  It is thanks to this alone ‘that the colour of a thing is seen’ (De 
Anima, 418b).  If there is nothing to say about the Idea itself, it is because the Idea is that starting from 
which something in general can be said.  Its own particular presence, then, cannot depend on a 
phenomenological type of evidence” (Origin 138-9, Derrida’s emphasis).  Defining yet non-definable, 
absent yet regulating, the rigor of the Idea will become both suspect and indispensable as we progress in 
our exploration of the deconstructive self-referential entrenchment, resulting from the temporal and spatial 
genesis of language and thought.  In fact, we will observe that the indeterminable status of the Idea is never 
reconciled within phenomenology’s “principle of principles” and that the Idea’s relation to the non-Idea 
(idealization) seems to be the spatiotemporal “strange” occurrence Derrida identifies as the absent “core” of 
différance itself.   
 40
the genesis of its spatiotemporal transformation from non-ideal to ideal, that is, from 
proto-constitution to its objective possibility as geometry.  For this, we must explicate on 
the self-engendering and the repetitious dynamic of the discourse of the ideal both; that 
is, first, how the ideal, always already a substitute, can be topologically located in any 
originary structure and, second, what makes the ideal— “this substitution of nonidentity 
(the Kantian Idea)”—emerge temporally (infinitely and repetitiously) through form of 
signification.   
            Here, in a self-reflexive nod, we must make mention of our proposition whereby 
differentiated ontological and lingual rudiments propel the deconstructive trace within the 
formative trajectory of the language of idealization or, if you will, the language of 
metaphysics, in staging their textually supplemental dramatics on the page.  For indeed 
the enigma of “passage to the limit” as such is never truly reconciled in the discourse of 
both Husserl and Derrida, who must, as we shall see, consign to the movement of 
différance the same moot, quasi transcendental non-resolution.58   
            Arguably, the only possible, yet inexplicable and thus aporetic, response to the 
irreconcilable dilemma of “passage to the limit,” in this case from non-geometry to 
geometry, is the indeterminable locum at the heart of phenomenological and for that 
matter of all philosophical potential reduction—“auto-affection.”   Derrida views 
                                                 
58 Henceforth, discussing the behavior of the supplement, the congruently filial movement of the temporal 
flux embodying différance, Derrida declares: “Somewhere, something can be filled up of itself, can 
accomplish itself, on by allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy.  The sign is always a 
supplement of the thing itself” (OG 145).  For now as we are yet to discuss Derrida’s morphemic and 
semantic neologism and as we are about to expatiate the movement of self-engenderment as “affecting” the 
“passage to the limit” from non-geometry to geometry, we must pay heed to the structurally unknown 
pathologies entrenched in both phenomenological and deconstructive thinking.  That is, the inexplicability 
inherent in the state of being deferentially and differentially once removed from “the thing itself” by sign 
supplement, a state which can be nothing more then representational.  Thus, it is here that the 
deconstructive “unknowable,” or if you will, “undecidable” finds its ambiguous “nonoriginary origin”—in 
the liminal space between non-presence and representational impulses, rising, as it must, from a repetition 
of the sign’s signifier and its indeterminately, temporally deferred, idealized signified.   
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Husserl’s understanding of the genesis of self-affecting processes as burgeoning from a 
familiar ground, speech or, if to be precise, voix59 as the contrivance within the bodily, 
spatial vassal, wherein the uttered phonemic signifier “transforms the worldly opacity of 
its body into pure diaphaneity [simultaneously] effacing the sensible body and its 
exteriority [presenting] for consciousness the immediate presence of the signified.” 
Hence, the conceptual scheme functions within interior/exterior, soul/body, 
speech/writing philosophical conventional matrix whereby “Writing is a body that 
expresses something only if we actually pronounce the verbal expression that animates it 
. . . . if it is animated by an act of meaning which transforms it into spiritual flesh.”  The 
auto affective moment is marked, therefore, by “This absolute proximity of the signifier 
to the signified, and its effacement in immediate presence [which allows Husserl to] 
accord himself the right to reduce the totality of language . . . . in order to recover the 
sense of its primordiality.”  What is more, the concept of immediacy and tenability of 
presence is the very movement from which and within which “the subject can hear or 
speak to himself and be affected by the signifier he produces, without passing the 
external detour, the world, the sphere of what is not ‘his own’ . . . . This is why hearing 
oneself speak [s’entendre parler] is experienced as an absolutely pure auto-affection, 
occurring in a self proximity that would in fact be the absolute reduction of space in 
general” (SP 77-81).60   Hence, according to Husserl, the voice in the world is, in effect, 
                                                 
59 Specifically, as in the French title of Speech and Phenomenon, La Voix et le phénomène, whereby the 
stress is on the voice, its immediacy and its sustainability as the singular state of the subject’s presence to 
itself.  
60 However, total temporal purity, that is, complete reduction of space as such falters as soon as Derrida 
posits his trace as a regenerative representation of the instantaneous absence of the speaking voice in what 
is always already a repetition for and within the “outer” realm of hearing (one hears one’s self through a 
repetition of the spoken).  In this way, the auto-affective temporality within which one is “hearing one’s 
self speak,” is fissured by repeating phonemic signification, which as repeating and , therefore, 
conceptually inscribed signs, stand delivering their inscription infinitely, as “general text” and/or “general 
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transcendent to it [does not have spatial mooring] and, paradoxically, sustains the 
subject’s auto affective temporality61 apart from the elements, i.e. signifiers [spatial, 
impure], which create it.  Indeed, the concept of the auto-affective ideality of the voice 
staggers as soon as we consider its phonemic signification as writing, that is, as a 
phenomenon, which is spatially outside the purity of the subject’s “sphere of owness,” 
and which, again, agitates all claims of sustained temporal integrity.   Still, as we 
continue to investigate temporality at its outmost purity, in its self- affecting state, we 
may observe that although transformational, for it underlies the initial passage to the limit 
from the Idea (concealed constitutionality as such) to its content (the possibility of its 
ideal objectivity as such),62 auto-affection’s participation in the temporal flux is 
                                                                                                                                                 
language,” beyond temporal presence causing “Space [to be] ‘in’ time; [which] it is time’s pure leaving 
itself” (SP, 86).  We are here, in fact, following Derrida in dislocating the metaphysically juridical binary of 
in/out, in showing that the temporal purity of presence [the voice, inner substance] is always already exiled 
by a re-generating re-petition that re-establishes temporal purity as spatiotemporal and, thus, impure [the 
written, outer  as incomplete auxiliary].   Both its metaphysical hold and the precarious nature of the voice 
is charmingly related by Thomas Pynchon’s Mucho Maas, who tells his wife, “Oedipa, the human voice, 
you know, it’s a flipping miracle” (The Crying of Lot 49, New York: Perennial Classics, 1966). 
61 For Derrida, the temporality of the subject is best conveyed through his auto affective movement of 
différance of which discussion is forthcoming.  However, Derrida is in total agreement with both Husserl 
and Heidegger about the auto-affective nature of temporality: “as soon as one takes the movement of 
temporalization into account . . . . the concept of pure auto affection must be employed as well . . . . The 
‘source point’ or ‘primordial impression,’ that out of which the movement of temporalization is produced, 
is already pure auto-affection.  First it is a pure production, since temporality is never the real predicate of 
being.  The intuition of time itself cannot be empirical; it is a receiving that receives nothing.  The novelty 
of each now is therefore engendered by nothing; it consists in a primordial impression that engenders itself” 
(SP 83).   As is relevant to our argument, moreover, the self engendered, “‘pure spontaneity’ create nothing 
. . . . it is not a being, it is not a produced object; and every language fails to describe this pure movement 
other than by a metaphor . . . . [but since, as Husserl says,] ‘names fail us’” Derrida  radicalizes Husserl’s 
statement by pointing to the fact that Husserl does name the auto affective “strange ‘movement’” as “an 
‘absolute subjectivity,’ . . . . a being conceived on the basis of presence as substance . . . . what is said to be 
unnamable is not . . . . a substance modified into subject, into an absolute subject whose self-presence is 
pure and does not depend on any external affection, any outside.  All this is present, and we can name it, 
the proof being that its being as absolute subjectivity is not questioned” (SP 84, Derrida’s emphasis).   
62 The working differential impulse here is of origin and its anticipated teleological re-materialization, 
which might be what Caputo means when he says, “Husserl wants to rescue the arché and the telos by 
reinstating them as ideas in the Kantian sense . . . .,” arguing that Derrida differs by treating them as 
structural components in systems of “altering repetitions” (Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, 
Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) p. 131.  What 
is significant to our argument is the indelible reality in which the movement, temporal as it must be, exists 
in both philosophical trajectories, exemplifying the differential nexus Derrida propounds, even as he 
shatters the inexplicable absoluteness with which Husserl views his phenomenological arché/telos design.   
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anomalous at best because, according to Derrida and as we have already made mention, 
its lineage is of self-engenderment, radically generated through the subject’s contact with 
its totally other.63   Hence, in addition to the inexplicable auto affective transformation of 
objective ideality, auto-affectation is also the self-manifesting movement, which marks 
intersubjective temporal flux and recovers its energies through a differential “primordial 
impression [which] is here affected by nothing than other itself, by the absolute ‘novelty’ 
of another now” (SP 85).   If auto affection embodies the self-engendering movement of 
intersubjective temporality and each auto affective moment is defined by what it is not, 
“it is pure movement,” that produces nothing and, therefore, must be articulated through a 
metaphor;  for indeed, “every language fails to describe this pure movement other than by 
a metaphor” (SP 84).64  In being defined through metaphorical, supplemental 
                                                 
63 Here we must inhabit the temporal, self-engendering “moment” of Husserlian intersubjectivity, which is 
crucial to Derrida’s own deconstructive understanding of ideal differences.  Derrida identifies Husserlian 
ultimate presence, “the presence of the living present . . . . the self-presence of transcendental life” (SP 6), 
that is, the presence of the subject to itself “unchangeable in itself and always other in its content” (Origin 
n90) as the definitive locum of intersubjectivity.  Hence, the definition of the subject as an ideal [that is, 
repeating here and always], must be located in its self-affecting temporality, which propagates it: 
“Intersubjectivity is the relation of an absolute origin to other absolute origins, which are always my own, 
despite their radical alterity [hence] The Living Present constitutes the other as other in itself and the same 
as the same in the other [which really means that] the same thing can be thought through absolutely other 
moments and acts” (Origin, p. 86).  We must stress here that although Derrida views Husserl’s 
understanding of the monolithic temporal state of the transcendental subject as necessary component in 
expounding his understanding of the differentiated state of the subject, he nonetheless questions it: “. . . 
incidences of primordial nonpresence [as those] whose repress[ed] differences Husserl could not fail to 
recognize . . . . [in] the process by which the living now, produced by spontaneous generation, must, in 
order to be a now and to be retained in another now, affect itself without recourse to anything empirical but 
with a new primordial actuality in which it will become a non-now, a past now—this process is indeed a 
pure [my emphasis] auto-affection in which the same is the same only being affected by the other” (SP, 82, 
85).  We here speak of self affecting temporal flux as the constituent of differentiated, yet, durational 
intersubjective temporality.  The aporia is situated on the “liminal” nonspace of auto-affective 
differentiation; Derrida points to the impossible state in which when the immediate-to-his-own-
consciousness temporality of the subject, in differentiating movement to its totally other, redefines itself as 
the other, while regenerating the same as itself in the other; in this case, therefore, the subject’s self—
consciousness, present to itself—is always already other, always already a lack, a nonpresence.  We must 
also stress that Derrida re-metaphysicalizes as he conceptually re-sojourns in the volatile impulsion of auto-
affection in ‘grounding’ his post-structural, deconstructive nonconcept différance, identifying self-
affectation as its paradoxical fluid core.   
64 It is crucial to understand that with auto-affective temporality, we must consider the parallel spatial event 
occurring simultaneously.  That is, if Husserlian ideal subjectivity is thought to be the constituting agency 
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pronunciation of what it is already not, the auto-affective product can never sustain the 
purity of its transformation.  Hence, as always, the stress is on a lack; that is, lack of 
presence [purity], which eminently occurs through the thing’s differing contact with its 
totally other.65        
             In the same vein, as we persist with deconstructive sensibilities to inherent 
absences, we need realize that when in the Origin Derrida discusses “passage to the 
limit,” as occurring auto affectively in creating geometric objectivity, he emphasizes that 
the self-affecting momentum affects itself through its contact with non-presence (as that 
of the Kantian Idea).  Thus, since auto-affection is predicated upon a lack, it is predicated 
upon a “nonderived re-presentation,” and is, therefore, non-reducible.  Now, as we 
                                                                                                                                                 
of all idealities, it must, when partaking in the movement of sense, break from its auto-affective temporality 
into signification’s indicatory, representational dynamic within which signs both metaphorically and 
empirically materialize a space outside the subject’s self presence: “Intersubjectivity is inseparable from 
temporalization taken as the openness of the present upon an outside of itself, upon another absolute 
present.  This being outside itself proper to time is its spacing: it is a proto-stage [archi-scène].  This stage, 
as the relation of one present to other present as such, that is, as nonderived re-presentation 
(Vergenwärtigung or Rpräsentation), produces the structure of signs in general as ‘reference,’ as being-for-
something (für etwas sein), and radically precludes their reduction” (SP 84-5, n9).  There is no maintaining 
the purity of the subject within the “undivided unity of a temporal present so as to have nothing to reveal to 
itself by the agency of signs” (SP 60).  As we are about to mention Husserl’s expression/indication binary, 
let us stress here that signification in the form of impure indication, inborn, according to Derrida, in the 
“expressive” state of the subject, is its proto-spatial movement.    
65 Although Derrida reveals western metaphysical concepts as defined through deferred, differed, and 
referential response to their totally other, I think that Shakespeare’s Macbeth says it in the bard’s succinct 
poetic best: “And nothing is but what is not” (Macbeth 1.3.143).  Better yet, Shakespeare’s arch-villain, 
Iago, is less universal in applying the differentiating process to himself: “I am not what I am” (Othello 
1.1.67), while Claudius (brother/unlike brother, uncle/unlike uncle, father/unlike father, husband/unlike 
husband) resonates Polonius’ “. . . . that with devotion’s visage/And pious action we do sugar o’er/The 
devil himself” in complete agreement with the seeming nature of what is, defining himself by 
differentiating his “deed to [his] most painted word” (Hamlet 3.1.47-48, 54).  Similarly, Regan, Lear’s 
remised turned villainous daughter, also problematizes metaphysics of definition in differentiating what is 
self-consciously known as what is not.  She comments on her father’s enraged behavior saying: “Yet he 
hath ever but slenderly known himself” (King Lear 1.1.96-7).  That according to Shakespeare processes of 
differentiated definitions gain such underhandedness must not surprise us; for if deconstruction purports to 
contribute to our understanding of what is/not, it must do so by calling our attention to inherent conceptual 
openings in identifying the potentially insidious.  All plays appear in The Complete Works of William 
Shakespeare.  David Bevington Ed. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.   One might also wonder 
as to the meaning of Samuel Beckett’s play’s title Not I; for indeed it seems as if the protagonist, MOUTH, 
is gaining self-consciousness by uttering a chain of words and fragmented sentences in describing all that 
she never was (Ends and Odds: Dramatic Pieces by Samuel Beckett, New York: Grove Press, Inc, 1976).     
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expatiate on absences in their non-temporal, non-spatial, non-substantial states, even as 
we are recurrently aware of the supplemental, repetitious textual dramatics they auto- 
affectively perpetuate, we must understand the significance of the idea of nonderived re-
presentational field, which a contact with a the thing’s other establishes.  For indeed if 
objective and subjective idealities are constituted through a non-derivational origin, then 
the viability of their phenomenological reduction is unlikely at best.66  Thus, we need 
recognize that lack, absence is the primordial element of any assumed original gesture, 
making economies of “presence” and its ensuing representation unlikely thereof.  
Nonetheless, at the outset, a pertinent point must be made: as soon as we consider 
signification and its reproductive economy, representational pathologies pervade.67      
                                                 
66 We might be well advised to note that Husserl follows philosophical tradition in viewing the objective 
and subjective realities as ontologically dual and as presence; whereby the object exists only insofar as it 
can present itself fully to intuition or thought and whereby the subject is fully present “only insofar as it is 
self-present, present to itself in the immediacy of a conscious act” (SP xxxii).  Derrida shows that in 
addition to the fact that objective and subjective idealities find their origin in a-representational hinterland, 
reduction will always already be fraught with differential and referential contingency.  
67 That is, we can anticipate representational impulse as soon as we discuss signification as mode of 
differences and referrals.  In fact, in his assault on Husserl’s understanding of subjectivity as “presence,” 
Derrida problematizes the subject’s status as “absolute” by pointing to the fact that the subject gains its 
“absolute subjectivity” only in its “opposition to the object,” deriving its definition “on the basis of 
difference.”   If relational dynamic defines subjectivity as such, then referentiality rather then the subject’s 
“absolute properties” must underlie its “nonderived” representation.  Thus, according to Derrida, as we 
have already mentioned, “the proto-stage [archi-scène] . . . . as the relation of one present to another 
present as such, that is as nonderived re-presentation (Vergegnwärtigung), produces the structures of signs 
in general as ‘reference,’ as being-for-something . . . .” (SP 84n9).   The representational mission of signs, 
their structure “as being for something,” that is, their referential impulse is best described through Derrida’s 
analysis of, yet, again, another Husserlian dichotomy, birthed of the inner/outer metaphorical prototype—
thing’s essential interiority in opposition to its porous, insubstantial exteriority.  In effect, in demonstrating 
the unlikelihood of Husserl’s conception of the univocal, pure expressive state of the subject whereby “in 
inward speech [one] communicates nothing to [one’s self] . . . . indicate nothing to [one’s self],” Derrida 
agitates one more Husserlian sacrosanct binary: expression and indication.  These two forms of Husserlian 
signification underscore the ideal status of his subject and language’s non empirical state in assuring that 
such ideality is viable. Expression conveys meaning content, “Bedeutung or Sinn” (SP 17), within which 
“‘there is no speech, nor does one tell oneself anything: one merely conceives . . . . in a monologue in no 
need of signification a priory pure’” (SP 48), that is, through a-intuitive, a-empirical processes.  In 
response, Derrida thinly interjects, “Husserl demonstrates that speech then is still speech with its full set of 
rights provided [my emphasis] that it obey certain rules which are not immediately given as rules of 
knowledge” (SP 90). In fact, Derrida readily shows that “absolute pure expression [rather than be] free 
from all indicative contamination” (SP 94), at the outset and so as to function, must have an indicatory 
dynamic.  Derrida brings Husserl’s own words form Logical Investigations in saying that “‘signs in the 
sense of indication do not express anything, unless they happen to fulfill a meaning as well as an indicative 
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             However, as we are about to designate language as the matrix of repeating 
ideality, we also must emphasize that primordial “nonpresence” is engendered auto-
affectively through repeating momentum in differentiated temporalities of past and 
future, eradicating any viability of sustained “presence” thereof.  Thus, from ideal 
objectivity in the Origin to ideal intersubjective temporality in Speech and Phenomena, 
Derrida persist with his offense on the integrity of Husserl’s concept of presence in 
showing that structures of self-engendering movement, revealed as auto-affective, propel 
any “passage to the limit” through primordial temporal absence, the Idea, as a non-
presence, defining its other, the ideal, a non-self (a possibility), to reproduce non-
representational impulse, which, paradoxically, is the “strange” environs, enigmatically 
created by or creating the ultimately definitive, structural representation—signs.68   
                                                                                                                                                 
function [stressing that] Meaning (bedeuten) in communicative speech is always interwoven with such 
indicative relation’” (SP 20 Husserl’s emphasis).  Derrida in fact proves “that the discursive sign is always 
involved always caught up in an indicative system” (ibid).  As we have seen in effect, “Husserl wants to 
grasp the expressive and logical purity of meaning as the possibility of logos . . . . [making] communication 
a stratum extrinsic to expression” (ibid) in asserting that expression is a “solitary mental act,” experienced  
in the immediacy of “‘the very moment (im selben Augenblick)’” (SP 49).  We are of course dealing with 
yet another form of presence, which cannot help but be representational; here, however, the implications 
are decisive: there is no representation without indicatory signification; that is, “‘the look’ cannot ‘abide’” 
(SP 104)  because expression, as all other idealities, is dependent upon the repetitious, regenerating 
indicatory system of signs first of all.    
68 In this paradoxical condition the whole of Husserlian theory of language is invested.  As Lawlor 
summarizes: “Derrida notes that the difference between expression and indication is, for Husserl, an ‘in 
principle’ or ideal distinction [however] Husserl’s very ability to speak of ‘the principle’ or ideal distinction 
between expression and indication has its condition of possibility in language” (Derrida and Husserl, 234).  
Derrida expounds on “the status of representation in language [stressing that] . . . . Representation can be 
understood in the general sense of Vorstellung, but also in the sense of re-presentation, as repetition or 
reproduction of presentation, as the Vergegenwärtigung which modifies a Präsentation or Gegenwärtigung.  
And can be understood as what takes place of, what occupies the place of, another Vorstellung . . . .” (SP 
49).  Hence, “What in the two cased is called a modification of representation . . . . is not something that 
happens to presentation but rather conditions it by bifurcating it a priory” (ibid 7).  For our purposes, the 
Derridean sensibility is directed to the reproductive impulse of representation rather than to representation 
that purports to represent presentation as Vorstellung.  The inherent significance is revealed in Derrida’s 
understanding of ideality as emerging through the teleological (expected) reproductivity of language via 
intentionality, which is itself supplementary, rather than that of transcendent objective and subjective 
possibilities, which, in turn, are metaphysically thought to be represented by language.  In Tony Morrison’s 
Paradise, representational dynamic, in this case, of keeping, “8-R. an abbreviation of eight-rock, a deep 
deep level in the coal mines. Blue-black people . . . .” (193), keeping unadulterated, pure black blood as 
ideal, is rigorously inscribed through a family tree by Patricia, who is taking it to representational virtuosic 
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            Henceforth, it is through the inexplicable dialectic of the primordially non-
representational (nonpresence) and what is representation par excellence (signs) that we 
might discuss what is most significant to our proposition in laying the ground for the non-
objective, non-hylētic,69  non-phenomenal, iterateble and, as it must be, ideal Derridean 
trace.  Non-phenomenal here refers to the trace’s own status as proto-writing, propelled 
through the discourse of idealization’s primordial spatiotemporal absences and the 
teleological task of its own metaphorical and ultimately phenomenal performative 
textuality.  For indeed, the trace is the non-material sediment of an absence, created 
through its contact with the Idea and proliferated through its own supplemental, repeating 
regeneration within the discourse of idealization in from of ontic70 metaphor, which, 
                                                                                                                                                 
degree, with one caveat—her mother was a “sandy haired, honey speckled eyed girl from Virginia” (195) 
and was let to parish during Patricia’s birth.  The defining ideal, the originary pure blood of the nine black 
settlers of Ruby, sustained “Unadulterated and unadulteried 8-rock blood held its magic as long as it 
resided in Ruby. That was their recipe. That was their deal. For immortality . . . everything that worries 
them must come from women” ((Paradise. New York: Penguin Group, 1999) p. 217.  According to 
Morrison, the original nine families of Ruby upheld ideology of racial purity through idealized, 
metaphysical discourse, propagated through and invested in the differential representational dynamic of 
language.  As is well known, the spaces between ideology and its proliferation as metaphysics gain 
materiality through ritualized practices, neo Marxists such as Louis Althusser identify as being underscored 
by ISA’s (ideological state apparatus). (“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an 
Investigation.”  Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays.  Trans. Ben Brewster. New Left Books, 1971) pp. 
123-173. 
69 Relevantly, at the get go, this distinction presents, even as it assures, the trace’s resistance to the 
ubiquitous, yet, potent philosophical inner/outer classification.  Thus, the term non-hylētic means that the 
trace, in its non-substantive state, is by no means a defining inner essence to some outer shell of a concept 
or phenomenon or an exteriority defined by inner essences.  As we shall see, the perpetual historicity of the 
trace cannot be delimited to either interiority or exteriority of any conceptual scheme; sojourning on the 
cusp of exteriority, fissuring conceptual inner purity, in effect, marks the trace as a deconstructive impulse.  
70 For Heidegger, Dasein’s (subject’s) condition is “ontico-ontological.” Unlike references to ontology, the 
investigation of universal structures of being, ontic refers to specific elements concerning beings (entities).  
Heidegger categorizing his investigations as existentiell (ontic) whereby “Dasein is an entity whose Being 
has a determinate character of existence,” that is, possible ways to be; and as existential (ontological) 
whereby “Dasein is in itself ‘ontological’, because existence is thus determinative for it,” that is, 
ontological structures are of any human whatsoever.  (Being and Time. Trans. John Macqurrie & Edward 
Robinson. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1962.) p. 34.  In the context of our own investigation, we follow Derrida 
who contends that when we attempt to substantiate metaphysical concepts, we must laps into some form of 
“ontic metaphor” (SP 85).  For example, time is just a name we ascribe to a movement, which we yet again 
name as such.  This is partly the paradoxical structure of the trace, whereby, although insubstantial, it 
hypostatizes through the idea of the reproductive regeneration of signification, which is conceptually and 
hence formally directed through its state as “proto-writing,” its ontic metaphor.   
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again, is partly hypostatized through phenomenal dramatization of signifiers’ 
regenerative, mimetic dramatics, which performs the primordial supplemental nature of 
metaphysical discourse.   
            My task at hand is to represent as best I can the irreconcilable condition of 
language as a textual, written phenomenon, on the one hand, and its spatiotemporally 
bifurcated lexicological origin71 on the other, even as we emphasize, as Suzan-Lori Parks 
does, the performative72 textuality this kind of strife produces.  The idea is that when 
discussing deconstructive consciousness to textuality, we need remember that 
deconstruction views textuality as both metaphoric and phenomenal dramatization of 
discursive supplementation, testifying to signs’ simultaneous insufficiency and promise; 
insufficiency, in their inability to fully represent the putative plentitude of their concepts; 
promise, in their potential to relentlessly and repetitiously sustain gossamer, insubstantial 
                                                 
71 Here we must pause in saying that meaning, semantics, lexicology are all synonymous to presence in the 
immediacy of speech, which is already absent in its phonemically textual representation, making its 
deferred temporality reemerge in the spatial materiality of its representation.   
72 We must stop and deal with this loaded term, which I, in effect, attribute to Derrida’s understanding of 
the always already-ness invested in the primordial regenerative reality of signification, or if you will 
“general writing , of which the system of speech, consciousness, meaning, presence, truth, etc. would be 
only an effect . . . .  a labor—metaphysical or not—performed on a conceptual system” (“Signature Event 
Context” in LI) p.21.  We have yet much to cover in explicating on the regenerative primordiality of 
language and its fundamental connection to space and time.  For now let me mention that the term 
“performance” became synonymous with deconstructive, queer theorist Judith Butler, who, although 
attributes the term to its conventional origin specific to the historical idea of theater, views performance as 
the outcome of discursive structures “whereby bodies performatively enact sexed or gendered identities 
according to socially sanctioned codes,” emergent through cultural expectancies (Julia A. Walker, “Why 
Performance? Why Now? Textuality and the Rearticulation of Human Presence.” The Yale Journal of 
Criticism 16.1 (2003): 149-175) p. 162.  In fact, in this way, we might trace performance theory through the 
Heideggerian view of the subject’s embeddedness in its cultural context and processes of historicity.  
Hence, rather than view theatrical performance through Aristotelian understanding of mimesis,  
representational  presences, enclosed within logos, performance theory proponents see forms of 
performances as open-ended processes, defined by their contextual conditions.  Performance art is just one 
of the off shoots of Antonin Artaud’s violent attempt to reject the text as the repressive agent of 
representational naturalism.  Deconstruction propels the subversion of Artaudian already subversive force 
as a process of “amortization” of the theatrical experience as thought by Herbert Blau whereby “The 
postmodern theory of a performance [is] that [which] escapes the museum, the script, or the recording, 
[and] is the discursive form which precisely legislates the conditions of that escape” (Steven Connor, 
Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary, NewYork: Basil Blackwell, 
1989) p. 155.  
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relation with the same self concept, revealed through metaphorically materializing 
textuality.73  Hence, the spatial, physical mise-en-scène is set on the page first of all.  I 
intend to show that Susan-Lori Parks partakes in this kind of textual, supplemental 
histrionics, which, as her play-texts abundantly evidence, emanate from her sensibility to 
a kind of radicalized form of ontology, that is, a quasi hypostatization of space and time 
through perpetually repeating signification.  Repetition, or, if you will, the term in its 
Derridean coinage, iterability, is the economy of the trace to which we shall direct our 
investigation next.74    
                                                 
73 Thus, while interrogating meaning (the signified), Derrida views, albeit within the system, signifiers as 
potentially disquieting elements.  In fact, in “Infrastructure and Systematicity,” Rodolphe Gasché suggests 
that we must understand Derrida’s play of signifiers as a pre-semantic syntactical economy as a “syntax of 
a syntax” (12), which, as John Caputo states in “The Economy of Signs in Husserl and Derrida,” frees the 
signifier from “the oppressive regime” (105) of viewing being as presence. (both essays appear in 
Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida. Ed. John Sallis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987).  Propounding on Derrida’s textual consciousness, Shain remarks: “Through 
relentless reflexivity, and constant awareness of the various “others” repressed or devalued by 
metaphysics—writing, physicality, sexual difference, death, metaphor, plurivocity, historicity, context—he 
tries to produce a different kind of discourse, one which points in new direction.  He produces texts that 
cannot be understood without taking this into account, because the texts embody/enact the suppressed 
others . . . . Understanding Derrida’s texts therefore requires attention to the materiality of the signifier, 
rather than its dismissal in favor of some supposedly pure ideal signified” (391).  It may be adequate to 
mention here that sensibilities as to the materiality of language mark Suzan-Lori Parks’s dramatic texts of 
which discussion as to their performative materiality is forth coming.    
74 It is that in Alexander Argyros’ “The Seam of the Trace” I first found the connection between the Idea in 
the Kantian sense and Derrida’s conception of the trace as most intriguing.  Argyros, however, fails to 
mention that Derrida does point to auto-affective moments in his own deconstructive discourse, never, 
though, directly connecting them to the primordially absent Kantian Idea.  Rudolph Gasché, in fact, points 
to the difficulty of viewing Derridean quasi-transcendental movements in correlation with the Idea in the 
Kantian sense, arguing that Derrida’s thinking fails to subtend a kind of syntheses, which permits 
conceptual unity (The Tain of the Mirror 275). Conversely, John Caputo contends that in Origin Derrida 
views the Idea as the basis for originary differences as differance (Radical Hermeneutics, 131).  In Origin 
Derrida indeed speaks of differences, never mentioning différance, never deliberately connecting them to 
the primordial absence of the Idea as such.  Nonetheless, we are still dealing with auto-affective 
movements, which, as I argue, do account for Derrida’s concepts’ “strangeness,” even if Derrida’s 
conceptual core is of differences.  In fact, rather than identifying his auto-affective concepts as 
“mysterious,” the term he uses to describe Husserl’s self-engendering, auto-affective passage to the limit, 
Derrida opts to call his auto-affective impulses (aporias such as différance, supplement, trace) “strange.”  
This, of course, comes to no surprise because Derrida never renounces metaphysics; thus, “mysterious” is 
just as ineffective as “strange” in identifying inexplicable, quasi-transcendental, non-empirical, yet, 
spatiotemporal movements such as idealities.  Nevertheless, as we have stressed before, Derrida calls our 
attention to the so called “strangeness” metaphysics conceals: “All the concepts of metaphysics . . . . cover 
up [Derrida’s emphasis] the strange [my emphasis] ‘movements’ of this difference” (SP, 85); discussing 
his own “difference’s” neologistic coinage, differance, Derrida asks, “how the concept we have of it is 
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The Trace—Its Repetition, Its Spatiotemporal [différance-ial]Life 
In investigating the performance of the Derridean trace, we hope to show the   
aporetic state of deconstruction, even as it pursues an intriguingly viable, and, in my 
view, necessary, interrogatory path in examining processes of [discursive] idealization, 
pathological to the state of metaphysics.  And so, in extrapolating on conceptual 
inadequacies of metaphysical discourse, we will attempt to show how the trace’s 
perpetual reemergence is inextricably concatenated to the sustained repeatability of 
idealities, finding their conceptual sustenance as presence in the “re-turn ad-infinitum” of 
their possibilities.75  What is more and as we have stressed before, returning possibilities 
                                                                                                                                                 
divided by strange  [my emphasis] separation” (“Differance” 150); expounding on the dissimulative state 
of Being, conceived as ‘sense’ in beings, Derrida argues that “in a particular and very strange [my 
emphasis] way, differance (is) ‘older’ than the ontological difference or the truth of Being” (ibid., 154); and 
then again, discussing the absences underlying his own thinking, Derrida observes and as we have quoted 
before, “it is the strange [my emphasis] essence of the supplement not to have essentiality . . . .” (OG 314); 
moreover, explicating on his notion of “iterability,” which is, in effect, the iterating movement of the trace 
and, for that matter, of all idealities, Derrida remarks: “Such is the strange [my emphasis] alogical logic of 
what I call “‘iterability’” ( “Afterwards” in LI 119).  To be sure and just as Derrida tells us, aporias persist.  
At the same time, revealing metaphysic’s “cover ups” is phenomenology’s teleological scheme; whereby as 
part and parcel of its adherence to its principle of principles, entailing the investigation of  “the immediate 
presence of the thing itself ‘in person’ . . . . the finite thing,”  Husserl’s inquiry is marked by epoché, an 
interrogatory quest to make the self-evident suspect.  All the same, Derrida shows that phenomenological 
investigations fail in their own interrogatory epoché by blindly succumbing to metaphysical economy 
saying, “despite the minute detail, the rigor, and the absolute novelty of his analyses, Husserl always 
describes all these movements in a metaphysical conceptual system” (SP 81).  As we close our section on 
origin and the Idea’s uncompromised status in defining the phenomenological design, we need mention that 
suspicion of its legitimacy as contributing to epistemological agency is cast by Nietzsche, whose rendering 
of the Idea in “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable.  The History of an Error” (in The Twilight of 
the Idols) poignantly demarcates the insurmountable gap between perception and phenomenon.  
Nonetheless, I agree with Lawlor that Nietzsche’s idea about the Kantian Idea marks deconstructive 
reflexivity (“Letter to Claude Evans.” Philosophy Today 42.2 (1998) p. 202).  A photocopy of Nietzsche’s 
“How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable.  The History of Error” may be found in our Appendices p. 
204.  
75 “For the ideality of the form (Form) of presence itself implies that it be infinitely re-peatable, that its 
return, as return of the same, is necessary ad infinitum . . . .”(SP 67).  Although repeatability is the 
condition for the possibility of all idealities, Derrida’s deconstruction shows that for their regenerative and, 
thus, repeating impulse, Husserlian ideal concepts depend on the impurity of writing rather than on the 
purity of intersubjective, expressive voice, which is for phenomenology the locum of all transcendental 
subjectivity.  Derrida explains: “The speaking subject [psychologistic, phenomenal] among the 
protogeometers is not sufficient to give ideal objectivities their ‘continuing to be’ and ‘persistent factual 
existence’ . . . .To be absolutely ideal, the object must still be freed of every tie with an actually present 
subjectivity in general .  . . . it must perdure ‘even when no one has actualized it in evidence.’”  Hence, the 
fact that for Husserl speech does free “the object of individual subjectivity” is insufficient to evade the 
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in their quasi hypostatized, metaphoric state are perpetuated through an absence, lack 
such as that of the Idea; as Derrida, when interrogating the likelihood of complete 
phenomenological reduction, emphasizes, “phenomenological consciousness is indicated 
every time that Husserl speaks of the Idea in the Kantian sense.”76  Hence, we must turn 
our investigation to the indicatory movement, birthing the discursive structures of 
metaphysical language.  However, and as both Husserl and Derrida concur, the genesis of 
objectivity and its teleological accomplishment as an ideal, [corresponding to primordial 
processes making transcendental subjectivity viable], is indicated through language and 
its possibility of infinite reproductivity and return.77  Thus, it is through language in its 
regenerative impulse that we encounter ideality first of all; it is in language, as is well 
deconstructively substantiated, that we find the iterating pathology of the trace as the 
impetus of “this ultra transcendental concept of life,”78 that is, as enfolding differential 
                                                                                                                                                 
inevitable reality in which the object is bound to “institutive community . . . . [therefore] writing [for 
Husserl] will assure the absolute traditionalization of the object, its absolute ideal Objectivity—i.e., the 
purity of its relation to a universal transcendental subjectivity.”  Such written communication is, Husserl 
contends, “‘virtual [because] it makes communication possible without immediate or mediate address 
[while Derrida point to the paradox that although] virtuality [Derrida’s emphasis] is an ambiguous value. . . 
. [it still manifests through] scriptural spatiotemporality [my emphasis] [that] sanctions and completes the 
existence of pure transcendental historicity” (Origin 87).  Moreover, “By means of this written inscription, 
one can always repeat the original sense, that is, the act of pure thought, which created the ideality of sense 
[however] to reactivate writing is always to reawaken an expression in an indication. . . .” (SP 81).  As we 
traverse the continuum between speech and writing, we shall soon discover that “scriptural 
spatiotemporality,” differance as such, takes some of the attributes that characterize Husserl’s 
transcendental treatment of expressive speech.    
76 (“Genesis and Structure” 167, Derrida’s emphasis) 
77 Yet, differences become incommensurable when Derrida points to weaknesses in Husserl’s treatment of 
language.  In fact, though not explicating on specifics, Caputo is correct in observing that “by choosing 
“The Origin of Geometry” Derrida [shows] that the whole project of a transcendental, a priori history is 
inherently dependent upon language and signs, [which is indeed] a point Husserl makes . . . . But that of 
course is all the better, for nothing pleases Derrida more than to show just how boldly metaphysics has 
recourse to what it excludes” (Radical Hermeneutics 123-4). 
78 (SP 15) Indeed, what, we might ask, does “ultra transcendental concept” mean, the ultimate state of 
transcendence?  That is, the transcendental beyond Husserl’s psychologictic and transcendental states of the 
ego, that is, its intuitive and intentional states, wherein, as Derrida argues, must reside, paradoxically 
unbeknownst to Husserl, the ethereal movement of Husserlian “parallelism,” or, shall we name it for what 
it deconstructively is, différance? We intend to discuss how the immergence of the Derridean trace both 
insinuates and problematizes this deconstructive movement in establishing, in effect, the only constant in 
Derridean thinking.  Hence, for now let us stress that for differences to emerge, they must do so against 
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and deferral primordiality, exemplified through Derrida’s conceptual neologism—
différance.79  It comes to no surprise that Derrida identifies the auto-affective movement 
as a movement of difference; that, furthermore, he follows Husserl in gaining a crucial 
temporal nucleus to his deconstructive philosopheme is also not surprising.  Nonetheless, 
the deconstructive point of departure, as we have stressed once and again, is self-
reflexivity, which is gained, at every turn, through the deconstructive 
implication/complication of language—the unique status of its signs as phōnē and its 
representation as grapheme, engaged in regenerative, spatiotemporal differential 
movement that disquiets the conceptual closure of metaphysics.  Yet, the question is how 
deconstructive analysis of language diffracts the metaphysical fortress that geometrical 
ideality is, seen by Derrida as the paradigm for all incidences of metaphysics of 
presences?  Derrida brings Husserl’s own reflection:  
Ideality comes to its Objectivity ‘by means of language, through which it 
receives, so to speak, its linguistic flesh . . . . how does linguistic 
incarnation make out of the merely intrasubjective formation the 
Objective, that which, for example, as geometrical concept or state of 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitutive consistency, which is, as it must be, the “ultra” referent as such.  In Of Grammatology, Derrida 
contends that “The unheard of difference between the appearing and the appearance [l’apparaissant et 
l’apparaître] (between the “world” and “lived experience”) is the condition of all other differences, of all 
other traces, and it is already a trace.  This last concept is thus absolutely and by rights ‘anterior’ to all 
physiological problematics concerning the nature of the engramme [the unit of engraving], or metaphysical 
problematics concerning the meaning of absolute presence . . . .” (65). Nonetheless, Derrida contends, “no 
language can cope with the operation by which the transcendental ego constitutes and opposes itself to its 
worldly self” (SP 12).  Indeed as Husserl contends, “names do fail us” and Derrida agrees, insofar that 
language is inherently “analogical” (ibid.) and stands to undercut thought with “conceptless verbalities” 
(SP, 24).  Hence, language fails to answer Levinas’ call for “this unthinkable-impossible-unutterable 
beyond (tradition’s) Being and Logos” (“Violence and Metaphysic” 114).  However, Derrida stresses 
“conscious and language are more and more difficult to discern” (SP 15); thus, failure to isolate thought 
from language might always already mean that if we hope to reveal “truth,” we must do it through language 
because, as Derrida argues, “language guards the difference that guards language” (ibid. 14).   
79 Derrida identifies différance as most akin to auto-affective movement, which, as he argues, “cannot mean 
grasping it in its identity, its purity, or its origin, for it has none.  We come closest to it in the movement of 
différance” (SP 82).   
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affairs, is in actual fact present, intelligible for all, now and always, 
already being valid in its linguistic expression as geometrical discourse, as 
geometrical proposition in its geometrical ideal sense.’  
                                                                               (Origin 76, Husserl’s emphasis) 
 
That Husserl must admit that “linguistic incarnation” is essential in contributing to 
formation of ideal object as such does not sway his phenomenological view of the 
constitutionality of ideal objects.  According to Husserl, “ideal formations are rooted only 
in language in general” (Origin 66) and ideality of language is limited to its re-
incarnating activity.80  Yet, the ultimate observation must be that “the Objectivity of this 
truth [i.e. exact concepts] could not be constituted without pure possibility of an inquiry 
into a pure language in general.  Without this pure and essential possibility, the 
geometrical formation would remain ineffable and solitary” (Origin 77, Derrida’s 
emphasis).  Husserl’s subject, Derrida suggests, must “fall back” (ibid.) into language to 
constitute the purity and assure the repeatability of his objective idealities; Husserl, 
therefore, never reconciles his claim of objective purity and its becoming through 
linguistic exigency, in which case, the question as to pure objective possibilities still 
remains.  Derrida points out decisively that since objectivity depends on the infinite 
                                                 
80 For Husserl, ideality of language is restricted to “morphological ideality,” what he identifies as a 
movement lacking possibilities of pure objective ideality but which is viewed as holding the anticipated, 
tenable return of morphemic possibilities.  Derrida explains: “starting from an anticipatory structure of 
intentionality, we go beyond morphological ideality toward the ideal and invariant pole of an infinite 
approximation.”  Derrida then brings Hussel’s own words from Ideas: “‘Geometrical concepts are ‘ideal’ 
concepts, they express something which one cannot ‘see’; their ‘origin,’ and therefore their content also, is 
essentially other than that of the descriptive concepts . . . . which on occasions [as] morphological essences 
‘approximate’ more or less [ideal concepts], without ever reaching them . . . .’” (Origin 134 n159, Husserl’s 
emphasis).  The paradoxical state is of qualified, quasi idealities, ‘morphological idealities,’ advancing the 
material, empirical reality of expressions of geometrical exactitude and, at the same time, assuring the 
possibility of its pure ideality ad infinitum return.  
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possibility of repeating signification, “speech constitutes the object.”81 Indeed, Derrida 
seems to suggest, if language assures objective ideality, it must structurally operate as 
ideal in the first place. 
 Language’s fecundity as the primary movement of idealization, the discourse that 
constitutes the ideal as infinite possibility, is itself predicated on “the ‘again and again,’ 
[immer wieder] the iterative ‘over and over again,’ or the ‘and so forth’ as fundamental 
forms of idealization” (Origin 135).   Derrida is clear about the fundamentally 
reproductive nature of language:  
When I effectively use words . . . . I must from the outset operate (within) a 
structure of repetitions whose basic element can only be representative . . . 
.  A sign which take place but ‘once’ would not be a sign . . . . it can 
function as a sign, and in general as language, only if a formal identity 
enables it to be issued again [my emphasis] and to be recognized.  This 
identity is necessarily ideal.  It thus implies representation: as Vorstellung, 
the locus of ideality in general, as Vergegenwärtigung, the possibility of 
reproductive repetition in general, and as Repräsentation, in so far that 
each signifying event is a substitute (for the signified as well as for the 
ideal form of the signifier).  Since this representative structure is 
signification itself, I cannot enter into an ‘effective’ discourse without 
being from the start involved in unlimited representation.  
                                                                                                (SP 50) 
                                                 
81 In referencing language here, Derrida calls our attention to the so called “transcendental language” as 
that which is restricted to transcendent subjectivity, saying, “we are speaking of transcendental language 
insofar as, on the one hand, the latter is ‘constituting’ compared with ideal Objectivity, and, on the other 
hand, insofar as it is not confused in its pure possibility with any de facto empirical language” (Origin 77, 
n76). 
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  Yet, we must ask, what causes such representation to occur, that is, a 
representation that is nonderivative (Vergegenwärtigung), reproductive, repetitious 
representation in the form of signification?  We have established that if language is 
repetitiously fecund, then language must be ideal.  We have also established that 
language is intrinsic to the differential temporal formation of intersubjective sense, in 
becoming the ideal juridical tool that assures subjectivity’s phenomenological 
constitution of ideal objective properties.82  Hence, rather than disregard the ideality of 
language, seeing it as merely “morphological ideality,” Derrida manipulates Husserl’s 
fundamentally transcendental philosophy in showing that if “authentic,” 
“uncontaminated” idealities are repeatable, the investigation must begin within the 
scheme of inherently systematic differential dynamic of language, which supplements  
the paradigmatic absence found in the temporal nucleus of intersubjective ideality.   More 
to the point, we are dealing with the Idea of language as transcendentally consolidating 
the irreconcilable state of an absence and its repetition as ideality.  Crucially, we are 
dealing with the Derridean trace as the paradoxically primordial, yet, nonderived 
representation of the inborn, defining intersubjective temporal absence, in assuring its 
constitutive, transcendental repetition [ideality] through the trace’s state as 
                                                 
82 We suggest that you reference our n63, n64 both of which deal with the formation of temporal and lingo-
spatial intersucjective transcendence.  To that effect, Derrida asks: “For, is the recognition in language of 
what constitutes absolute ideal Objectivity, as far as it states this Objectivity, not just another way of 
announcing or repeating that transcendental intersubjectivity is the condition of Objectivity?  At bottom, 
the problem of geometry’s origin puts the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity on par with that 
of the phenomenological origin of language” (Origin 79).  This is a profound observation.  In fact, when he 
discusses the trace, Derrida gets close in connecting intersubjectivity and language, putting forward a 
proposition as to how differentiated Husserlian intersubjectivity is propagated in concert with the idea of 
signs, though anticipating failure in proving that such a process is viable without elapsing into yet another 
form of metaphysics. 
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“protowriting.”83   Thus, it is through the trace’s quasi-ideal status as the infinitely 
heterogeneous referential possibilities inherent in the notion of “general text” or “general 
language,” that we come to understand intersubjective temporality.84  What is at stake is, 
of course, the flailing purity of temporal intersubjectivity, shown as such through the 
persistent engagement of the Derridean trace.  We must, therefore, elucidate the condition 
of the trace as elemental to the non-explicable state of the constitutive properties of 
“general language,” even as we point to the trace’s inherent iterative, temporal and spatial 
differential exigencies in “strangely” propelling deconstructing différance, all, we must 
stress, through a textual, “ontic” metaphor.  Now, as to the ways the aforementioned 
explication touches our proposition, we hope to show how textual phenomenon persists 
                                                 
83 We speak here of “archi-writing,” protowriting, “the movement of differance, irreducible archi-synthesis 
[which]. . . . cannot, as the condition of all linguistic systems, form a part of the linguistic system itself and 
be situated as an object in its field” (OG 60). Hence, much like Heideggerian understanding of the 
engulfing sway of Being, one cannot speak of a directive dynamic and identify it within its constituent 
field. Therefore, for Derrida, archi and proto writing designate a conceptually overarching economy of 
writing, “a new concept of writing,” in which “synthesis and referrals. . . . forbid . . . . that a simple element 
be present in and of itself, referring only to itself” (Positions 26, Derrida’s emphasis).   As protowriting 
concerns our proposition, the plethora of signs is connected to the lingual reproductive viability inherent in 
the quasi ideal conception of language, emergent in the phenomenologically textual as a movement 
performing the workings of the trace.  In examining Freud’s impossible dialectic of the subject’s 
conscious/unconscious as contributing to trace’s conceptual topographical space, within the schema of 
reproductive textuality, Derrida explains the fundamental impossibility of viewing the text as a vehicle of 
unconscious truth or presence: “There is not present text in general, and not even a past present text, a text 
which is past as having been present.  The text is not conceivable in an originary or modified form of 
presence.  The unconscious text is already “a weave of traces . . . . a text nowhere present, consisting of 
archives which are always already transcriptions . . . . repositories of a meaning that was never present, 
whose signified presence is always constituted by deferral” (“Freud and the Scene of Writing” 211).  
Derrida views the trace as a protolanguage movement, which will always forbid “the style of transcendental 
phenomenology [which] describes the living present as primordial and incessant synthesis . . . . led back 
upon its assembling self, by retentional and protentional openings.”  Such temporalization is “simple 
dialectical complication of presence [unlike] Freud’s alterity of the unconscious” (“Difference” 152).     
84 General language, much like general text is the design, idea, form of language, void of  “all ontological 
status” (Tain of the Mirror 283) and is akin to “arche-writing [which] is not reducible to the production of 
durable signs” (ibid. 277).   I argue of course that such idea of language transforms Saussure’s structural 
understanding of language to language that is an ontological abstraction.  Delimited by its lack of empirical 
state, language “in general” is the necessary ideality in explicating all else with, nonetheless, a crucial 
deconstructive caveat that it undercuts all forms of metaphysics of presence when it escapes our ability to 
perceive it in the impossible totality of its inherently referential heterogeneity and its infinite differential 
division.  Such is the idea of “general writing,” as protowriting, which disturb metaphysical conceptuality 
of temporality as pure by showing that ideals of purity are contingent upon the effects of writing, that is to 
say, grammatological, inscriptional spatial effects. 
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in sustaining its metaphorical and empirical condition as a drama of supplemented 
idealities, in emphasizing the spatiotemporal movement underlying signification.  We 
hope, as we have stressed on several occasions, to show that such ontological openings 
mark a deconstructive space that is akin to those spaces that Suzan-Lori Parks’s plays 
reveal.  As we are about to discover, nothing defines deconstructive space better than the 
absent nonpresence of the trace.  
To understand the life of the trace and its persistent return, we must follow 
Derrida in locating it in the ideal core of the transcendental subject’s intersubjective auto-
affective temporality.  That is, Derrida de-construct Husserl’s intersubjective temporal 
flux by showing that its fluid auto-affective dynamic is constituted through differences, 
which “introduce into self-presence from the beginning all the impurity putatively 
excluded from it.  The living presence springs forth out of its nonidentity with itself and 
from the possibility of a retentional trace.  It is always already a trace” (SP, 85). 85   
                                                 
85 In deconstructing the temporal scheme of intersubjective constitution, the “retentional trace” is 
understood as “an irreducible nonpresence as having a constituting value and with it “a nonlife, a 
nonpresence or nonself-belonging of the living present, an irreducible non-primordiality” (SP 6-7).  Hence, 
the trace is the constitutive element of “the living present” as the absence of its self-presence in 
differentially defining “the living present” through the totally other within it.  In understanding Husserl’s 
monumental blueprint of the transcendental ego’s auto-affective temporality, we must elucidate terms such 
as retention, protention, punctual (instant) now, and living, thick presence.  According to Husserl when 
maintaining an awareness of an object, the conscious and constitutive subject’s temporality is marked by a 
continuous presence, the living present, which assures a durational perception of an object.  However, 
Derrida points to the impossibility of continuous subjective self-presence (consciousness) by arguing that 
the “instant as a point . . . . concept of the now . . . . the present as punctuality of the instant . . . . discretely 
but decisively sanctions the whole system of “essential distinctions” (SP 60-1).  Hence, Derrida “exploits 
the tension” in Husserl’s account of the instant now and “thick presence” (Rosenthal, Sandra B. “Sign, 
Time, and the Viability of Trace: Derrida and Peirce.” International Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1996): 
19-28) p. 21.  In so doing, Derrida hinders Husserl’s account of the pure continuity of the “living present” 
as presence, proving that indivisible, “simple” presence is not available.  What is more, Derrida 
complicates the concept of “the actual now,” im selben Augenblick, the temporality that “defines . . . 
philosophical thought . . ., evidence itself . . ., governs every possible concept of truth and sense” (SP  62), 
in suggesting that its persistent presence is another example of a tradition that carries “Greek metaphysics 
of presence into the ‘modern’ metaphysics of presence understood as self-consciousness” (ibid 63); he 
notes, in fact, that “as soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not now, perception and 
nonpreception . . . . in the primordial impression, we admit the other into the self-identity of the 
Augenblick” (ibid. 65).  Moreover, the introduction of the other to the living present (as self-consciousness) 
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In identifying the trace as inhabiting the subject’s both retentional and 
protentional temporal impressions, Derrida shows that its presence is  
defined through past and future impression while simultaneously rendering the presence 
of its living present tenably and internally absent.  Derrida explains the trace’s 
retentionally and protentionally “dividing” economy of subjective presence: 
This trace relates no less to what is called the future than what is called the 
past, and it constitutes what is called the present by this very relation to 
what is it not . . . . In order for it to be, an interval must separate it from 
what it is not; but the interval that constitutes it in the present must also 
divide the present in itself, thus dividing, along with the present, 
everything that can be conceived on its basis, that is, every being—in 
particular, for our metaphysical language, the substance or subject . . . . it 
is constitution of the present as a “primordial” and irreducibly nonsimple, 
                                                                                                                                                 
causes the living present’s displacement, which results in inherent absence; however, if we still perceive it 
as presence, it is because “the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is 
continuously compounded with nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation 
(retention and protention)” (ibid. 64).  Significantly, primary memory for Derrida is a repeating, retentional 
trace; whereas for Husserl it is “a conceptual phase [in which when] ‘a primordial datum, a new phase, 
emerges the preceding one is not lost but is retained in concept’” (Johanna M. Tito,“Praise of Presence: 
Rethinking Presence with Derrida and Husserl,”  Philosophy Today 45.2 (2001): 154-67, Tito quotes from 
Husserl’s Internal Time Consciousness 63) p. 155. Antithetically, secondary memory for Husserl is 
characterized by imagination and reproduction.  Crucially for Derrida, reproduction identifies the trace’s 
connection to signification whereby “the trace implies that there is a repetition that is prior to any present 
impression” (Derrida and Husserl 193).  Hence, retentional and protentional impressions are “essentially 
and indispensably involved” in constituting the possibility of “the actual now,” thus, problematizing the 
status of the living present as presence (SP 64).  Although Husserl views “retention and its consequent 
endurance [as] a kind of primary memory, a presence which is not the result of productive imagination 
yielding a separate act of repetition . . . .,” considering the introduction of “the instant or punctual now to 
the living presence,” he might have difficulty proving “experience as enduring within an ‘endless 
continuum of duration’” (Patrick Bourgeois, “The Instant and the Living Present: Ricoeur and Derrida 
Reading Husserl.” Philosophy Today 37 (1993): 31-7) p. 32.  The question is if retentional and protentional 
elements, as alternate elements of nonpresent /nonidentity to the “actual now,” cause the collapse of the 
subject’s durational state as a living present, “the thick now,” how does the transcendental subject tenably 
upholds its presence?  For that, Derrida turns to the trace, finding its absent impression in 
phenomenological retentional and protentional elements, deconstructively redefining these temporalities 
within the movement of differance (“Differance” 152). 
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and, therefore, in the strict sense nonprimordial, synthesis of traces, 
retentions, and protentions that I propose to call protowriting, prototrace, 
or differance.                                             
                                                             (“Differance” 143, my emphasis)                            
In the phenomenological design, proto-ness as such refers to constitutionality of 
an ideal and thus to its concealed origin.  Yet unlike Husserl, who segregates his 
transcendental ego and its constitutive idealities from the tools of the idealization, 
Derrida distinguishes his quasi metaphysical forms by necessarily situating them within a 
spatial sojourn, appropriated through reproductive, repeating differentiating signs, and 
identifying them in the “nonprimordial” state of subjective, transcendent temporal 
deferrals.  More to the point, now that we have discussed the Derridean trace’s absent 
temporal intervention in agitating the conceptual purity of all transcendent temporalities, 
its interrogation as quasi metaphysical deconstructive movement must explicate on its 
possibilities as ideal and, therefore, its iterative practices.  Crucially, in investigating the 
trace’s iterability, we must follow its “falling back” into language and hence revealing a 
reproductive, repeating, and, as it must be, ideal space.  Therefore, when Derrida is 
specific in stating that in its persistent temporal reemergence “the self of the living 
present is primordially a trace [and that] . . . . Being primordial must be thought of on the 
basis of the trace, and not the reverse” (SP 85), we must point to the fact that if the living 
present is a trace first of all, then the living presence’s temporality is nonprimordial.86  At 
                                                 
86 Hence, the trace thwarts the possibility of the primordial [presence, origin], which is “being constituted 
on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system” (Positions 26).  What 
inhabits any concept is a trace of its other, forbidding any concept’s claim to origin as such; therefore, 
deconstructively speaking, “The trace is not only the disappearance of origin . . . . it means that the origin 
did not even disappear, that it was never constituted expect reciprocally by nonorigin, the trace, which thus 
becomes the origin of the origin” (OG 61).   
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the same time, we must also point out that if nonoriginary primordiality “overtakes” the 
trace, it is precisely because of its deconstructive position as “protowriting,” that is, its 
conceptual eminence as reinscription of reproductive representation 
(Vergegenwärtigung).87  Indeed, although a “nonoriginary origin,” a “nonpresence,”88 a 
persistent impure temporal sediment as a deferring, constitutive absence, the trace gains 
spatial hypostatization as an “ontic metaphor,” through its status as “archi writing. . . . 
opening in one and the same possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the 
other and language” (OG 60),  representing, in effect, an understanding through which 
deconstruction reinvents language as structurally ontological.   
                                                 
87 When we speak of repetition fundamental to the anticipation of returning signification, we speak of 
reproductive representation that is intrinsic to “differences [which] appear among the elements or rather 
produce them, make them emerge as such and constitute the texts, the chains, and the system of traces.  
These chains and systems cannot be outlined except in the fabric of this trace or imprint” (OG 65).  Hence, 
conceptual spatial “imprint” such as that of the trace is the offspring of differences, even as the trace itself 
ensures their return.  Consequently, differences are allocated through retentional and protentional traces, 
not representing a presence as such but rather a repetition, indicated through language’s promise of 
reproductivity.  According to Derrida, “re-tention and re-presentation” are the “forms” inhabiting “the 
living now,” traces through which a repeated return of its deferred absence is gained through its openness 
as presence upon ideality: “Without reducing the abyss, which may indeed separate retention from re-
presentation [as vorstellung]. . . we should be able to say a priori that their common root—the possibility of 
re-petition in its most general form, that is, the constitution of a trace in the most universal sense—is a 
possibility which not only must inhabit the pure actuality of the now but must constitute it through the very 
movement of difference it introduces” (SP 67).  Constitutes even as it is constituted, the re-tentional trace 
re-emerges through re-presentational re-productivity in the repeating ideality of “the pure actuality of the 
now,” in assuring its ad infinitum re-turn in alterable state of lack.   
88 Even as we are about to expound on the quasi spatial status of the trace, we must follow Derrida in 
emphasizing its condition as an “effaced” “nonpresence,” facilitating the impossibility of substantive 
presence as such: “The trace is not a presence but is rather the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, 
displaces, and refers beyond itself. The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the 
very structure of the trace. Effacement must always be able to overtake the trace; otherwise it would not be 
a trace but an indestructible and monumental substance” (“Differance” 156).  Effaced, yet, present as 
nonpresence and, hence, not surprisingly, Derrida identifies it as a “cinder” contending, “I would prefer 
ashes, as a better paradigm for what I call the trace—something that erases itself totally, radically, while 
presenting itself” (“On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the Essex Colloquium,” Research in 
Phenomenology 17 (1987)) p. 177.  In Cinders Derrida repeats the phrase, “cinders there are” (il y a la 
cendre) in suggesting the unavoidable condition of “that which preserves in order no longer to preserve, 
dooming the remnant to dissolution . . . . [yet, remaining by] knowing how to keep itself from showing” 
(Trans. Ned Lukacher, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991) pp. 21, 35.  Interestingly and on the 
mark, translator Ned Lukacher textualizes the heading of his introduction by inserting Mark Antony’s 
introspective remark from Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, “I shall show the cinders of my 
spirits/through the ashes of my chances.”  
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Deconstructively speaking, then, discussing language’s ontological, 
spatiotemporal, elements means discussing the absent habitation of the trace in the 
deferred and differed conceptual sign.  If we once again persist with our examination of 
both Hussrel and Derrida’s “primordial” absences, we find that the trace’s absence carries 
a constitutive pathology similar to that of the Idea in the Kantian sense; similar too is 
their self-engendered, auto-affective economy— mathematical objects and intersubjective 
constituting idealities for Husserl, differences as a constitutive impulses for Derrida.89  
Nonetheless, unlike Husserl, who envisions his subjective monadic ideal as 
homogeneously, expressively[purely univocal] a-lingual,90 Derrida quasi hypostatizes his 
temporally deferring “nonpresence” by ascribing it a spatial dimension through the ultra 
form of signification, “protowriting,” which iteratively propels as it inhabits an interval 
within the auto-affective temporality of transcendental subjective “sense.”91  Henceforth, 
                                                 
89 Caputo, in fact, claims that “by subverting the very idea of ‘origin’ in treating “The Origin of Geometry,” 
Derrida insisted that the principle of deferral, disguised metaphysically by Husserl as the ‘Idea in the 
Kantian sense,’ aught to be confessed outright and built into the very structure of consciousness as a 
principle of différance” (Radical Hermeneutics 131).  As we have mentioned before, Origin is Derrida’s 
pre-deconstructive work, in which one can readily discern the onslaught of deconstructive thinking, lacking 
at the time its full nominal punch.  The so called “principle of differance” was first introduced in Speech 
and Phenomenon as La Voix et le Phénomène by Presses Universalitaires de France in 1967, whereas 
Origin as Edmund Husserl’s L’origine de la géométrie was first published by Presses Universalitaries de 
France in 1962, within which differance as such is never mentioned.  Derrida’s essay “Differance,” 
dedicated completely to the non/concept, was first given as an address before the Société française 
philosophie and published in its bulletin in 1968.      
90 Pointing to Husserl’s crucial understanding of the elucidation of the ego through its totally other and the 
retentive other as “past present” whereby, “now differences within auto-affection” of the subject’s “alter 
ego, constituted within the ego . . . . [as well as] the other present, the past present, as constituted in . . . . 
the living present,” Derrida questions Husserl’s choice in rejecting “the divergence in indicative 
communication and even in signification in general . . . ., for Husserl not only intends to exclude indication 
from ‘solitary mental life’; he will consider language in general, the element of logos, in its expressive form 
itself, as a secondary event, superadded to a primordial and pre-expressive stratum of sense” (SP 68-9). 
91 As we attempt to expound the spatial dimension of the trace, discussing its onto-lingual properties, we 
must make mention of its ethical interval as propounded by Emmanuel Levinas.  In “Violence and 
Metaphysics,” from the Levinaic first ethics of the “face-to-face,” the event of infinite opening of any 
exteriority (the other) within the interiority of the ego, Derrida borrows the idea of the trace as the other 
within a self-presence; yet, unlike Levinas,  Derrida absolves the exacting differential binaries inherent in 
“the emergence of absolute alterity, the emergence of an exteriority which can be neither derived, nor 
engendered, not constitute on the basis of anything other than itself” (WD 106), in distributing differences 
through multiplicity of traces, necessarily avoiding defined presences of both the self and the other.  Then 
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we follow Derrida, who de-onto-theologizes Husserl’s conception of intersubjective 
temporal purity, presence par excellence, by convincingly showing that although sense is 
indeed auto-affectively temporal, its primordial deferral, (that is, the absence of its 
always already collapsed presence, dissimulated, through its retentive and protentive 
traces), is narrated, as it must be, through  the “scène, a theater stage” (SP 86), 
conceptual space of signification: “sense, being temporal in nature, as Husserl 
recognized, is never simply present; it is always already engaged in the ‘movement’ of 
the trace, that is, in the order of ‘signification’” (SP 85).  Now, in admitting that the 
practices of the Derridean trace involve ontological structures of time and space both, we 
must respect and, hence, respond to Derrida’s premises that the fissured temporality of 
intersubjective sense occurs: first, in locating the trace within the “order of 
‘signification,’” and, second, in allowing the ubiquity of the phrase always already 
announce the reproductive, regenerative perpetuity marking inscription and the repeating 
behavior of the trace, whence “This protowriting . . . . is always already at work at the 
origin of sense” (ibid., my emphasis).  In other words, the onto-lingual turn, significant to 
deconstruction and to our proposition, might be understood through the double-life of the 
trace on the intersubjective spatiotemporal cusp and its persistent return; for indeed, if 
                                                                                                                                                 
again Derrida declares, “Thus I relate this concept of trace to what is at the center of the latest work of 
Emmanuel Levinas and his critique of ontology: relationship to illeity as to the alterity of the past that 
never was and can never be lived in the originary or modified form of presence . . . this notion signifies. . . 
the undermining of being as presence and the meaning of language as the full continuity of speech” (OG 
70).  In fact, Derrida partly attributes Levinas’ qualification of the trace in aiding to forge differance: “A 
past that has never been present: this formula is the one that Emmanuel Levinas uses . . . . to qualify the 
trace and enigma of absolute alterity: the Other . . . . the thought of différance implies the entire critique of 
classical ontology undertaken by Levinas” (“Difference” 152).   In the deconstructive trajectory “classical 
ontology,” onto-theology, understood as a totality of a substantive presence, is overturned by differences, 
simultaneously propagated through primordial deferral and regenerative productivity of nonprimordial 
signification.  Hence, the trace is “neither a ground, nor a foundation, nor an origin [and] in no way can it 
provide for a manifest or disguised ontotheology” (Positions 52). 
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through its iteration the trace sustains an opening for idealities and their return, then the 
trace sustains presences, with, however, one deconstructive qualifying caveat—an 
admittance of its pending inability to re-present complete, substantive presences. 
Arguing our first point, the engagement of subjective temporality through the 
trace as protowriting, proto-Idea of-writing, we follow Derrida, who argues that we have 
no other agency in engaging retentional and protentional, past and future, subjective 
temporalities, other than within the incommensurable sedimentations of its traces as 
infinitely heterogeneous possibilities of signification.92   It is through “the order of 
signification” that the trace engages the temporality of the transcendental subject,93 
dispossessing, in the process, western metaphysics from its conception of  pure presence 
by shuttering its inner/outer paradigm in agitating all settled dichotomies, guided by 
                                                 
92 Discussing “constitutive language” in the Origin, Derrida charts our necessary path within a lingual and 
temporal dimension as a way of sustaining “an ideal object” within our “gaze,” our perception in assuring 
its “permanent disposition.”  He argues, “before being the constituted and exceeded auxiliary of an act 
which proceeds toward the truth of sense, linguistic ideality is the milieu in which the ideal object settles as 
what is sedimented or deposited . . . . depositing [however] is not the recording of a private thing, but the 
production of a common  object, i.e., of an object whose original owner is thus dispossessed.  Thus 
language preserves truth, so that truth can be regarded in the henceforth nonephemeral illumination of its 
sojourn; but also so it can lengthen that stay . . . . [the word]  hoarding [thésaurisation] . . . . deposits and 
keeps hold of the truth [and] without which a project of truth and the idea of an infinite task would be 
unimaginable.  That is why language is the element of the only tradition in which (beyond individual 
finitude) sense-retention and sense prospecting are possible” (78, Derrida’s emphasis).  Hence, retentive 
and protentive traces, “sense retention and sense prospecting,” are viable only through language.  In the 
same vein, though dealing with Freud’s memory substratum as the other to conscious stimuli, “‘the 
foundations of memory [which] come about in other, supplementary system . . . . form permanent traces’” 
as writing; “Writing [therefore] supplements perception before perception appears itself.  The ‘perceived’ 
may be read only in the past, beneath perception and after it” (“Freud and the Scene of Writing” 224).   
93 In expounding differance, Derrida discusses the trace in stressing the differential lingual-temporal 
movement being conditioned, even as it conditions by, the practices of the trace, which “is what makes the 
movement of signification possible only if each element that is said to be ‘present,’ appearing on the stage 
of presence, is related to something other than itself but retains the mark of a past element and already lets 
itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element.  This trace relates no less to what is 
called the future that to what is called the past, and it constitutes what is called the present by this very 
relation to what it is not ” (“Diffèrance” 142).  There is no constitution of presence, the constituted present 
is a “nonpresence” as trace, which as “protowriting” opens temporality within itself as spacing.   
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conceptuality of temporal inner purity as antithetical to spatial outer marginality.94  Now, 
following Derrida once again in arguing our second point, we intend to show that the 
temporal impulse, marking the trace of the other as the intesubjective nonpresence, is 
defined by spatial intervention, which, as we have stressed before, fissures substantive 
presence; that is, presence as “determining Being as presence (presence in the form of the 
object, or self-presence under the rubric of consciousness)” (MP 71), which underlies for 
Derrida “the metaphysics of presence.”  In fact, we are dislocating the metaphysics of 
presence95 (intersubjective, pure, and conscious to itself, legitimized through univocality 
of phenomenological expression) by showing that spatiality as such is revealed through 
the trace (outside the intersubjective scheme as indicative, inscriptive, impure, and 
writing as protowriting), which is always already at work in the always already 
reproductive regenerative, and hence, iterative movement of signification.96   We thus 
                                                 
94 We suggest that you refer to our n60 and our explication on the phenomenological “theme of a pure 
inwardness, or the hearing one’s self speak” (SP 86) as irreducibly compacted temporality.  This view is 
disproved by Derrida, who argues that since the spoken had been long gone, the breadth between speaking 
and hearing is filled with repeating signification, intervening and in so doing creating an interval, space, 
through its reproductive representation as Vergegenwärtigung.   Temporality and spatiality are thus 
combine to a seemingly irreducible whole, which is, in effect, fissured by the movement that makes it 
possible, by the movement of the trace, which “is the intimate relation of the living present with its outside, 
the openness upon exteriority in general, upon the sphere of what is not ‘one’s own,’ etc., the 
temporalization of sense is, from the outset, a ‘spacing.’  As soon as we admit spacing both as ‘interval’ or 
difference and as openness upon the outside, there can no longer be any absolute inside,  for the ‘outside’ 
has insinuated itself into the movement by which the inside of the nonspatial, which is called ‘time’ appears 
. . . . ‘the going forth into the world’ [is always already] implied in the movement of temporalization” 
(ibid.), situating the trace on the cusp of the primordial, differential opening of the inside upon itself, which 
is to say that the ultra metaphysical binary of inside/outside is effaced; whereby its outside is a from of its 
inside, in which case, “hearing myself speak,” is already a repetition, which forces temporality to a “pure 
exit of time out of itself” (SP 86).     
95 In disqualifying intersubjective temporality as tenably pure, that it, in “shaking” metaphysics of presence, 
Derrida suggests “venturing beyond our own logos . . . . whenever metaphysics serves as the norm of 
Western speech . . . . allow[ing] the trace of whatever goes beyond the truth of Being to appear/disappear.  
It is a trace of something that can never present itself; it is itself a trace that can never be presented . . . . it 
lies beyond what profoundly ties fundamental ontology to phenomenology” (“Differance” 154).  Though a-
empirical, whereby “in presenting itself it becomes effaced” (ibid.), importantly, Derrida designate a stage, 
a spatial interval crucial for the trace in temporally propelling signification into performing its inscriptional 
textuality, showing, lastly, an opening to potential detachment from “logos,” signified, meaning as such.  
96 “Once again,” we iterate as we stress: “The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which 
amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is the 
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pursue an incomplete, quasi spatial structure of the iterative trace as it engages an 
opening of an ideal, a repeating phenomenal event and/or self-presence, through 
reproductive representation (signification), which is invested in and promulgated by the 
trace.  For indeed, when one hear one’s self speak, the absent of what was spoken/uttered 
can infinitely continue by being written down, that is, through the movement of 
protowriting.  More to the point, hearing is itself a trace of the spoken and, hence, a 
repetitious act, which, finds its lifeline through the iterative regeneration of 
representation, of archi-proto-writing.  Says Derrida, “When I effectively use words . . . . I 
must from the outset operate (within) a structure of repetitions” (SP 50); significantly, 
however, this exponential “structure of repetitions” gains its iterative impetus through the 
“bending back of a return” (SP 68), “regressus ad infinitum . . . . regression to the 
beginning” (Origin 125) in an attempt to recover “the presence of the present.”97  Derrida 
                                                                                                                                                 
difference which opens appearance [l’apparaître] and signification . . . . origin of all repetition, origin of 
ideality, the trace is not more ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent 
signification than an opaque energy and no concept of metaphysics can describe it” (OG 65).  There is no 
defining the trace within its “interval” of differance wherein “constituting itself, dynamically dividing 
itself, this interval is what could be called spacing; time's becoming-spatial or space's becoming-temporal 
(temporalizing)” (“Differance”143).  We also must stress the trace’s condition of iterative nonorigin origin 
as protowriting, breaching, through its conceptual state as inscriptive signification, “all metaphysical drives 
to purity.”  Explicating the spatial interval of the trace, Derrida discusses the khora as that preexisting 
condition to all metaphysical drives to purity, “which [are] never free of traces . . . . What drives them is 
spacing, a khora that prevents them from reaching their purity.  This obstacle, this limit to the pure and full 
plenitude and fulfillment of this drive, is not a negative failure nor is it a threat.  It is also a chance, an 
opening of the desire of the drive.  This obstacle is the condition of possibility of the drive itself” 
(Deconstruction Engaged: The Sydney Seminars, ed. Paul Patton and Terry Smith, Sydney: Power 
Publications, 2001) p. 23.  Writing as “spacing” is the possibility of all drives of idealization, even as the 
trace as writing undermines the viability of their temporal purity.   
97 It seems as if Don DeLillo’s Sister Edgar understands the conceptual impossibility of infinite regression 
to origin, “leaning over the washbasin in her room cleaned a steel wool pad with disinfectant, then [using] 
the pad to scour a scrub brush, cleaning every bristle.  But she hadn’t cleaned the original disinfectant in 
something stronger than disinfectant.  She hadn’t done this because the regression was infinite.  And the 
regression was infinite because it is called infinite regression.  You see how fear spreads beyond the pushy 
extrusions of matter and into the elevated spaces where words play upon themselves” (Underworld, New 
York: Scribner, 1997) p. 251.  Dreading it, Sister Edgar understands that regression, reducibility, to origin 
as what it is, will have to end up with a play of words “upon themselves.”   Yet, there is no end to 
repetitious regression or else what Samuel Beckett’s Clove can possibility mean when he says, “Finished, 
it’s finished, nearly finished, it must be nearly finished” (Endgame, in The Norton Anthology: World 
Masterpieces, Sixth Edition vol. 2, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1992) p. 1930. 
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overturns the phenomenological overarching project of revealing sustainable, expressive, 
univocal, pure presences by asking:  
Does not the fact that this bending back is irreducible in presence or in 
self-presence, that this trace or differance is always older than presence 
and procures of it its openness, prevents us from speaking about a simple 
self-identity ‘im selben augenblick?’  Does this not compromise the usage 
Husserl wants to make of the concept of ‘solitary mental life,’ and 
consequently of the rigorous separation of indication from expression? 
             (SP 68)   
The answer seems to be “self-evident” [here the scare quotes denote the peculiarity of the 
term for deconstruction] whereby “the presence of the present is thought of as arising 
from the bending back, from the movement of repetition and not the reverse” (ibid.).  
Hence, phenomenological eidetic reduction of subjective and objective idealities is, in 
effect, be-labored by signifying iteration, which preexists any possible 
conceptualization.98   
                                                 
98 That is to say, all subjective and objective idealities gain their status as ideal through their possible 
return; that is, through their viable iterate return.  Derrida explains, “The concept of iterability is this 
singular concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, and hence of a concept . . . . But it is also 
the concept that . . . . marks the limit of idealization . . . . of a concept in its relation to the nonconcept” 
(“Afterward” in LI 119).  Both limits and accommodates, the “unique character of this structure of 
iterability, or rather this chain, since iterability can be supplemented by a variety of terms (such as 
différance, grapheme, trace, etc.), lies in the fact that comprising identity and difference, repetition and 
alteration, etc., it renders the project of idealization possible without lending “itself” to any pure, simple, 
and idealizable conceptualization.  No process [procès] or project is possible without iterability, and yet 
iterabilty itself cannot be idealized.  For it comports an internal and impure limit that prevent it form being 
identified, synthesized, or re-appropriated, just as it excludes the reappropriation of that whose iteration it 
nonetheless broaches and breaches [entame]” (LI 71).   Hence “internal impurity” as that of the originary 
impulse of the trace, as the differential trace of the other within the absent presence of self presence, 
propels iterating idealization as nonpresence in its relation to an absent presence, which is necessary for 
“infinity [to] be instituted only in the form of presence upon ideality, as the possibility of a re-turn ad 
infinitum” (SP 67).  Return is prescribed through the possibilities of inscriptive iterability, assuring as it is 
limiting tenable movement of ideality.    
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 As we explicate phenomenological structures of origin through the Idea in the 
Kantian sense, we find that idealization, the language propagating/constituting the 
content of the Idea, that is, its possibility as an ideal, is metaphysical.  We have also 
revealed that what characterizes idealization as metaphysics is its supplemental structures 
of putative purities that are differentially defined by traces of what they are not, in 
compulsory relation to the same self assume purities’ absent presences (we speak here of 
the ideal states of the presence of the self-present and a tenable objective presence).  Re-
stressing the tenets of our proposition again, we are set to show how inherent 
spatiotemporal, auto-affective regeneration underlies metaphysical discourse in attesting 
to pre-subsisting traces (conceptual “general language” as protowriting and as “spacing”) 
that promise a concept’s opening within the closure of its temporal purity, demarcating a 
concept’s nonpresences within its proclaimed substantive presences, while assuring its 
return as an ideal.  Hence, we set out to show how processes of deconstructive poetics 
underlie dramaturgical views of conceptual and empirical textual dramatics, wherein 
inscribed engramme-atic signifiers perform the spatiotemporal problematic inherent to 
structures of idealization.  Deconstructively, we speak here of metaphysical discourse, 
which through processes of self-characterization,99 emphasizes the difficulty of its 
impossible dual state as both unsubstantiated dogmatic and its tenacious return as ideal.  
We claim that such strife is invested in the nonprimordial primordialilty differential of a 
deconstructive textual particular, differance, marked, as Derrida stresses, by “obtrusive 
                                                 
99 In misspelling the word difference to create his landmark neologism differance, Derrida explains that 
such aberration is “necessary in the course of writing about writing, and of writing within writing” 
(“Differeance” 131), pronouncing/inscribing, henceforth, a dynamic of self-reflexivity through the textual 
difference of differance.   
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character” (“Differance” 131) and, as it were, marking all textual possibilities insofar as 
they are understood deconstructively. 
 If Derrida’s philosophy of language is a meditation upon the heterogeneity 
intrinsic to referential, differential chains of signifiers in an incessant conceptual “play,” 
it is because he reveals it in the “epochal” thinking of our time.100  Nonetheless, through 
the empirically textual, morphemic irregularity of differance, the gram, the inscribed a, 
which is in fact silent, Derrida’s call aims to “refer to an order that resists philosophy’s 
founding opposition between the sensible and the intelligible,” between writing and 
speech in pronouncing differance’s  spatiotemporal intervention as the ultimate condition 
of all metaphysical thinking.  Therefore, in auto-affectively “constituting itself, 
dynamically dividing itself” in creating an “interval [which] is what could be called 
spacing; time’s becoming-spatial or space’s becoming-temporal (temporalizing)” 
(“Differance”143), differance infuses conceptual metaphysics with fundamental onto-
lingual primordial division.101  And so, though differance “‘produces’ differences,” which 
                                                 
100 Derrida points to “the difference of forces in Nietzsche, Saussure’s principle of semiological differences, 
differing as the possibility of . . . . impression and delayed effect in Freud, difference as the irreducibility of 
the trace of the other in Levinas, and the ontic-ontological difference in Heidegger” (“Differance” 130).   
At the outset, Derrida states that he employs his differences in following Heidegger, whose differences 
“indicate the closure of presence” (ibid. 131).  Heidegger’s cosmic “dif-ference” thus textualized, is a 
“dimension [which] apportions world and thing [and] opens up the separateness and towardenss of world 
and thing . . . . The dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world’ it 
disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of things . . . . the dif-ference, as the middle for world and 
things, metes out the measure of their presence.  In the bidding that calls things and world, what is really 
called is: the dif-ference.”  Persuasively, Heidegger discusses the “stilling” nature of “dif-ference” into 
which things repose, even as they gain their definition.  Lastly, dif-ference “gathers the two [world and 
things] out of itself as it calls them into the rift that is dif-ference itself.”  Heidegger then identifies 
language as “the pill of stilling [which] is, inasmuch that the dif-ference takes place” (“Language” in The 
Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, New York: Norton & Company, 2001) pp. 1130,1132.  
Derrida’s understanding of differences echoes, yet, again when Heidegger examines differences of 
language and thinking, “poetry and thinking [which] are held apart by luminous difference . . . . not 
separated if separation is to mean cut off into a relational void.  The parallels intersect in the infinite” (On 
the Way to Language, Trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 90.    
101 Division is the first order of differance, beginning within the auto-affective temporality of “hearing 
one’s self speak,” in sustaining one’s sense by hearing one’s words within one’s living present, in effect, 
making subjective presence inescapable; at the same time, however, the tenability of the words one hears 
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are “themselves effects [which] have not fallen from the sky ready made,” differance 
itself is “nonfull, nonsimple ‘origin’; it is the structured and differing origin of 
differences” (“Differance” 140-1).102  Primary to differences “in a chain or a system” 
within which “every concept is inscribed . . . . referring to another and to other concepts, 
by the systematic play of differences . . . ., differance is no longer simply a concept, but 
the possibility of conceptuality, of the conceptual system and process in general” (ibid.).   
There is no stepping outside of differences, which really means that there is no avoiding 
infinite state of deferrals; for indeed, “without differance as temporalization, without the 
nonpresence of the other inscribed within the sense of presence” (OG 71), any kind of 
conceptualization will be out of our reach.  Hence, nothing can be understood in 
isolation, things are what they are because they differ, which is to say that they infinitely 
defer their primordial definition.  Thus, deferral, delayed response, a temporal opening, 
the “sollicitare [which] means in old Latin, to shake all over, to make the whole tremble 
                                                                                                                                                 
within one’s living present dissolves, always already making subjective living presence a thing of the past.  
This is differance’s divisionary point within and through which subjective presence always escapes the 
subject, who is always delayed to its own complete subjective temporality.  Nonetheless, to overcome the 
loss of presence, to supplement sense, one participates in the “again and again” (Origin 134) iterative 
movement of the trace, in bringing back memory to sense.  Hence, iteration is the movement that differance 
makes possible in supplementing the absence of subjective presence: “. . . what is supplementary in reality 
is différance, the operation of differing which at one and the same time fissures and retards presence, 
submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay” (SP 88).  However, if the subject’s 
“simultaneously” divided and delayed [already gone] presence is to be perpetually recovered, then its 
immediate, yet, finite temporality [the voice, speech] must be infinitely returned through the continual 
supplementarity of differance, which materializes through “. . . . writing of difference, this fabric of the 
trace [which] permits the difference between space and time to be articulated . . . .” (OG 65-6).  If, 
therefore, subjective sense is to survive, graphic, grammatical [as gram, an inscriptive unit] possibilities 
must assure its return; moreover, if graphemic possibilities are to survive, differance must “articulate” 
idealization in the form of anticipation of a return and, in effect, of a return of the trace in the form of full, 
substantive presence; yet, aporetically, we must also remember that “effacement must always be able to 
over takes the trace” (“Differance” 156), which is “nothing, it is not an entity, it exceeds the question ‘What 
is?’ and contingently makes it possible” (OG 75).   
102 Hence, as “differing origin” differance itself becomes the primordial dividing and divided temporality.  
It comes to no surprise, therefore, when Derrida declares: “There is no essence of différance: not only can it 
not allow itself to be taken up into the as such of its name or its appearing, but it threatens the authority of 
the as such in general, the thing's presence in its essence. That there is no essence of différance at this point 
also implies that there is neither Being nor truth to the play of writing, insofar as it involves différance” 
(“Difference” 158, Derrida’s emphasis). 
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[as the outcome of] What is questioned by the thought of differance [which is] . . . . the 
determination of being as presence . . . .” (“Differance” 153).103  Concluding his essay 
“Differance,” unnaming the name of Being through differance, in mentioning 
Nietzschean “affirmation” of play “conceived without nostalgia . . . . with certain 
laughter and with certain dance,” Derrida refers to “Heideggerian hope” as the 
disturbance of the dialectic underlying being (“Differance” 159-160).  Quoting from 
Heidegger’s “The Anaximander Fragment,” Derrida discusses “the question,” that is, the 
state of differance within which opening one participate in dynamics of indecision.  Here, 
deconstructive “undecidability,” as a function of differance, agitates the historically 
decided binary opposition in showing that its elements, rather than be calcified and 
detached, are “held in a relation of non-absolute, incomplete, non-oppositional 
differences” (A Derrida Dictionary 150).  If, and we follow Derrida in quoting Heidegger 
here, “Being / speaks / through / every / language; / everywhere and always /,” then the 
Being of beings is always already differentially and deferentially referential. 
 Through this noticeably textually dually fractured text, we aim to show the 
mitigating spaces of differance as inscriptive textuality, that is, as the ultimate performing 
testament of the deconstructive contestation Suzan-Lori Parks stages on her pages. 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 The “trembling” of the occidental conceptual temporal stronghold is gained, henceforth, through the 
inscriptive “gram as différance, structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the basis of the 
opposition presence/absence . . . . a systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the 
spacing by means of which elements relate to each other . . . . the becoming-space of the spoken chain—
which has been called temporal or linear; a becoming-space which makes possible both writing and every 
correspondence between speech and writing, every passage from one to other” (Positions 27).     
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Part II 
 
Suzan-Lori Parks and the Conceptual Turn 
 
As the imprint of king Hamlet’s ghostly specter disappears, Horatio exclaims, 
“Stay, illusion!” (Hamlet 1.1.131), expressing William Shakespeare’s profound 
understanding of the differentially dichotomous state of experience and concept thereof 
and, for that matter, the locum of the theatrical impulse gained through the 
incommensurable gap between reality and representation.104  As some academicians in 
literary studies question the merits of scholarly criticism on the one hand, while, on the 
other, fail to comprehensively account for the philosophical structures they use, I aim to 
demonstrate that contemporary American playwrights like Suzan-Lori Parks adhere to a 
heritage of philosophical, self-reflexive, conceptual trajectory that is germane to all 
                                                 
104 Illusion making is the business of theater and in the act of “hold[ing] as’t were the mirror up to nature” 
(Hamlet 3.2.22), theater comments on its inability to represent reality.  Nonetheless, by producing illusions, 
self-reflexively and repetitiously enacting its failure, theater becomes a persistent viaduct to the absent 
shadow of the real.  Says Herbert Blau: “there is something in the nature of theater which from the very 
beginning of theater has always resisted being theater” (The Eye of Prey: Subversions of the Postmodern. 
Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987) p. 185.  Still, Artaud’s vision of pure 
representation is as Blau remarks, impossibility: “There is nothing more illusory in performance than the 
illusion of the unmediated.  It is a very powerful illusion in the theater, but it is theater, and it is theater, the 
truth of illusion, which hunts all performances, whether or not it occurs in the theater” (quoted in Marvin 
Carson, Performance: A Critical Introduction. New York: Rutledge, 1996) p. 513.  Self-reflexive dialogue 
and action in a theatrical performance, which underlie metatheratrical structures, within which dramatists 
concentrate on theater’s inability to represent the real, peak with Brechtian verfremdungseffekt.  Brecht’s 
alienation effect is metatheatrical because it fissures the space between the proscenium arch and audience 
so as to agitate audience’s comfort with naturalistic/illusionist view of theatrical performance.  John Willett 
describes Brecht’s A-effect as an effort “to shatter illusion and stop the reader or the spectator from getting 
swept away by the story, the characters, the actors who represented them on stage, and/or the naturalistic 
devices with which that stage set out to make their representation truly life-like” (Brecht in Context: 
Comparative Approaches, New York, Methuen, 1984) p. 219.  Historically speaking, we can find 
metatheatric, or, if you will, metadramatic structures in works by Marlowe (Sara Munson Deats and Lisa S. 
Stark, “So neatly plotted, and so well perform’d: Villain as Playwright in Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta,” 
Theater Journal 44(1992): 375-89), Shakespeare (James L. Calderwood, Shakespearean Metadrama, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), and most noticeably Luigi Pirandello’s trilogy of Six 
Characters in Search of an Author (1921) Each in his Own Way (1924), and Tonight We Improvise (1930).  
Of course and again, there is no discounting Samuel Beckett, whose Hamm is both playwright and director.  
As we shall see, Suzan-Lori Parks’s play is a careful referential subversion of illusionist, traditional drama 
with distinct Brechtian and Beckettian underpinnings.      
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possible production of dramatic discourse.105  As I am about to discuss Parks’s 
consciousness of spatiotemporal perpetuated textuality, a movement which, as I have 
shown, procures its conceptual, formal design from both phenomenological and 
deconstructive investigations, I am simultaneously suggesting that in The America Play, 
Parks’s dramaturgical scope is underscored by critical sensibilities that subversively, that 
is, reflexively, locates her work within Western philosophical tradition.  For indeed, her 
ontological reflection begins with a somewhat universal quest for the “exploration of 
The-Drama-of-the-Black-Person-as-an-Integral-Facet-of-the-Universe.”106  In an online 
                                                 
105At the 2006 MLA annual convention in Philadelphia, I felt dumbfounded when I heard David Kastan out 
of Colombia purport that we are “after theory,” fantastically, in a position to enclose our examination of a 
play in the present, in what he identified as “presentism,” as if the so called “presentism” itself can be 
isolated from processes of theorization and as if anything in the presence, including a literary work, can be 
examined in its pure, temporally unadulterated form.  What is more, Early Modern scholars were not the 
only ones moving away from a conceptually critical design.  In speaking about “Theorizing the 
Performance Archives,” performance theorist Elin Diamond out of Rutgers contends that she aspires to 
reveal “things as they are,” forgetting that all conceptualization occurs relationally through language, a 
process that will, as it must, always keep investigation one step removed from the archives she attempts to 
reveal.  As discussions progressed, it became abundantly clear that some scholars adopted none-reflexive, 
uncritical, usage of their concepts, moving on parallel lines of rejecting any kind of theoretical bearing and 
negligent usage of philosophical terms that verge on flagrant reproduction of metaphysics.  Hence, when in 
discussing “Missing Persons,” someone out of Boston University, constructs a subjective “monad,” which 
generates its definition from “within” and is analyzed through presence, which is “unlike Derrida’s,” and 
when someone from the university of Southern California examines the subject through Leibniz’s 
understanding of the solipsistic ego, avoiding almost 70 years of investigation and problematiztion of 
Heidegger’s  Dasein-ic, contingent subject, one must wonder about the state of our discipline and its 
critical, self-reflexive practices.  I intend to show that it is on the cusp of conceptuality and experience, the 
Heideggerian ontological/ontic differential, fundamental to Derrida’s understanding of differance, Suzan-
Lori Parks’s works function, persistently commenting on their inability to depart from a conceptual 
heritage, while problematizing their success in gaining tangible materiality.  Certainly, here I must make 
mention of my former mentor’s view of the bankrupt state of literary theory.  Anthony Kubiak goes as far 
as to link poststructural, performance theory, specifically Judith Butler’s “canonization of multiplicity . . . 
assumption that multiplicity and instability are inherently liberatory” to problems ranging from “MPD” 
(multiple personality disorder) to “other phenomena in the world realpolitik” (Agitated States. Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2002) p. 160.  Although Kubiak makes a complex and compelling 
argument in linking American cultural ailments to prevailing historically anti-theatrical sentiments, 
nonetheless, when arguing against poststructural, performance theory’s adoption of “multiplicity and 
instability,” he avoids acknowledging that the condition of conceptuality is inherently heterogeneous.  
Henceforth, when Husserl tells us that, “philosophy is the systematic description of pure possibilities that 
subtend any possible real world,” we may safely agree that “possibilities” are conceptual and as such 
infinitely multiple.  Thus, in philosophizing, we must, at every turn, contemplate heterogeneity of 
possibilities so as to consciously reject monolithically calcified, rigid and ultimately dogmatic thinking.   
106 (Suzan-Lori Parks, “An Equation of Black People Onstage” in The America Play and Other Works) p. 
21.  In discussing contemporary American playwrights’ indebtedness to Samuel Beckett, which really 
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excerpt Parks emphasizes, “. . . . while also being interested in human emotions and the 
human condition . . . . I am most interested in Time and how people pass through it,”107 
adding on another occasion, “It’s not only trying to tell the story of your people, or put 
the blame on somebody. . . . learn that the important thing is to solve the riddle of the 
universe . . . . quantum theory . . . . atomic theory. . . . ‘The Big Bang Theory’ . . . . 
resonate in our daily lives . . . . so it’s bigger thing that makes for more interesting 
relationships between things.”108  
Western metaphysics unavoidably carry pathologically traumatizing echoes of 
enslavement and racial discrimination.109  Certainly, Parks’s works are about blacks; yet, 
                                                                                                                                                 
means indebtedness to Western dramatic and philosophical heritage, Tony Kushner says, “Suzan-Lori 
Parks is an interesting case, because she's on one level a very opulent and lyrical writer but also one who 
explores terseness and abbreviation and silence and aporia of various kinds. She has a very clear debt to the 
Beckettian tradition” (Jonathan Kalb, “American Playwrights on Beckett,” PAJ: A Journal of Performance 
and Art 29.1 (2007): 1-20) p. 8.  Silences—as absences, as ideas, as a formal design—propel Parks’s 
ontological vision of her dramaturgy.  Discussing The America Play, Parks states that she attempts to 
“encourage people to think about the idea of America in addition to the actual day-to-day reality of 
America” (Michelle Pearce, “Alien Nation: An Interview with the Playwright,” American Theater 13.2 
(1994): 26).  An Idea, design or a map is what “a playwright provides . . . . there are 10 roads, 20, 50 
roads—take one.  No one way of doing a play, provide a design and let the director, audience make a 
choice. . . a bad play only has a one-way road”( Shelby Jiggetts, “Interview with Suzan-Lori Parks,” 
Callaloo 19.2 (1996): 309-17) p. 312.  Asked by interviewer Jeffery Brown about her latest publication 365 
Days 365 Plays, in what sense these, at times less than page long plays, are plays, Parks describes a play as 
having an opening, “a doorway from its conception” ( Interview with Jeffery Brown, The News Hour with 
Jim Lehrer, PBS, 22  December 2006) .  An opening, an unenclosed space, however, does not mean that 
Parks is not adamant about a playwright’s necessary skill to aim at her audiences’ intuition: “what I think 
theater or a play should do is provide the opportunity to feel it in your gut,” even as she declares that “The 
most exciting thing about theater is that it’s about theater” and in so doing underlies the conceptual rigor of 
metatheatrical dynamic. (“Interview with Suzan-Lori Parks” 313).   
107 (“Suzan-Lori Parks playwright & screenwriter” Theater ’96  8 June 2004     
http://www.alpertawards.org/archive/winner96/parks.html).  As we are about to discover, conceptuality of 
time and space are crucial to Parks’s textual scope.  On the same occasion, Parks specifies, however, that, 
“A by-product of Time is History - what is remembered, recorded and transported into the next age. History 
- the destruction and creation of it through theatre pieces and how Black people fit into all of this.”   Hence, 
Robert Burstein’s assertion that “Parks’s writing has always been as much a product of Western 
postmodernism as of African-American consciousness and the black experience, an unusual amalgam of 
the two,” comes to no surprise. (in Jonathan Kalb, “Remarks on Parks: A Symposium on the Work of 
Suzan-Lori Parks.” Hunter online Theater Review 30 April 2004.  24 September 2006 
 http://www hotreview.org/articles/remarksparks2.htm)  
108 (“Interview with Suzan-Lori Parks” 314).     
109 These echoes are explicit in what some scholars identify as Parks’s “history plays.”  Although The 
America Play is one of them, looking through the dramatis personae of plays such as The Last Dead Man in 
the Whole Entire World (1992) and Imperceptible Mutablities in the Third Kingdome (1989), one is 
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she never fails to express her resentment for attempts to restrict black dramaturgy to the 
so called “black experience.”  Shawn-Marie Garrett explains,  
Hers is not drama of polemics . . . . In 1990, she asked in a post-
show discussion: ‘Why does everyone think that white artists make art and 
black artists make statements?’ [telling] an interviewer ‘I don’t write 
headlines . . . . People say the black experience is X, and usually the X is 
the sorrows and the frustrations . . . . That’s all we get to write about.  
That’s the black experience.  Well, it’s very important, but it’s not my 
thing.’ In 1994: ‘I just don’t respect politically correct writing.’ In 1995: 
‘In theatre we have more simplistic forms of representation that are still 
                                                                                                                                                 
immediately hit with sometimes profound, sometimes ludicrous sense of black historicity.  The Last Dead 
Black Man in the Whole Entire World’s list of “figures,” for example, reads: “Black Man with Watermelon, 
Black Woman with Fried Drumstick, Lots of Grease and Lots of Pork, Yes and Greens Black-Eyed Peas 
Cornbread, Queen-then-Pheraoh-Hatshepsut, Before Colombus, Old Man River Jordan, Ham, And Bigger 
and Bigger and Bigger, Prunes and Prisms [Prunes and Prisms repeats the phrase in attempts to reduce the 
size of her lips], Voice on thuh Tee V” (100).  In Imperceptible Mutabilities of the Third Kingdom, the 
“Players,” who navigate a metaphorical “Middle Passage,” echo in names and content African-Americans’ 
haunting experiences.  Parks’s poetic and textual acumen is unmistakable:  
Shark-Seer: How many kin kin I hold. Whole hull full.  
Soul-Seer: Thuh hullholesfull of bleachin bones.  
Us-Seer: Bleached Bones Man may come and take you far uhcross thuh sea from me.  
Over-Seer: Who're you again?  
Kin-Seer: I'm. Lucky.  
Over-Seer: Who're you again?  
Soul-Seer: Duhdduhnt-he-know-my-name?  
Kin-Seer: Should I jump? Shouldijumporwhut?  
Shark-Seer: But we are not in uh boat!  
Us-Seer: But we iz. Iz iz iz uh huhn. Iz uh huhn. Uh huhn iz.  
Shark-Seer: I wonder: Are we happy? Thuh looks we look look so.  
Us-Seer: They like smiles and we will like what they will like.  
Soul-Seer: UUH!  
Kin-Seer: Me wavin at me me wavin at my I me wavin at my soul.  
Shark-Seer: Chomp chomp chomp chomp.  
Kin-Seer: Fffffffffff--  
Us-Seer: Thup.  
Shark-Seer: Baby, what will I do for love?  
Soul-Seer: Wave me uh wave and I'll wave one back blow me uh kiss n I'll blow you one back.  
Over-Seer: Quiet, you, or you'll be jettisoned!  
Shark-Seer: Chomp chomp chomp chomp.  
Kin-Seer: Wa-vin wavin.  
Shark-Seer: Chomp chomp chomp chomp.  
Kin-Seer: Howwe gonna find my Me? (39-40) 
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held up as examples of the best kind of theatre that black people can 
involve themselves in.  It’s just a long road, a long, dumb road.’110    
Debate as to what exactly makes for black theater is still raging, creating substantive 
polemics amongst black artists and scholars, polemics, in effect, which are not limited to 
the  theater and which are well reflected in African-American political and social 
discourse.    
Contributing to heated discourse in locating black theater teleology, Harry Elam 
follows many in using W. E. B. DuBois’ 1926 famous words in claiming “that ‘a real 
Negro theatre’ must be ‘About us, By us, For us, and Near us.’  His intention was to 
liberate black theatre from white representational control.  But for the ‘us’ implied by 
DuBois, there was no public consensus about what it meant to write for ‘us.’”  Elam 
relates George C. Wolfe’s, a renowned black director, exasperation, “‘People kept asking 
for a ‘black’ play.  I kept asking, ‘What’s a ‘black’ play?  Four walls, a couch and a 
mama?’ I can't live within those old definitions.’”111  Nonetheless, a concise definition as 
to the meaning of “black theater” followed, outraging black and white playwrights and 
critics alike.  In his 1996 address, “The Ground on Which I Stand” to The Theater 
Communication Group, celebrated playwright August Wilson declared that “American 
theater . . . . was an instrument of white cultural hegemony and the recent campaign to 
integrate and diversify it had made things worse.”112  Wilson, who identifies himself as a 
“race-man,” finds his inspiration by allying himself with the Black Power Movement of 
the 60’s and its ideologies of black separatism, suggesting that black theater productions 
                                                 
110 (“The Possession of Suzan-Lori Parks,” American Theater 17.8 (2002): 22-26, 132-34) passim.    
111 (“Making History” Theater Survey 45.2 (2004): 219-25) p. 222 
112(Quoted in Henry Louis Gates, Jr., “The Chitlin Circuit” in African American Performance and Theater 
History, Eds. Harry J. Elam, Jr. and David Krasner, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 132. 
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must uniformly entertain black audiences and singularly employ black directors and 
actors.113  In a direct and burning refute, Robert Brustein, the founder of the Yale 
Repertory Theater and the drama critic for the New Republic, askes, “‘What next? 
Separate schools? Separate washrooms? Separate drinking fountains?”114  Realizing that 
Wilson’s rise to fame was predominantly affected by “white power,” Wilson’s call to 
arms is no less than hypocritical; as Suzan-Lori Parks, who Wilson shamelessly identifies 
as a “crossover artist” and who expressed her admiration for Wilson’s work on several 
occasions, tells Gates, “August can start by having his own acclaimed plays premiere in 
black theaters, instead of where they premiere now.  I’m sorry, but he should examine his 
own house.”115  That eminent scholar such as Henry Louise Gates Jr. seeks Parks’s 
opinion, is not surprising.  Parks is known, through her own publications and many 
interviews, for her avid participation in the theoretical discourse about black theater and 
her work.   
Parks’s theoretical thought on black theater attests to a far reaching understanding 
of how black humanity necessarily partakes in a combined heritage of philosophical and 
black conceptuality, in, finally, manipulating black theater polemics against itself.  
Parks’s theoretical design is about diffusing black/white binaries that have been defining 
black drama in an attempt to disengage black consciousness from sensibilities limited to 
race.   Her intent is to reveal a black space in the ontological parlance, suggesting that 
                                                 
113 Sandra Shannon discusses Wilson’s position, asserting that, “Though he conceded that there are a 
number of highly capable white directors up to the task, he rejected the white applicant, arguing, ‘But he is 
not black. He is not a product of black American Culture—a culture that was honed out of black experience 
and fired in the kiln of slavery and survival—and he does not share the sensibilities of black Americans’” 
(“What is a black play? Tales from my theoretical corner,” Theatre Journal 57.4 (2005): 603-5) p. 604. 
114 Brustein identifies Wilson’s sentiments with “the rabid identity politics and poisonous racial 
consciousness” and “an appeal for socially approved and foundation-founded separatism” (“Subsidized 
Separatism” in The Wadsworth Anthology of Drama, Ed. W. B. Worthen, 4th ed. Boston: Wadsworth, 
2004.) p. 1330. 
115 (“The Chitlin Circuit,” 134).   
 77
such discourse is not singular to the occident.  Narrativization, indeed, story telling of 
history occurs in space and time, even when we take into account that those elements 
partake in defining history and its retelling in language, through spatiotemporal 
structures.  She explains: “The use of the White in the dramatic equation is, I think too 
often seen as the only way of exploring our Blackness; this equation reduces Blackness to 
merely a state of non-Whiteness . . . . We have for so long been an ‘oppressed people’ 
there are many ways of defining Blackness and there are many ways of presenting 
Blackness on stage [so that] Black presence onstage is more than a sign or messenger of 
some political point.”116   This is not to say that Parks is not intensively conscious about 
being a black writer, whose love and sense of indebtedness to her heritage is readily 
apparent, saying “I write plays because I love Black people.”117 Yet, as a playwright, 
who, as I argue, demonstrates specific sensibilities to ontological and deconstructive 
elements, Parks can be identified as contributing to the onslaught of postmodern 
suspicion.  Hence, Parks rejects conventional, limiting discursive descriptors such as 
“Black Experience” “Black Aesthetic,” arguing that “there is no one way to write or think 
or feel or dream or interpret or be interpreted.”118  
                                                 
116 (“An Equation for Black People Onstage,” in The America Play and Other Works, New York: Theater 
Communication Group, 1995) p. 19-21.  Certainly, Parks in not the only black dramatist to interrogate the 
black historical dramatic space, redefining expectancies of theater critics and goers.  In fact, Shannon notes 
that “surprising number of playwrights who happen to be African Americans have taken to defamiliarizing, 
deconstructing, and even outright rejecting traditional notions of blackness in their work” (“What is a Black 
Play?,” 603).  Analyzing Parks’s play In the Blood, Elam observes that Parks, “pushes beyond simple racial 
definition as it provokes and represents questions of cultural identity.  Parks . . . . adamantly seeks to move 
beyond the identify politics of the past black cultural nationalism and has argued for the exploration of new 
dramatic territory in black writing” (“The Postmulticultural: A Tale of Mothers and Sons,” in Crucible of   
Cultures: Anglophone Drama at the Dawn of a New Millennium.  Marc Maufort , Franca Bellarsi, Ed. 
Brussels, Belgium: Peter Lang, 2002) p. 117. 
117 (“An Equation” 21).   
118 Characteristically blatant, Parks adds: “As African-Americans we should recognize this insidious 
essentialism for what it is: a fucked-up trap to reduce us to only one way of being” (ibid.).   
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Agitating inscribed binaries within which blacks are depicted as oppressed and 
marginalized against whites as oppressors and privileged, is but one aspect of Parks’s 
battle against black theatrical convention.  Unlike Wilson, Parks supports “color-blind” 
casting, relating an idea of an acquaintance “that a fabulous production of The 
Importance of Being Earnest would feature Black principles with Whites as the servants . 
. . . [stressing that] This is the thinnest sort of dramaturgy.”119   Revisiting her essay, “An 
Equation for Black People Onstage” after 10 years, Parks still seems to view “Blackness” 
within a universal scheme.120  Follows, is an excerpt from her verse “The New Black 
Math,” explaining what is a “black play,” explanation which, as I argue, underlies the 
complexity of her work as interrogatory and, at the same time, as adhering to certain 
metaphysical configuration: 
A black play knows the real deal.  
 
A black play is told that it is about race and a black play knows it's really about 
other shit.  
 
A black play knows that racerelations sell.  
 
A black play knows that racerelations are a holding cell.  
 
A black play is blacker than my new black cat, Houndog, named after Houndog 
Taylor, the blues guitarist, who is also a polydactyl brother.  
 
A black play is blacker than black.  
 
                                                 
119 (“An Equation” 20).  It might be worth mentioning here Harry Elam’s distinction between color-blind 
casting and nontraditional casting, supported by Wilson.  Nontraditional casting “inverts, subverts or 
potentially or potentially illuminates those meanings by casting across gender, cross-racially against the 
traditional norms as implied within the written text [while color-blind casting] implies that race does not 
matter, that the casting is blind to color” (The Past as Present in the Drama of August Wilson, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2004) p.223. 
120 In “Remarks on Parks: A Symposium on the Work of Suzan-Lori Parks” held in Hunter College on 
April 30, 2004, Liz Diamond, who directed all of Parks’s early plays and who participated in the directors’ 
panel, tells of a concern voiced on the first day of rehearsal of The Last Dead Black Man in the Whole 
Entire World about Diamond not being black.  According to Diamond, “Suzan-Lori turned around and said, 
‘You’re not?’” 
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A black play is written by a black person.  
 
A black play has black actors.  
 
A black play is written by a white person and has white actors.  
 
A black play doesnt [sic] have anything to do with black people. Im [sic] saying 
The Glass Menagerie is a black play.  
 
SAY WHAT?  
 
EXCUSE ME?!?!  
 
Cause the presence of the white suggests the presence of the black. Every play 
that is born of the united states of america is a black play because we all exist in 
the shadow of slavery. All of us. The Iceman Cometh is a black play. Angels in 
America is a black play and Kushner knows he's a brother. Its all black.121  
 
The conceptual play of ontologically defined concerns and specificities of black 
heritage, representing Parks’s artistic worldview and her African-American dramatic 
                                                 
121 (“New Black Math,” Theatre Journal 57.4 (2005): 576-83) p. 580.  For a complete reading of Parks’s 
“New Black Math,” refer to our Appendix.  In relating black dramatic sensibilities and their dialectics of 
race specific and universally encompassing sentiments, it might be worth mentioning that consciousness to 
race-politics pervades American discourse from politics to sports.  For example, in an interview, Barak 
Obama listening to Bobby Rush’s words, “I'm a race politician and he's not. I don't compromise. I don't 
step back. I don't try to deny. I'm proud to be an African American,” replied, “There's no doubt that in the 
history of African American politics in this country there has always been some tension between speaking 
in universal terms and speaking in very race-specific terms about the plight of the African American 
community. By virtue of my background, I am more likely to speak in universal terms” (Interview with 
Steve Inskeep, Morning Edition, NPR, WUSF:FM, Tampa 28 February 2007).  On another occasion, 
columnist Joseph H. Brown discusses  NPR’s senior correspondent Juan Williams’s newest publication, 
Enough: The Phony Leaders, Dead-End Movements, and Culture of Failure That Are Undermining Black 
America – and What Can We Do About It, in expressing African-American exasperation with race identity 
politicians (“What Kind of History Are We Making,” Tampa Tribune, 18 February 2007, final ed.: B1).  
Discussing, in part, the make-up of a community, Angela Davis, scholar, author, and former radical, 
stresses that “race has become, uh, an increasingly obsolete way of constructing a community because it is 
based on unchangeable immutable biological facts in a very pseudo-scientific way, alright?” signifying a 
more conceptually universal gesture for African Americans (Anna Deveare Smith, Fires in the Mirror: 
Crown Heights, Brooklyn and Other Identities. New York: Dramatists Play Service Inc., 1997) p. Sports 
are not exempted from the debate.  On receiving the Heisman Trophy,  Troy Smith, Ohio State Buckeyes 
quarterback,  rejected talk about the importance attributed to the fact that he is the first black quarterback 
ever to get the trophy, saying that he “is just another guy” who doesn’t buy into “the African American 
thing” (Weekend Edition NPR, WUSF: FM, Tampa 10 December 2006).  Contrary to Smith, accepting the 
Super bowl trophy on January 8, 2007, Tony Dungy declared that he is fully aware of his historic position 
as “the first black coach” to lead a team to championship.     
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consciousness become manifest in rich, poetic, and innovative oeuvre.  Expressing what I 
view as her deconstructive penchant Parks says, “I write plays that are theatrical, 
performative, language based and formally challenging,”122 explaining, “As a playwright 
I try to do many things: explore the form, ask questions, make a good show, tell a good 
story, ask more questions, take nothing for granted” in defending “dramatic theater 
against becoming ‘Theater of the Schmaltz.’”123  Yet, again and as I have been proposing, 
Parks’s obvious interrogatory proclivity is located within unsettled dialectic of unraveling 
of traditional understanding of drama and its conceptual heritage on the one hand, and an 
excavation of a certain specie of black metaphysic124 on the other, which, as it is dug in 
The America Play, it is subverted as concoction of supplemented, textually performing 
dialogue that comments on its propagation through spatiotemporal structures that attest to 
defining underlying absences.    
The America Play is about repetitious “digging” of what a gravedigger, the Lesser 
Known as the Foundling Father as Abraham Lincoln sets out to replicate—“The Great 
Hole of History.”  For indeed, if the working impulse in The America Play is digging, 
excavating in regressively and repetitiously attempting to replicate concept and 
phenomena, and Parks is interested in “History – the destruction and creation of it 
through theatre pieces and how Black people fit into all of this,”125 then we might surmise 
                                                 
122 (“Suzan-Lori Parks playwright & screenwriter” Theater ’96  8 June 2004     
http://www.alpertawards.org/archive/winner96/parks.html) 
123 (“Elements of Style” 6).    
124 Says Parks, “. . . . because so much of African-American history has been unrecorded, dismembered, 
washed out, one of my tasks as a playwright is . . . . to locate the ancestral burial ground, dig for bones, find 
bones, hear the bones sing, write it down” (“Possession” 4).   On another occasion, Parks asks: “Where is 
history? Because I don’t see it.  I don’t see any history out there, so I’ve made some up” (Alien Nation,” 
26).  Certainly, in analyzing her texts, I intend to present Parks’s views limitedly.  For now nonetheless, I 
am attempting to introduce the kind of philosophical trajectory with which Parks, by her own account, 
identifies.    
125 (“Suzan-Lori Parks playwright & screenwriter”). 
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that Parks’s work does oscillate between adherence to certain Black ideality and 
postmodern suspicion of a history as stasis.  As we shall see, processes of historicity in 
the play carry a certain promise of pliability, invested in what I see as the re-
narrativization, as in the supplementation, of American history.  As I am about to show, 
Parks’s supplementary dynamic in The America Play is propagated through distinct 
deconstructive structures, which find their allusive core in the absence of presences that 
define their iterative state through Derrida’s concept of the trace—the signified that is 
always already a signifier; its temporally deferred semantic that is always already 
simultaneously spatially differed; the component that is always already accountable for 
the impossibility of idealization and the possible perpetuation of its return.  Certainly, in 
discussing processes of deconstructive iteration, we will emphasize Parks’s own 
repetitious, supplemental poetics in inscribing the dramatics of their own irreconcilable 
state as material effect and illimitable impetus of conceptuality.  Hence, Parks’s 
deconstructive consciousness is most noticeable in her textually performing pages, 
textual theatrics that comment on their content’s deconstructive undecidability, 
burgeoning from a concept’s absence and its spatiotemporal genesis in the world.   
I plan to show that Suzan-Lori Parks’s deconstructive dramaturgical design in The 
America Play prepares readers for a textually performative stage of differential, 
repeating, supplemental avant-garde impulse, which implodes conventions of 
philosophical and dramatic occidental structures.126  For indeed,  
                                                 
126 It might be worth noting here that staging her 2001 Pulitzer Price wining play, Topdog Underdog, 
prompted some critics to laud her so called naturalistic turn (i.e. Don Shewey’s “Suzan-Lori Parks Turns 
Toward Naturalism,” New York Times, July  22, 2001) in moving away from her early works as one of 
contemporary drama’s most experimental playwrights.  I join critic Alisa Solomon and director Liz 
Diamond in admittedly being enthralled by her early works.  Solomon, one of the critic panelists on Hunter 
College “Parks Symposium,” voices her frustration about a “narrative [that] describes her starting out with 
promising but largely obscure early plays championed by a few white intellectuals until she was 
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A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text 
[s]he writes, the work [s]he produces are not in principle governed by 
preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining 
judgment, by applying familiar categories to text or to the work.  Those 
rules and categories are what the work of art itself is looking for.127 
Indeterminacy, seen by most commentators as decisively contributing to examination of 
the postmodern ethos, defines The America Play paradoxically.  The paradox of the 
indeterminate unveils itself when the play’s unique language and structure, propelled 
through absence, become a philosophical yet juridical gesture, which indicates, while 
converges, their form and content.  As we shall see, Parks’s sensibilities to a-linear, a-
naturalistic, a-representational drama is most noticeable in her method of Rep & Rev.  
Parks stresses that “a text based on a concept of repetition and revision is one which 
                                                                                                                                                 
triumphantly rescued by those who knew better, George C. Wolfe and The Disney Corporation, who 
guided her toward the writing of characters you can sympathize with and plots you can follow and 
sometimes even predict” (in Jonathan Kalb, “Remarks on Parks: A Symposium on the Work of Suzan-Lori 
Parks.” Hunter online Theater Review 30 April 2004.  24 September 2006).  Robert Brustein voices the 
same sentiment in his review of Parks’s Topdog Underdog, admitting to be “an admirer of her previous 
work,” saying that he was on the committee that gave the Pulitzer Price for drama to Suzan-Lori Parks for 
Topdog/Underdog and that “Prizes often go to the lesser achievements of good playwrights whose better 
stuff had been previously ignored” (“On Theater – A Homeboy Godot,” The New Republic, May 13, 2002) 
p. 25.  I hope to show that Parks’s genius is apparent in her unique mastery of language, which is 
noticeably discernable in her early works; this kind of mastery is revealed through the drama’s connection 
to conceptual possibilities, which are hypostasized, staged through the materiality of her drama’s textual 
configuration.      
127 (Jean-François Lyotard, “What is Postmodernism?” in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi,  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
Press, 1984) p. 80.  Challenges to norms of dramatic textual form are not novel for contemporary drama: 
Heiner Müller’s Hamletmachine’s brick-like textuality comments on a modern Hamlet’s state of 
philosophical bankruptcy; Richard’s Forman’s Rhoda in Potatoland’s sectioned text calls attention to its 
deconstructive content; Tony Kushner’s Angels in America: The Millennium is Coming and Perestroika’s 
split intervening scenes textually comment on their potential manipulation in the theatrical space; Anna 
Deveare Smith’s Fires in the Mirror: Crown Heights, Brooklyn and Other Identities represents a series of 
interviews as theatricalized performance art pieces; Mac Wellman’s The Hyacinth Macaw has signs, icons, 
for scenes; David Greenspan’s Jack scattered, repetitious dialogue is testimony to the characters’ 
suspended emotions; however, none surpass Samuel Beckett’s pioneering textual spaces, corresponding to 
his characters’ state of collapse and potential regeneration.  Joining many, Kushner is apropos in 
identifying Beckettian echoes in Parks’s work specifically The America Play’s Great Hole of History 
discussion of which is forthcoming.  
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breaks from the text which we are told to write—the text which cleanly ARCS.”128  
Parks’s unusual structures accommodated unusual content and vice versa.  For Parks, 
therefore, structure is an inherent part of the narrative; she in fact asks, “Why linear 
narrative at all?  Why choose that shape?  If a playwright chooses to tell a dramatic story, 
and realizes that there are essential elements of that story which lead the writing outside 
the realm of ‘linear narrative,’ then the play naturally assumes a new shape.”129  
Disturbing categories of conventional form induce Parks’s semantics to challenge their 
own meaning.  Analyzing The America Play, Haike Frank is right in noting that, “The 
play uniquely resists linear logic.  Not only do the spectators try to track down the 
meaning of the work, but the play also chases its own meaning.”130  My proposition aims 
to reveal the deconstructive absent locum through which Parks’s interrogation of 
meaning indicates itself.  In my view, questions of origin are the basis for Parks’s 
suspicion of history and its renarrativization; moreover, suspicion of concepts such as 
identity can be traced in The America Play to a fractured and three dimensional 
protagonist.  To be sure, and as many commentators of Park argue, Parks’s avant-garde 
view of a drama and the texts she creates locate her within the postmodern epoch.  Hence, 
we might be well served in quoting Mikhail Bakhtin here in stating that “Art derives its 
character directly form the unity to its ideological horizon . . . . it is art only if it is 
‘oriented toward the common value centre of the ideological horizon of each epoch.”131  
Postmodern “horizons” notwithstanding, Parks’s indebtedness to dramatic and 
                                                 
128 (“Elements” 9). 
129 (ibid. 8) 
130 (“The Instability of Meaning in Suzan-Lori Parks's The America Play,” American Drama 11.2 (2002): 
4-20) p. 4.  
131 (quoted in Juliet Fowler MacCannell’s “The Temporality of Textuality: Bakhtin and Derrida,” MLN  
100 (1985): 968-88) p. 970 
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philosophical “heritage” can be hardly questioned.  Hers is a drama that succeeds in 
manipulating traditional ontological and lingual values in representing structures of white 
idealization through “black” self-reflexivity, which, as we shall soon discover, finds its 
genesis in Brechtian verfremdungseffekt—all occurring within Parks’s innovative, 
repetitious structures.  Again, I here quote Lyotard, who discusses processes through 
which postmodern art gains its status as avant-garde:  
The secret of an artistic success, like that of commercial successes, resides 
in the balance between what is surprising and what is ‘well known,’ 
between information and code.  This is how innovation in art operates: one 
re-uses formulae confirmed by previous success, one throws them off-
balance by combining them with other, in principle incompatible, 
formulae, by amalgamations, quotations, ornamentation, pastiche.132 
In The America Play as we are about to see, Parks’s “amalgamations” and “quotations” 
participate in a performance of ground-breaking textuality, which as it repeats helps 
create American Lincolnesque pastiche, through which conceptualities of histories and 
identities are all but certain.  
 
The Textual Performance of the Deconstructive Supplement: 
Parks’s Ontological/Ontic Strife 
 
In considering the conceptual turn, the metaphysical turn, I see Parks’s 
deconstructive bend in The America Play, introduced through her rigorously regenerative, 
repetitious, textually performing written discourse, as a persistent self-reflexive  
commentary elemental to its supplemental state.  Hence, the differential of ontologically 
                                                 
132 (“The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” The Lyotard Reader, Ed. Andrew Benjumin, Cambridge: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989) p. 202-3.     
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defining spatiotemporal, formal trace structures, as both propagating an opening for and 
obviating the return of idealization, hypostatize—through the empirically ontic 
phenomenon of signification in noticeably dramatic textual strife—on the page. 
Arguably, deconstructively speaking, language—its lexicological dissemination in 
metaphysically making the merely evident self-evident and its phenomenal reemergence 
in repetitious and supplemental reproductivity—emanates from a nonpresence.  That is, a 
nonpresence which is defined auto-affectively through the trace as “general language,” 
“protowriting,” according to Derrida “spacing,” in promising a concept’s opening within 
its temporal purity,133 and, hence, questioning its viable ideality while reassuring its 
return as an ideal.  The upshot is that strife, difference is both attenuated and, at the same 
time, identified within the binary of a concept, rising from the aporia of its supplemented 
absence [of origin, of presence] and its possible materialization through performing 
signification in innovative textual expression.  For indeed, since I argue that in The 
America Play Parks’s deconstructive poetics is apparent through its textual theatrics on 
the page, I must also make mention of the supplemented concepts for which these 
repetitious, textually specific, deconstructive semiotics are perpetuated.  Forthwith, I 
intend to showcase Parks’s repetitious supplemental virtuosity, which, as I have already 
argued, is a testament to the fluid, indeterminate condition of her concepts.  For now, 
however, understanding the so called “textual” as an ontic representation of onto-
spatiotempo-lingual life of a concept is significant because this is the point through which 
we might begin to understand Parksian, deconstructive attachment to and detachment 
from metaphysics. 
                                                 
133 As mentioned already, discussing the auto-affective moment of a concept, says Derrida, “Constituting 
itself, dynamically dividing itself, this interval is what could be called spacing;  time’s becoming-spatial or 
space’s becoming-temporal (temporalizing)” (“Differance” 143).   
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 Although I agree with critics who comment specifically on Parks’s consciousness 
of textuality in linking its impulse to values of theatrical performance, I differ by 
identifying her textual performance as deconstructively phenomenological  
nonconceptual byproduct. That is, my investigation of textual perfomativity in The 
America Play concentrates on its inviolable relation  to an absence that adjudicates, much 
like Husserl’s Idea in the Kantian sense, its state as supplemental, reproductive, 
repetitious, and regenerative operation in form of signification as an ontic metaphor.134   
W. B. Worthen, who, in addition to Parks’s other early plays examines The America 
Play’s textuality, views breaching, conventional dialectic of text and performance as 
being mitigated by “citational” structures apparent in Parks’s texts:  
Parks’s theater self-consciously underscores the performative (Worthen’s 
emphasis), citational dimensions of the repetitive, ritualized events taking place 
on stage . . . . [while] the many footnotes, extracts, and lectures performed in her 
plays emphasize the textual character of “history,” and the mediating role of print 
in our understanding of history in and out of the theater.135 
Unlike my reading of Parks’s perpetuation of textual repetition as deconstructive 
performativity, Worthen, in his later works, transposes print from its conventional 
position as rigid and archival to the fluidity of performance. Although stating that “Texts 
cannot determine performance,” Worthen still contends that “the material properties of a 
given dramatic text – typography, layout, page and cover design – matter to the ways 
                                                 
134 Derrida, of course, identifies the reproductive life of the sign as preexisting ideality before the 
implementation of a desire for conceptual presence.  I intend to argue that Parks’s The America Play 
operates on both levels: primordial reproductivity and supplemental ideality.  
135 (“Citing History: Textuality and Performativity in the Plays of Suzan-Lori Parks,” Essays in 
Theatre/Etudes Théâtrales, 18.1 (1999): 3-22) p. 4-5.  Here we deal with the performing values of inscribed 
texts revealed through the phenomenon of its textuality.   
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specific groups of readers . . . . understand its potentialities of performance, insert them 
into the conventional behaviors . . . . of theater practice.”136   Examining Parks’s textual 
machinations in Venus, Elizabeth Dyrud Layman observes, “Parks combines multiple 
strategies of variable fonts, white space, speech attributions, spelling, page layout, and 
even punctuation . . . . to create devastating dramatic effect.”137 Jennifer Johung, who 
discusses one scene from Parks’s Venus, identifying among other notational marks the 
index as asserting a relational impulse to spatial and “bodily performance,” views both 
Layman and Worthen’s work as “significantly advance the field of inquiry into the 
activities of writing and performing toward a much needed convergence of the materials 
and methods of print notation and performance.”138 Kimberly D. Dixon, examining 
Parks’s early plays, diverts tensions from written text and its propositioned effect on 
performance to values of audibility and textuality as effectively contributing to 
performative structures.139  Liz Diamond, director of Parks’s first three plays, also 
discusses Parks’s language and the perforamtive value that her words contain: “Her 
words are actors, performing virtuoso feats of transformation, reconfiguring new 
meanings . . . .”140  Alisa Solomon, though somewhat less metaphysical, argues that 
“Parks uncovers the power of language to be performative . . . . [whereby] the very 
                                                 
136(“The Imprint of Performance” Theorizing Practice:  Redefining Theatre History, vol. 1. Worthen and 
Holland, Peter Eds. New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p. 123-4. 
137(“The Page Refigured: The Verbal and Visual Language of Suzan-Lori Parks's Venus,” Performance 
Research 7:1 (2002): 90-100) p. 97. 
138(“Figuring the ‘Spells’/Spelling the Figures: Suzan-Lori Parks’ ‘Scene of Love (?).’” Theater Journal 
58.1 (2006): 39-52) p. 43. 
139Dixon quotes Tejumola Olaniyan in explaining, “that the performative ‘conceives identity as open, 
interculturally negotiable, and always in the making—a process,’ and that ‘it stresses the historicity of 
culture, that is, its ‘madeness’ in space and time. (“An I am Sheba me am (She be doo wah waaaah doo 
wah) O(au)rality, Textuality and Performativity: African American Literature's Vernacular Theory and the 
Work of Suzan-Lori Parks” The Journal of American Drama and Theatre 11.1  (1999) 49-66) p. 51. 
140(“Perceptible Mutability in the World Kingdom,” Theater 24.2 (1993): 86-87) p. 86. 
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typography of Parks’s script . . . .  [can be understood] in theatrical terms.”141  Solomon 
brings Parks’s own words, stressing the self-reflexivity underscoring her dramatic 
language: 
So how do I adequately represent not merely the speech patterns of a 
people oppressed by language (which is the simple question) but a pattern 
of a people whose language use is so complex and varied and ephemeral 
that its daily use not only Signifies on the non-vernacular language forms, 
but on the construct of writing as well.  If language is a construct and 
writing is a construct and Signifying on the double construct is the daily 
use, then I have chosen to Signify on the Signifyin(g).142 
To understand Parks’s fundamentally philosophical impulse, Derrida had only to remind 
us that empirical value of textual aberration is “necessary in the course of writing about 
writing, and of writing within writing.”143  Moreover, reflecting on Parks’s textually 
performing pages, her choice “to Signify on the Signifyin,” I argue, can be interpreted 
deconstructively whereby the performing supplementation of signs on the page is a 
                                                 
141 (“Signifying on the Signifyin: The Plays of Suzan Lori Parks,” Theater 21.3 (1990): 73-80) p. 76.   
142(ibid. 75-6).  Linda Ben-Zvi, therefore, is apropos in saying that “Parks stages the process of linguistic 
deformation itself, the imposition of language and culture and these strategies of survival encoded in the 
Black vernacular” (“Aroun the Worl: The siginfyin (g) Theater of Suzan-Lori Parks,” The Theatrical 
Gamut: Notes for a Post-Beckettian Stage.  Ed. Enoch Brater.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1995) p. 191.  Though not specifically extrapolating on the process underlining it, Jeanette R. Malkin 
discusses Parks’s language as deconstructive: “Parks’s language, as Robert Brustein has pointed out, is also 
a form of verbal deconstruction.  ‘Like other verbal adventures,’ Brustein writes ‘especially Joyce and 
Stein, Parks is preoccupied with deconstructing language’; this is partly an effort to exalt black English into 
a kind of poetic code.  It is also an effort to adapt English words to the black experience” (Memory-Theater 
and Postmodern Drama.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999) p. 160.  In a book review, 
presenting authors’ interviews, one of whom is Parks, Liz Diamond observes that these authors “seem 
united by a preoccupation with deconstruction as a liberating act. A project of destabilization is under 
way—of conceptions of gender, race, authorship—of the very project of discovering or revealing truth 
(“Affinity and Contradiction, Theater 32.3 (2002): 144-145)  p. 144.  Hence, the mention of deconstruction 
seems to become synonymous with Parksian language.  Nevertheless, though quite few critics mention 
space and time in referencing Parks’s works, they fail to make a discrete connection to the ways 
spatiotemporal elements perpetuate her deconstructive traces.   
143 (“Differance” 131). 
 89
testament to the machinations of the trace: hypostatization of a conceptual absent, which 
is, as Derrida suggests, the textual evidence of processes of idealization, which are 
marked by “the double construct” of a double absence—of signification and of concept.  
Hence, as critics point out, Parks’s textual drama on the page is indeed a 
commentary on the performative value of her signs.  Yet, as I argue, rather than 
performatively attempting to deliver conceptual totalities, Parks’s semiotic craft in The 
America Play culminates in her convincing staging of textual performances that are 
specific to deconstructive investigation; whereby reformulated phonemic and morphemic 
inscriptions, immerge through Parks’s supplemental spectacle in commenting on their 
impossible task.  Deconstructively speaking, what is a written sign’s impossible task?  
The answer might be knowing that inscription, writing — an “ontic metaphor” to its 
conceptually absent “protowriting” or “general language,” which formulates (through 
spatiotemporal reemergence of the Derridian trace as a sign) metaphysical concepts — 
aids us in elucidating the ‘impossible task’ and allows us to view Parks’s supplemental, 
hyper-textual phenomena as performing writing’s inability to represent its own putative 
lexicological values.  If I am to succeed in making a case for Parks’s fundamental 
deconstructive alliances in The America Play, I must show that the play’s cache of 
concepts is represented through repetitious idealization, gaining its repetitious 
reemergence through the impossible spatiality of the trace, while I sustain specific 
consciousness to these concepts’ absent, deferred temporality as nonpresence and, hence, 
their interrogationable metaphysical state.  Once again, traces of conceptual nonpresence 
represented as presence underlie the condition of all tenable deconstructive interrogation; 
I see Parks’s dramaturgy perform the nonpresence of a conceptual presence, ideality as it 
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must be, through textual, signified [v.] supplementarity, perpetuated by the ontic 
semblance of the trace within the nonconceptual ontology of differance.144   As Parks 
textually iterates, she performs the problematic genesis of a metaphysical concept and the 
promise of its idealization through its absent, yet enigmatically potent, irreducible trace.  
Iterating signs supplement the difficult dialectic of absence and presence in interrogating 
the deferred temporal opening, which is re-substantiated through the spatial movement of 
the trace as protowriting, in effect, a nonconcept—differance itself.  Henceforth, we can 
readily identify the so called deconstructive “undecidable” as irreconcilably intrinsic to 
Parks’s materialization of the tension between a concept’s unsubstantiated idealization 
and its qualified return through textual performance.  And so, we set out to show how 
processes of deconstructive poetics underlie Parks’s conceptual aporetics and their 
dramatization within The America Play’s textual scheme; wherein inscribed, engramme-
atic signifiers perform the irreconcilability of the onto-spatiotemporal-lingual difficulties 
inherent in structures of idealization and their repeating reemergence through the ontic, 
signifying, supplementing movement of the Derridian trace.145 
 
 
The Foundling Father: Differance as Supplement within the Pathologies of Rep & 
Rev 
 
 Presenting Tony Morrison’s idea about African-American’s need to use 
“fabricated presence,” Steve Drukman ask Parks if when “making a character or a stage-
figure” she is compelled to follow such construction, Suzan-Lori Parks responds that she 
                                                 
144An excerpt from Derrida’s “Signature Event Context” in our Appendix offers an explanation on 
connections Derrida draws within the deconstructive scheme in explicating on the “labor . . . . performed on 
a conceptual system . . . . in displacing a conceptual order as well as the nonconceptual order with which it 
is articulated” (LI 21). 
145As I propose, Parks’s textual work is deconstructive in following what Shain identifies to be “Derrida’s 
philosophical view [which] can be designated as ‘textualism,’ because ‘text’ is for Derrida both 
ontologically and methodologically primary” (“Situating Derrida between Hegel and Kirkegaard” 399). 
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creates her stage-figures, “From the fabricated absence, actually.  It’s fabricated absence.  
That’s where I start from.  And that’s where the Foundling Father came from.  It’s the 
hole idea.”146  The whole idea does emerge from a hole, “A great hole.  In the middle of 
nowhere.  The hole is an exact replica of the Great Hole of History.”147  With these 
words, ACT ONE: THE LINCOLN ACT148 and Parks’s perpetual “replication” 
of absent event-turn-conceptual ideality begins.  For Parks, as I argue, the replication of 
an absent event is invested in reproductive signs, dramatizing in a supplementary impulse 
within the play’s spatiotemporal scheme, the repetitious collapse and return of the 
Derridian trace.  What is more, Parks’s excruciatingly formal manipulation of structure 
and content is but a façade for her paradoxically substantively absent concepts of which 
origin, presence, is ad-infinitum deferred through the dynamic movement of differance.   
 I will demonstrate the ways in which The America Play is a deconstructive drama; 
that is, the ways in which repetitious regeneration of concepts such as history and identity 
are potentially introduced as elements belonging to the trace, supplemented through 
textually specific structure and language.  Moreover, since, as I argue, deconstruction is 
marked by ontological pathologies invested in Saussure’s structural differential, I plan to 
show how Parks’s manipulation of space on the page in concert with content-related 
expressions of time, attest to underpinnings of spatiotemporal intervention in processes of 
discursive idealities, marking the language of metaphysics.  More to the point, if 
                                                 
146 (“Suzan-Lori Parks and Liz Diamond Doo-a-diddly-dit-dit,” TDR 39.3 (1995): 56-75)  
  p. 67.             
147 (Suzan-Lori Parks, The America Play and Other Works. New York: Theater Community Group Inc,    
 1995, [The America Play will be referenced as TAP hereafter]) p. 159. 
148 In quoting, I follow Parks’s typographical style in The America Play, emphasizing the work’s 
accentuation on a textual gesture.  
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repetitious “regressus ad infinitum . . . . regression to the beginning”149 marks the 
ontological and ontic differential primacy of differance, whereby deconstruction, 
breaking from Husserlian phenomenology, is a movement of a self-proclaimed, self-
declared anticipation of a none-reductive labor, then The America Play is a model of 
deconstructive self-reflexivity, performing its concepts’ irreducibility to their origin.  
Also, since topographical recovery of originary structures of a concept is in question, I 
intend to discuss, the space, the locale, “the great hole of history,” within which absent, 
supplemented and ultimately historicized idealities are staged with reproductive ferocity.  
Parks’s protagonist in the play, the Foundling Father, unlike the constitutive 
phenomenological subject, becomes the differential catalyst, who, by personifying the 
regenerative, nonconceptual plane of differance and protowriting, reveals deconstructive 
subjectivity as an absence, gaining its subjective definition through differentiation and 
supplementation.  As a product of supplementing differential, the Foundling Father 
reproduces his vicarious current reality as a Lincoln impersonator (which might be 
understood as “the pure actuality of the now”)150 by differentiating, even as he 
regenerates, temporalities of his past as the Lesser Known, a black gravedigger 
(understood through retentive traces), with the temporality of a projected, idealized future 
as Abraham Lincoln (understood through protentive traces) all within the deconstructive 
movement of differance, “which at one and the same time both fissures and retards 
presence, submitting simultaneously to primordial division and delay.”151  I intend to 
demonstrate how The America Play is a model of deconstructive understanding; that is, 
how underlying structures of deferred temporalities define the reproductive nature of 
                                                 
149 (Origin 125) 
150 (Speech and Phenomena 67) 
151 (ibid, 88) 
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metaphysics, in tenably representing idealized presences of concepts such as identity and 
history through supplementary differentiated retentive and protentive traces, which 
complicate any claim of recoverable origin.  
 Henceforth, in introducing Parks’s spatiotemporal, differential scheme in The 
America Play, we shall start by anthropomorphicizing Derrida’s nonconceptual, passive, 
yet, paradoxically indicatory plane of differance.  We must, furthermore, show how 
Parks’s method of Rep & Rev, repetition and revision, functions in concert with 
deconstructive pathologies marking the trace’s repeating reproduction within a deferred 
temporal scheme, which simultaneously performs absences of conceptual presences and 
the absence inherent in Derrida’s notion of the always already- at-work trace as 
“protowriting.”  Our attentiveness to the language of metaphysics, idealization as such 
and its ontological differential, follows Parks’s textual retort to metaphysical discourse’s 
supplemental rigor of its conceptual absence, its “locum.”152  Hence, I identify an 
anthropomorphically mutating differance in The America Play’s protagonist, the 
Foundling Father.  The “perceptibly” mutating dynamic rises through Parks’s 
unconventional plotline.  In “Act One: Lincoln Act,” The Foundling Father, 
formerly a gravedigger called the Lesser Known, whose resemblance to Abraham 
Lincoln prompts him to leave his wife and child, become a Lincoln impersonator and 
stage a show “out West” in which he reenacts the Lincoln assassination.  In “Act Two: 
                                                 
152 Here I suggest that Parks’s concept of a center-emanated-structure in the play follows Derrida’s view of  
a center of a structure, which “had no natural site, that it was not a-fixed locus but a function a sort of 
nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitution came into play (“SSPDHS” 280).  Discussing 
“fixed” and “mutational” structures, the “usage of larger-than-life slides in Imperceptible Mutabilities Parks 
says: ‘you have these fixed pictures projected up there and down below there’s a little person mutating like 
hell on the stage.  I’m obsessed with the gap between these two things’” (“Signifying on the Signifyin’” 
75).  “The gap” is the absence directing Parks’s work.  I aim to show that The America Play’s repeating 
structures, consisting of words, phrases, and paragraphs, are tools for Parks’s formal side, even as these 
tools are being undermined by the absent status of the concepts they attempt to represent.     
 94
The Hall of Wonders,” wife and son, Lucy and Brazil, come to bury him.  No 
naturalistic, linearly progressing plot here.  As we shall see, the Foundling Father’s 
changing temporalities define a plot of which climax can be marked through the 
playwright’s formal manipulation of repetition and revision.  To be sure, Parks’s Rep & 
Rev is part of a greater design.  I suggest, in fact, that Parks is performing on her pages a 
certain consciousness to a theater that comments on its inability to represent the 
purported realities of its drama.  Paradoxically, superposing deconstructive self-
reflexivity, of which metatheatrical sensibilities are indeed part, is The America Play’s 
supplementing and supplemented protagonist, who signifies the diminishing potentiality 
of a viable identity by differentiating retentive and protentive realities of his former self, 
the Lesser Known, and his ideal, the Great Man (Abraham Lincoln), in the shifting, 
temporally fractured actuality of his reproductive and hence impossible identity.   
In keeping with Parks’s textual and, hence, onto-lingual sensibilities, following is 
a textual design, representing the deconstructive trajectory of the play; the following 
inscriptive scheme, I contend, stages the Foundling Father’s differing and deferring 
temporalities, emulating the performing spaces with which Parks fissures her pages.  In 
fact, Parks’s spaces are deconstructive because they are akin to Derrida’s inaudible 
differential apparatuses necessary for definition of phonemes and their inscriptive 
representation in writing.  My diagram trajectory153 locates the Foundling Father on the 
spatiotemporal plane of Derrida’s differance, through which repeating, supplementing 
traces the Foundling Father, as an absence of his own presence, the intersubjective, 
spatiotemporal nonpresence, self-reflexively regenerates the identity of his former self, 
                                                 
153 Our textual trajectory may be found in our Appendices.   
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the Lesser Known, through trace-Lincolnesque idealities.  Specifically, as 
anthropomorphic differance, the Foundling Father manipulates the Lesser Known’s 
idealized conceptuality of the Great Man, even as he differentiates their historical milieu 
within and through which their identities are defined, in showing that any attempt to 
locate originary structures of identity and history is problematic.  In keeping with The 
America Play’s self-interrogatory momentum, spatially differed and temporally deferred 
concepts of identity and history are supplemented through heterogeneous temporality 
within the inescapable historicizing and historicized space of “The Great Hole of 
History.”   
The differential impulse, undermining the metaphysics of assumed origin begins 
at the outset, whereby a supplement, an epigram, a heading to the play before the play 
within a heterogeneous double play is inscribed as follows:  
In the beginning, all the world was America. 
—JOHN LOCKE 
ACT ONE: LINCOLN ACT 
  A great hole.  In the middle of nowhere.  The hole is an exact replica of the Great Hole  
  of History.   
THE FOUNDLING FATHER AS [my emphasis] ABRAHAM LINCOLN   
                                                                                                                          (TAP 159) 
            Proclaimed primordial grasp of origin as “American” delivered by Locke, which 
can be readily identified as nothing else but ideal and metaphysically supplemental, is 
deflected through economies of self-reflexive, deconstructive supplement.  For indeed the 
seeming empirical assuredness invested in Locke’s statement is imploded by the 
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enunciating colon(ed) space between the two phrases that follow.154  That is, as the colon 
separates, even as it enables a syntactical differential, the colon defines performative 
possibilities of an “ACT” within an “ACT” in ambiguating the conventional structure of 
a theatrical model and, hence, affecting upon the Lockean expression a departure from a 
normative understanding of the primordial, “the beginning,” on the level of its accepted 
semantic integrity.   Furthermore, the colon(ed) space between the double supplement of 
an act within an act, explanation as to its multi-supplemental values is forthcoming, is 
mirrored by the absent presence of “a great hole.”  This “nonpresence,” an absence of a 
coreless structure, is a supplement of yet another hole, The Great Hole of History with 
which historicizing contents we shall soon be familiar.  For now, I would like to 
demonstrate how The America Play’s repeating trace-supplements are the precarious core 
of its formal, “architectural” like structure, which is a seminal part of its plot.155   In fact, 
when introducing the Foundling Father for the first time, (THE FOUNDLING FATHER 
AS [my emphasis] ABRAHAM LINCOLN: ) Parks creates a structural binary so as to 
                                                 
154 Parks emphasizes spatial silences with variety of textual markers, which reflect elements inherent in the 
structural differential.  I think that Derrida explains the value of “nonphonetic ‘signs’” in classifying them 
as differential silence best: “What is called phonetic writing can only function . . . . by incorporating 
nonphonetic ‘signs’ (punctuation, spacing etc.); but when we examine their structure and necessity, we will 
quickly see that they are ill described by the concepts of signs. Saussure had only to remind us that the play 
of difference was the functional condition, the condition of possibility, for every sign: and it is itself silent.  
The difference between two phonemes, which enables them to exist and to operate, is inaudible.  The 
inaudible opens the two present phonemes to hearing, as they present themselves.  If, then, there is no 
purely phonetic writing, it is because there is no purely phonetic phone.  The difference that begins out 
phonemes and lets them be heard and understood [entendre] itself remains inaudible” (“Differance” 133).  
Liz Diamond is specific in addressing the fact that Parks’s texts call attention to those “inaudible,” yet, 
crucial signs: “I think that periods and comas and semi-colons and dashes and the distance between the 
heading and the line of text and the way it is written on a page are all full of rich clues for the director” 
(“Suzan-Lori Parks and Liz Diamond . . . .”69). 
155 Says Parks, “Form should not be looked at askance and held suspect – form is not something that ‘gets 
in the way of the story’ but is an integral part of the story . . . . Also, ‘form’ is not a strictly ‘outside’ things 
while ‘content’ stays ‘inside’ . . . . form is not merely a docile passive vessel, but an active participant in 
the sort of play which ultimately inhabits it” (“Elements of Style” 7-8).  Christopher Innes is right to 
observe that “In her view, ‘the question of form runs parallel to the question of the way the world is set up.  
If you are questioning form in theatre then you are questioning the form of the world’” (“Staging Black 
History: Re-Imaging Cultural,” South African Theatre Journal 13.1-2 (2000): 20-29) p. 25. 
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qualify its suggested dialectic by inserting the destabilizing sign, “AS.”  “As” as such is 
the morphemic catalyst with which Parks interlaces the supplemental fabric, textum, of 
the play; Parks follows Heidegger, who views the term “as” as the structural component 
of all metaphysical discourse.  Deconstruction radicalizes our understanding of 
Heideggerian “as structure,” explainng the metaphysical impulse and steeps it with signs.  
The significance of the deconstructive action is monumental because it forces any 
analysis of philosophical aporetics to consider the problematic of linguistic differential, 
even as such analysis investigates the effects of its ontic elements.   
In devising a textual design with specific consciousness to repeating structures, 
Parks, I argue, acknowledges the necessity of deconstruction’s expansive treatment of 
language; she stages the supplemental movement of its concepts, its signified, through 
signifiers whose textual performance evidences the problematic spatiotemporal inception 
of these concepts’ absent, yet, repeating traces.   In effect, the Foundling Father’s, AS 
Abraham Lincoln, first words culminate in the ultimate self-evident supplement of them 
all – dictionary excerpts!156  Of all words, the Foundling Father brings excerpts of “An 
example of chiasmus, by Oliver Goldsmith, cited under ‘chiasmus’ in Webster’s Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA, Inc, 1983) p. 232.”157  It comes to no 
surprise that Parks uses footnotes to perform what is necessarily supplemental; what is 
more, that she performs the anticipated failure of reducibility of a term to its origin, can 
                                                 
156 Here I must make mention of Dr. Phillip Sipiora’s remark in asking whether the Supplement to the 
Oxford Dictionary is not, in effect, a supplement to THE supplement—The Oxford Dictionary.  Indeed, I 
think that the Foundling Father theatricalizes the supplement per excellence in showing the multi-layered 
condition of each morpheme and the regenerative potential it regressively holds.   
157 (TAP n1, 159) I here must call attention to the fact that I am quoting a footnote, explaining the meaning 
of chiasmus.  Footnotes are but one of the “citational” elements characterizing Parks’s text, adding to 
reflexive consciousness of tenacious supplementarity.  Hence, I agree with Innes that “As with all Parks’ 
techniques, the footnoting offers multi-layered meanings,” but I disagree that, “as an academic trope, it 
substantiates the historicity of what is being presented on the stage” (“Staging Black History” 24), rather I 
view such “layered meaning as complicating processes of historicity altogether. 
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be identified as discretely deconstructive.  We cannot ignore the deliciously ironic choice 
of a term such as “chiasmus”158 in which certain ambiguity emanates from its positioning 
and repositioning within syntactical and contextual differentials, through specific process 
of spatial regression.  Follow are the Foundling Father’s first utterances in the play, most 
of which are samples of chiasmus:159 
 
THE FOUNDLING FATHER AS ABRAHAM LINCOLN:   
“To stop too fearful and too faint to go.”160 
(Rest) 
“He digged the hole and the whole held him.” 
(Rest) 
“I cannot dig, to beg I am ashamed.”161 
(Rest) 
“He went to the theater but home went she.”162 
(Rest) 
Goatee.  Goatee.  What he sported when he died.  Its not my favorite. 
(Rest) 
“He digged the hole and the whole held him.” Huh. 
                                                                                       (159)   
 
                                                 
158 “n. Rhetoric. reversal in the order of words in one of two otherwise parallel phrases, for example, Do not 
live to eat, but eat to live (Collier’s Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.: New York, 1973) p. 172. 
159 So as to give readers a clearer image of how the following quote from The America Play is presented in 
the text, I have transferred the quote onto the next page.  
160This expression is footnoted by Parks in The America Play’s n1 as: “An example of chiasmus, by Oliver 
Goldsmith, cited under “chiasmus” in Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA, Inc, 
1983) p. 232.  Notes 2 and 3 also refer to examples of chiasmus” (TAP 159).   
161 This expression is footnoted by Parks in n2 as: “A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, H.W. Fowler 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 86” (ibid.). 
162 This expression is footnoted by Parks in n3 as: “The New American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, William Morris, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1981) p. 232” (ibid.). 
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The Foundling Father’s, as Abraham Lincoln, “overabundance of the signifier”163 persists 
through performance on stage in his theater, which is a replica of “The Great Hole of 
History,” in systematically supplementing semantic values of a rhetorical function.   As 
the Foundling Father as Abraham Lincoln utters supplements as to the meaning of 
chiasmus, he regresses to his past, as a gravedigger and the Lesser Known, and, 
paradoxically, to a projected future, through which the Lesser Known hopes to emulate a 
dead president’s idealized past life.  The differential gesture is indeed invested in the 
trace’s spatiotemporal matrix.  For the Foundling Father as an anthropomorphic 
representation of differance, fissures his presence, in which he actively brings examples 
as to how chiasmus functions, with retentive traces of his past life as a gravedigger and 
protentive traces of a-would-be-reality as Abraham Lincoln.  More to the point, as we 
read the footnoted chiasmus samples in their context, we can make a qualified inference 
as to why the Foundling Father chooses to use them.  He, in effect, introduces the 
environs within which he can situate, even as he differentiates, his thematically 
heterogeneously supplemented trace chiasmus about his former self as the Lesser Known, 
the gravedigger, and the Lesser Known’s idealized self as the Great Man.   
Thus, in the Foundling Father’s first utterances, we are introduced to the fecund 
trace of “theater” with which supplements The America Play “echoes” with retentive 
traces that are re-localized, re-contextualized through the haunting gunshot in the Ford 
Theater: Lincoln’s assassination, the “hole in the president’s head,” Marry Todd’s 
“hysterics,” Lincoln’s “guffawing” to a “very thin joke” from “Our American Cousin [the 
play staged that night] with Ms. Laura Keen,” John Wilkes Booth’s “purportedly” last 
words, and, most significantly, the perpetuity of a multi-layered representation of theater 
                                                 
163 (SSPDHS 279). 
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as manipulated by an impersonating nonpresence, the Foundling Father.  It is then within 
such conceptual heterogeneity that the Foundling Father self-reflexively situates, even as 
he differentiates, a trace that carries elements of his personal narrative; that is, a trace 
element, as chiasmus, describing the Lesser Known’s historicized state.  Therefore, the 
utterance, “‘He digged a hole and the whole held him’” is not only invested in the 
retentive temporality of the Foundling Father’s own past as a gravedigger, but can be also 
identified as carrying spatial dynamic, locating the Lesser Known in his “hole,” which is, 
not surprisingly, a defining absence.  In the next utterance, made before he repeats his 
authentic chiasmus about his temporal past, the Foundling Father interjects a seeming 
arbitrary, unquoted, direct address to his audience, in which he comments on his dislike 
of the impersonated, the Great Man’s, Abraham Lincoln, choice of a beard: “Goatee.  
Goatee.  What  he  sported  when  he  died.  Its164  not  my  favorite.”  In so doing, the 
Foundling Father as differance introduces, yet, another retentive temporal value, one 
belonging to the American historical past and one onto which the Foundling Father 
projects165 the Lesser Known’s self-image as a president through retentive and protentive, 
                                                 
164 Omitting apostrophes is one of the ways Parks calls attention to the physicality of her signifiers in 
factoring their assumed conceptuality as signified.  Aside from unconventional syntax and noticeably 
fragmented sentences, Parks changes words’ morphological structure and, hence, their phonemic 
economies.  Parks’s word-play and morphological neologism is expressed by join words, “heud” for, he 
would, “Ffhe sspast” for, if he is past, adding a glottal sound in the end of  a “the” to create a new phoneme 
as “thuh,” drop apostrophes as in Great Mans for Great Man’s.  The neo in logos, for both Parks and 
Derrida, means a redeployment of language so as to interpose on a complacent consciousness an awareness 
of our discursive metaphysical practices.  Mark Lilla discusses Derrida’s “a-communicative strategy” a 
tactic employed self-consciously by Derrida “for combating logocentrism.” Derrida explains, “what I try to 
do through the neutralization of communication, theses, and stability of content, through microstructure of 
signification, is to provoke, not only in the reader but also in oneself, a new tremor or a new shock of the 
body that opens a new space of experience” (“The Politics of Jacques Derrida” The New York Review of 
Books 25 June, 1998) p. 38.  In a similar vein, says Parks: “Language is a physical act. It’s something 
which involves your entire body—not just your head. Words are spells which an actor consumes and 
digests—and through digesting creates a performance on stage” (“Elements of Style” 11).     
165 Here I use the term in its Heideggerian sense whereby projection is a kind of thinking through which 
individuals have specific understanding about their future, which effectively molds their past whereby 
Dasein’s past “‘happens’ out of its future on each occasion” (Being and Time  41).  I intend to discuss 
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temporalities; such termporalities are regenerated through idealized, metaphysical 
discourse throughout The America Play.  If, as I argue, the Foundling Father 
anthropomorphicizes the movement of deconstructive differance, then the grand 
metaphysic he helps to interrogate is the substantive “presence” of his own identity and 
the history in which “hole” he is historicizing and historicized—held by its whole.  And 
if, as I argue, the Foundling Father is an anthropomorphic differance, then he must 
function self-reflexively, aware and, hence, outside the discursive idealization of the 
Great Man, overtaking the Lesser Known, his former self.  To be sure, the temporal 
ambiguity underscoring his personal past in addition to the temporality of historically 
collective past, which is personalized through concentrated impersonation—reproduced 
through repetitious, spatiotemporal, discursive trace-structures—complicate any attempts 
of understanding the Foundling Father’s discourse as nothing more then supplemental  
and as such necessarily open to interrogation.  What is more, the rigorously intersecting 
temporalities are accentuated by the textual spaces with which Parks fissures her pages, 
spaces that are not always empty.   
 Hence, when the Foundling Father as Abraham Lincoln repeats his authentic 
chiasmus, the tremor of Parks’s repetitious, regenerative, spatiotemporal trajectory begins 
to reveal itself.  For indeed, the utterance, “‘He digged a hole and the whole held him’ 
Huh.” is repeated and revised by the addition of a phoneme, “Huh,” which is outside of 
original quotation marks so as to indicate a revised repetition.  Moreover, as those 
preceding it, the repeated expression is distinctively surrounded by space within which 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heidegger’s temporal trajectory limitedly in revealing the ways in which the Lesser Known is influenced 
by the Great Man’s “traditionalized” and idealized historicity, a process marked by a temporal ambiguity in 
which the Great Man’s “footsteps” are impossibly ahead of the Lesser Known’s.  
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Parks situates repeating parenthesized, italicized terms166 that though potentially 
understood as conventional stage directions, are instead reinforcing a suggestion that the 
utility of conceptual spatiality is part of Parks’s deconstructive design.  Parks is creating a 
milieu, on the page, within which she attempts to perform the ways repeating 
temporalities are hypostatized through the spatial, signified (v.) reemergence of the 
Derridian trace.  As we progress, we shall be able to grasp the scope of Parks’s Rep & 
Rev structures and the profound deconstructive understanding their utilization lends to 
the reading of her drama.  For indeed a progressively diachronic movement of repetition 
with revision suggests that the subjective and objective presences their signs convey 
semantically are not excisable in their substantive totalities.  Even so, this is exactly the 
point in which I identify Parks as contributing to the deconstructive dynamic and its 
possible impossible irreconcilable dialectic.  That is, I contend that Parks’s Rep & Rev 
matrices, just through the sheer sequence of their repetitions, represent a viable opening 
for metaphysics, which can potentially arise through the repetition of a trace-supplement 
as ideal—complete and repeatable in its completion.  Yet, antithetical to repeating 
ideality, is Parks’s deconstructive revision, which undermines the repetitious impetus of 
the trace in its completion; in so doing, Parks’s revisionary structures testify to the 
impossibility of the trace’s tenable state as ideal and, therefore, as metaphysic.  Hence, 
before we embark on the Foundling Father’s articulation of supplemented sign traces of 
                                                 
166 (Rest) is a technique Parks uses throughout the play, which is an italicized stage direction that is 
solitarily set in a parenthesis, defining blank, spatial values in relation to written inscriptions that surround 
it.  The fact that Parks chooses a term denoting a musical pause to implement a literal pause is in step with 
her jazz-like method of Rep & Rev.  “(Rest)” fissures the page and potentially demarcates the 
materialization of passing time in the performative space.  Also transitional, is another spatial  textual 
device specific to Parks’s dramatic texts, a spell: “An elongated and heightened (rest).  Denoted by 
repetition of figures’ names with no dialogue.  Has sort of an architectural look.  This is a place where the 
figures experience their pure true simple state” (“Elements of Style” 16).  For a deconstructive reading, any 
usage of the term “pure” might be problematic.  In my view, rest and spell are spatiotemporal devices, 
conveying a transition, a conceptual passage of time.     
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the Great Man’s idealized history and identity, which are historicized through the Lesser 
Known’s “mind’s eye,” I would like to discuss Parks’s understanding of Rep & Rev,167 
through which structure I see the Foundling Father perpetuating deconstructive, self-
reflexive supplement in showing the absent origin of repeating and, hence, idealized 
traces.   
 Parks follows dramatists such as August Wilson in admitting to the influence of 
jazz on their writing: “Through listening, with its solos sculpted around revisions of 
repeated theme, Parks says she’s recently realizes ‘how much this method is an integral 
part of the African and African-American literary and oral traditions.’”168  Parks’s 
dramatic works contrast conventionally written plays with their noticeable structures of 
Rep & Rev, which guide her writing.  Parks says, “In such plays we are not moving from 
AÆB but rather, for example, from AÆ AÆ AÆ BÆ A. Through such movement we 
refigure A.  And if we continue to call this movement FORWARD PROGRESSION, 
which I think it is, then we refigure the idea of forward progression.  And if we insist on 
calling writings structured with this in mind PLAYS, which I think they are, then we’ve 
                                                 
167 Taking a theoretical cue from Henry Louise Gates Jr., argues James Frieze, “Parks draws on the 
African-American tradition of ‘repetition [and] difference’. . . . Rep & Rev found its apotheosis in jazz 
composition, a central principle of which is the establishment of a particular phrase or harmonic line which 
is then repeated with signal difference.  Parks’s theatrical application of the technique conjures up the 
experience of meanings changing, often barely perceptibly, over time” (“Imperceptible Mutabilities in the 
Third Kingdom: Suzan-Lori Parks and the Shared Struggle to Perceive.” Modern Drama 41.4 (1998): 523-
32) p. 524.  Interestingly, Marc Robinson describes Parks as “a fanatic reviser.  Her plays sound like fugues 
of language, always turning back on themselves in order to travel again through significant perceptions” 
(“Four Writers” Theater 24.1 (1993): 31-42) p. 37. 
168 (“Signifying on the Signifyin” 79).  Discussing The Death of the Last Black Man in the Whole Entire 
World, Louis Bernard observes that “Parks experiments with the rhythmic complexity that is the foundation 
of scat, be-bop, or free jazz.  As Ornette Coleman and John Coltrane chose to ‘ignore bar lines, chord-based 
improvisation and even tonality . . . .,’ so Parks constantly violates rules, her dialogue becoming the spoken 
equivalent of ‘suprasegmentals’—the variations in pitch, stress, and dynamics” (“The Musicality of 
language: redefining History in Suzan Lori Parks’ The Black Death Man in the Whole Entire World.” 
African American Review 31.4 (1997): 687-96) p. 687.  
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got a different kind of dramatic literature.”169  The relevance of incorporating into her 
drama a sense of temporal flux is significant to Parks’s theater theorem.  Parks asks, in 
fact, “How does this Rep & Rev—a literal incorporation of the past—impact on the 
creation of the theatrical experience?”170  Moreover, discussing one of her earlier plays, 
Betting on the Dust Commander, Parks points out that “the ‘climax’ could be the 
accumulated weight of the repetition—a residue that, like city dust, stays with us.”171  
Indeed, “a residue” readily describes the potentially accumulating, yet, effacing trace, 
which as a nonoriginary origin is the supplementing and supplemented movement 
underlying conceptual metaphysics.  Hence, when the Foundling Father Repeats & 
Revises his introductory utterances, “Goatee.  Huh.  Goatee.,”  and “‘He digged the Hole 
and the Whole held him.,’” they are spatially re-contextualized within monologues that 
mobilize supplementing traces about identity—economies of Lincoln’s beards and the 
historicizing effects of the “Hole” within which the “Whole” holds the Lesser Known.  
The absent origin as trace, attesting to the supplemental, idealized state of concepts such 
as identity and history, is presented through the following template:172 the Foundling 
Father’s metatheatrical, self-reflexive  intervention in presenting the concept of theater as 
striving on its representational and supplemental impulse, the Great Man’s historicity 
against which the Lesser Known’s is differentiated within the historicizing Great Hole of 
                                                 
169 (“Elements” 9-10). 
170 (ibid.)  In fact, Parks describes all of her early plays through illustrated equations in which one is asked 
to solve for X, calculation which involves values of time and space.  Photocopies of Parks’s illustration-
equations of Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom, Betting on the Dust Commander, Pickling, 
The Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World, Devotees in the Garden of Love, and The America Play 
may be found in our appendix.   
171 (ibid.) 
172 I refer to the forthcoming triple structured excerpt from The America Play presented on p. 111, which, 
as I argue, underscores the conceptual fundaments of my argument.  The sub-thesis I present here parallels 
to the three parts distinctively noticeable in the excerpt, which ultimately indicates the treble conceptuality 
of differance.  
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History, and, finally, Rep & Rev structures within which the Foundling Father’s as 
differance shows how idealization is perpetuated through supplementation .173  Hence, on 
the one hand, the double life of the trace as iterative movement sustains an opening for 
idealities and their return, attesting to the possibility of presence, while, on the other 
hand, iterative traces deconstructively reject the viability of presence through their 
reemergence as impossibly revised presences.  Therefore, nothing signifies such revision 
as Parks’s fragmented syntax and abundance of morphemic neologism, in repeated and 
revised structures; such structures are deconstructive, effectively suggesting sensibilities 
to postmodern avant-garde and its suspicion of a discursive unity of meaning.174  Parks’s 
postmodern drama, I argue, targets modern pastiche by staging a deconstructive 
momentum that directs The America Play’s “rage of mimesis”175 against a sense of 
certainty, a familiar gesture of dogmatic, metaphysical intransigency, in showing the 
inherent problematic of language as communicating unified meaning.  Hence, Parks’s 
fragmented language communicates its anticipated failure and, at the same time, its 
anticipated success, gained through a perceptual opening necessary for structures of 
repetition and revision and the tenability of the deconstructive undecidable.  
                                                 
173Rep & Rev structures introduce idealities, absent presences, within which The America Play’s 
protagonist is a metaphor for the ultimate absence: differance.  In playing with absences, Parks seems to 
follow jazz great Miles Davis, who was quoted as saying, “don’t play what’s there, play what’s not there” 
(Morning Edition, NPR January 6, 2007).   
174 Discussing Derrida’s view of modern avant-garde, Caputo reveals postmodern angst.  Caputo stresses 
that for Derrida European modernity, the “paradigmatic gesture,” is an “‘auto-biographical’ project in 
which European thinkers tell the story of Europe as the avant-garde and ‘promontory’ of the West . . . . 
composing a eulogy to a Europe that sets the heading for Western, indeed global destiny.” He continues to 
say that “Derrida would have Europe eschew this closing off within destiny so that opening for the ‘tout 
autre’ occurs ‘beyond this modern tradition’” (Deconstruction in a Nutshell 118).  In the same vein, 
Lyotard decries European “nostalgia of the whole and the one” obtained through “the nostalgia for the 
unattainable” in which “reconciliation of language games” is “the transcendental illusion” that “can hope to 
totalize them into real unity” (“What is Postmodernism?” 81-82). 
175 (Agitated States 197).  I here invert the meaning of Kubiak’s phrase, who suggests that Parks’s The 
America Play fails to preserve the integrity of its hidden trauma, by inscribing the double trauma of 
postmodern “agitation” in questioning modernist longing for totalities of meaning and modernist failure to 
anticipate the onslaught of dogmatic worldview which such totalities help create.  
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The “Structure” of Parks’s Differance—Its Absent Idealized Traces and the Self – 
Reflexive Dramaturge Who Regenerates Them 
 
Investigating accumulating absences in The America Play’s supplemental 
structures, we follow the Foundling Father’s deconstructive iteration in showing that 
idealization is both rejected by and indispensable for his dramaturgical labor.  As the 
anthropomorphic representation of the deconstructive differance, the Foundling Father 
indicates as he differentiates retentive and protentive traces in giving emphasis to the 
ontological status of a concept and its signs’ spatiotemporal/ontic birth, as they 
accommodate the impulse of its supplementation.  Deconstructive Rep & Rev are the 
tools of his trade, with which idealities of regenerative, morphemic repetition belonging 
to conceptual metaphysics stand returning ad infinitum with, nonetheless, revision, which 
superposes and ultimately imposes self-interrogatory momentum on idealities of origin as 
presence.   
To achieve an interrogatory self-reflexivity, the Foundling Father creates a 
topologically textual movement, on the page, within which as the deconstructive 
differance he differentiates as he supplements historicized temporal traces of the Great 
Man and the Lesser Known.  In so doing, the Foundling Father accommodates an 
ontologically defining environment which, through spatiotemporal traces, must vie with 
possibilities of ontic realities.  The following excerpt from The America Play’s firs act 
represents the Foundling Father as differance and the traces with which he supplements 
metaphysical aporias such as identity and history, problematizing their viable 
conceptuality as presence.  I aim to represent the heterogeneity of deconstructive 
conceptualization through the textually tripled passage, which is, in effect, congruent to 
the values of my initial design of the Foundling Father’s anthropomorphic, 
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spatiotemporal state of differance.  Since my intent is to treat each of the parts separately 
in showing the impossibility of conceptual totalities, I distinct between them as parts A, 
C, and B respectively.  What is more, staging the Foundling Father’s monologue in the 
play’s first act reveals textual dramatics, which attest to the inherently fractured condition 
of seeming lexicological, signified integrity.  Hence, as he addresses his audience, on his 
stage, in his Hole “out west,” the “whole” system is interrogated: 
While the Great Mans livelihood kept him in Big Town the Lesser 
Knowns work kept him in Small Town.  The Great Man by trade 
A         Was a President.  The Lesser Known was a Digger by trade.  From a 
Family of Diggers.  Digged  graves.  He was known in Small Town  to  
Dig  his  graves  quickly  and   neatly.  This  brought  him  a   steady  
business. 
 
(Rest) 
 
 C        A  wink  to  Mr. Lincolns  pasteboard  cutout.  (Winks  at Lincoln’s  
             Pasteboard cutout) 
 
(Rest) 
 
It would be helpful to our story if when the Great Man died in  
Death he were to meet the Lesser Known.  It would be helpful to 
our story if, say, the Lesser Known were summoned to Big Town by 
the Great Mans wife: “Emergency oh Emergency, please put the  
Great Man in the ground”176 (they say the Great Mans wife was 
given to hysterics: one young son dead others sickly: even the Great Man                   
B         couldn’t save them: war was on then off and surrendered to: “Play Dixie I always 
liked this song”177: the brother against the brother: a new nation all conceived 
and ready to be hatched: the Great Man takes to guffawing guffawing at 
thin jokes at bad plays: “You sockdologizing old man- trap!”178 haw  haw  haw… 
and one moment guffawing  and the next moment the Great Man is gunned down 
in his rocker.  “Useless Usless.”179  And there were bills to pay.)  “Emergency, oh  
Emergency please put the Great Man in the ground.”       
                                              (160)    
               
                                                 
176 This is Parks’s n4, it reads: “Possibly the words Mary Todd Lincoln after the death of her husband.” 
177 Parks’s n5 reads: “At the end of the civil war, President Lincoln told his troops to play “Dixie,” the song 
of the South, in tribute to the Confederacy.” 
178 Parks’s n6 reads: “A very funny line from the play Our American Cousin.  As the audience roared with 
laughter, Booth entered Lincoln’s box and shot him dead.” 
179 Parks’s n7 reads: “The last words of President Lincoln’s assassin, John Wilkes Booth.” 
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So as to stress Parks’s Rep & Rev impulse in the play, I choose to underline, italicize, and 
bold-face repeating expressions; these, as we are about to witness, will repeat, again, 
throughout the play in semi-revisionary structures, which are subtly re-contextualized as 
the play negotiates the meaning it interrogates.   
And so, as the personification of deconstructive self-reflexivity, the Foundling 
Father must begin with a deconstructive point of interrogation, that is, he must begin with 
signs that reveal the ontological strife of their arrival—the questionability rooted in their 
spatiotemporal origin as reproductive, supplemental traces.  Henceforth, looking at the 
distinctively partitioned passage, we notice that, at the outset, beyond the textual rupture 
of footnoted, supplemented traces, temporal values are ambiguous at best: part (A) 
represents the differentiated identity of the Lesser Known, gained through the 
historicizing traces of the Great Man, a reality the Foundling Father locates in the past; 
part (C) is the paradoxically potent temporality of the Foundling Father, as differance, 
and dramaturge, through which dramatic schism on the page he is able to self-reflexively 
differentiated retentive and protentive traces in the impossible state of “the pure actuality 
of the now”; lastly, part (B) takes the action to the 1800’s, “time immemorial,” 
representing events in the Great Mans past that though are most distant in time, are 
idealized, relocated, and projected onto a future to which the Lesser Known could have 
had a recourse.  The Foundling Father, I argue, attempts to unsettle suggestions of 
chronicled, normative conceptualization of history.180  Further, in addition to historicized 
                                                 
180 There is very little doubt that Derrida’s concept of “play,” as in the play of absence and presence, directs 
the disturbance of normative history in The America Play.  When Derrida, therefore, states that “the 
reference to play is always caught up in tension.  Tension with history first of all” and that “The thematic of 
historicity . . . . has always been required by the determination of Being as presence” (SSPDHS 290-1), he 
problematizes attempts to reduce history to teleological, metaphysical sum, suggesting that locating it as 
presence lends history a persistent unity for which it might fail to account.  Certainly, Parks fractures form 
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temporality, the dramatically schismatic irreconcilability between the passage’s 
distinctive parts can be traced to the Foundling Father’s consciousness about the 
supplemental reproductive state of the language he manipulates as the anthropomorphic 
representation of differance and the condition of the trace as protowriting.  Anterior to 
“making history,” therefore, is the language of its making and remaking.   Hence, though 
I disagree that Parks “denies” history, I accept Una Chaudhuri’s analysis of The America 
Play’s manipulation of history as a function of language.  Chaudhuri notes that,  
Parks’s denial of history occurs at the level of language, or rather of the 
recognition that history, because it exists as language, is always subject to 
revision. . . . Every fresh repetition of one of history’s privileged textual 
fragments rewrites the meaning, the substance and affect, of that 
fragment.181   
Similarly, Bernard Wilmer remarks, “Parks questions the historical moment by repeating 
and revising it, thereby denying its timelessness and even its authenticity”182  In Parks’s 
view, is historical truth available?  Responding to Parks’s statement that “Theater is an 
incubator for the creation of historical events,” Katy Ryan correctly points out that this 
statement implies “an understanding that history is always mediated knowledge and that 
cultural spaces, like theatre, like Lincoln’s tomb, serve as incubators for historical 
events.”183  As I argue, in The America Play Parks vacillates between revealing how 
                                                                                                                                                 
that dialectically comments on a content that proscribes any call for teleological opening, including 
historically persistent temporality.    
181(Staging Place: The Geography of Modern Drama.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995) p. 
265.  
182 (“Musicality” 446).   
183(“‘No Less Human’: Making History in Suzan Lori Parks’s The America Play,” Journal of Dramatic 
Theory and Criticism 13.2 (1999): 81-91) p. 83.  “Cultural spaces,” or if you will contexts also mark 
Derrida’s understanding of history.  Hugh Rayment-Pickard argues that Derrida’s fidelity to history rises 
through his meditation on contexualizing historical events in showing that historical truths are viable only 
 110
history is produced as a metaphysic and the viability of propagating it in its black design 
in some of her other early “history plays.”184  She does follow Derrida in understanding 
that    
The concept of history . . . . cannot be subject to a simple and 
instantaneous mutilation, the striking of a name from the vocabulary. We 
must elaborate a strategy of the textual work which at every instant 
borrows an old word from philosophy in order immediately to demarcate 
it . . . . We must first overturn the traditional concept of history, but at the 
same time mark this interval, take care that by virtue of the overturning, 
and by the simple fact of conceptualization, that the interval not be 
reappropriated.185 
For example, In The Last Dead Black Man in the Whole Entire World 
(TLDBMWEW), Parks treats the concept of history with certain temporal circularity, 
within which her figure, BLACK MAN WITH WATERMELON, never dies, his 
lynching continues ad infinitum as his wife, BLACK WOMAN WITH FRIED 
DRUMSTICK, says: “Yesterday today next summer tomorrow just uh moment uhgoh in 
1317 dieded thuh last black man in thuh whole entire world,” when another figure, YES 
AND GREENS BLACK-EYED PEAS CORNBREAD, urges her “you should write it 
down and you should hide it under a rock.”186  As many commentators agree, the 
practices of “writing it down” in TLDBMWEW are expected to provide a promise of 
                                                                                                                                                 
through a reflexive realization of their interpretational impetus.  (“Derrida and Fidelity to History,” 
History-of-European-Ideas 28 (2002): 13-20) p. 16. 
184As I view The America Play as an attempt to disquiet metaphysical certitude, I disagree with Janette 
Malkin, who contends that The America Play is an attempt to “implant a different memory of America’s 
past, restoring a black presence” (Memory-Theater and Postmodern Drama, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999) p. 176. 
185 (Positions 59) 
186 (The America Play and Other Works 102).   
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regained historical permanency for people whose history was never narrated in the first 
place.  The play is full of retentive, repeating traces, which recall the African past, 
“Before Columbus” and the forced slavery and persecution of blacks in America.  
Certainly, Parks’s Imperceptible Mutabilities of the Third Kingdom, is a sobering 
observation of black life drained out of its memory, reconstituted with subversive white 
imprint.  For example, in the play’s first part, MOLLY, formerly known as MONA, tells 
CHARLENE formerly known as CHONA, that she is expelled from school because she 
fails to recite “The-little-lamb-follows-closely-behind-at-Marys-heels-as-Mary-boards-
the-train . . . . [because she has] never seen no woman on no train with no lamb.” Both 
Molly and Charlene are observed by THE NATURALIST, “who came to teach, 
enlighten, and tame . . . observe the objects of study . . . . through experimentation” while 
hiding in a cockroach costume.187   In part two of Imperceptible, we regress to the Middle 
Passage whose echoes reverberate in the figures’ names.  US-SEER warns of the ensuing 
calamity: “Com home come home dont say out too late.  Bleached Bones Man may get 
you n take you far uhcross thuh waves. . .”188  In part three, ARETHA SAXTON, a slave, 
mistress, wife, and mother is having her teeth extracted absurdly to make room for a 
passage, while readying for her last passage.  Aretha’s life is marked by a complete 
subservience to her master CHARLES SAXTON, who is introduced interchangeably as 
god.   She is being told that based on “Amendment 1807,”189 she is “expiring” and must 
die.  In part four, Greeks, Parks drives the nail all the way in whereby SERGEANT 
SMITH, wife and daughters, BUFFY AND DUFFY have no recourse to black heritage; 
in fact, the interwoven theme in part four is of total assimilation, which leaves him with 
                                                 
187 (ibid. 25,27,29).   
188 (ibid. 38) 
189 Parks’s n6 reads: “In March of 1807, England’s slave trade was abolished” (ibid. 47). 
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“Distinction,” and limbless.  Most subversive in identifying the viability of black 
metaphysic is Parks’s Venus.  The play is based on a 19th century African Khoikhoi 
woman, Saartji Baartman, who had a “remarkable bottom” and was exhibited in England 
like a circus animal.  Though Parks does not exculpate Baartman from being a 
coconspirator of her own demise, Baartman, introduced as “The Hottentot Venus,” is 
caged, lusted for, dismembered, and studied.  Nothing can “deconstruct” the bottomless 
abyss opened by The Baron Docteur, Venus’ lover, whose possession and meticulous 
dissection analysis and of her body can be transposed with evils of Africa’s 
colonization.190  Indeed, this kind of un-deconstructible pit reveals a black hole through 
which no metaphysical supplement can proliferate.  Certainly, dealing with historically 
black themes of loss and subjugation, introducing a metaphysical opening for the 
viability of black identity, and the reconstitution of black history, locate Parks’s theater in 
the black drama scene with one significant caveat: Parks’s persistent relocation of her 
work within the historical consciousness of Western philosophy.191  This kind of 
consciousness is also clear in her remaining early plays, Devotees in the Garden of Love, 
Pickling, and Betting on the Dust Commander; that is, her characters and authentic 
plotlines indicate very little affiliation to black ethnicity.  For instance, in Devotees, love, 
                                                 
190 As Elam and Rayner note that “It was not uncommon to exhibit Hottentot woman in Europe, but the 
Hottentot Venus stands as a single emblem for figuring nineteenth century colonial discourse on race and 
sexuality” (Harry J. Elam Jr. and Alice Rayner, “Body Parts: Between Story and Spectacle in Venus by 
Suzan-Lori Parks,” in Staging Resistance: Essays on Political Theater, Jeanne Colleran, and Jenny S. 
Spencer,. Eds. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan Press, 1998) p. 265.     
191 To be sure, Suzan-Lori Parks invalidates European prejudices about black history.  Quoting from James 
S. Snead’s essay, “Repetition as a Figure of Black Culture,” Antonia Rodriguez-Gago introduces Hegel’s 
reflection on “African history,” communicating the sentiment on the continent: “‘[In] Africa there can be 
really no history.  There is a succession of accidents and surprises . . . . Thus we find nothing other than 
man in his immediacy . . . . The Negro represents the natural man in all his wildness and indocility: if we 
wish to grasp him, then we must drop all European conceptions.  What we actually understand by Africa is 
that which is without history or resolution [and which turns] . . . . all European categories of logic’” ("Re-
Creating Herstory: Suzan-Lori Parks's Venus." Staging a Cultural Paradigm: The Political and the 
Personal in American Drama, Barbara Ozieblo, and Miriam López-Rodríguez, Eds. Brussels, Belgium: 
Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes (P.I.E.)-Peter Lang, 2002) p. 259. 
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though thematically universal, takes on Parks’s ludicrously hilarious pathologies when 
Lily and her daughter George, both devoted to wedded love, are sitting on a hilltop 
watching how Odelia Pandahr, a French matchmaker, is directing a battle between 
ThisOne and ThatOne to win George’s hand.192  Here, nonetheless, if we are to decipher 
historicist structures at all, then we will have to trace them through Heidegger’s view of 
the effects of technology on modern lives and, antithetical to it, his understanding of the 
manifold sway of “gathering” and its significance for a community.193   
Whether general about black historicity and the subversive white structures that 
define it, or specific in treating ontologically crucial themes, Parks’s Rep & Rev in The 
America Play is overarching in permeating the Foundling Father’s dialogue with 
deconstructive self-reflexivity, which accentuates the possibilities of spatiotemporal and 
                                                 
192 As we can easily recognize, Parks is one of few American writers with distinctively wicked sense of 
humor.  Of course, one feels just as tickled with Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow’s protagonist 
Tyrone Slothrop and his eventful English-candy miseries at Mrs. Quoad’s, not to mention Slothrop’s 
unseemly intimate liaisons with the V-Bomb; Pynchon’s Vineland and its nun motorcycle gang; Pynchon’s, 
Oedipa Mass, protagonist of The Crying of Lot 49, in ludicrous search for an illusive stamp carrying the 
imprint of a bugle, which becomes a fecund metaphor for a pynchonesque anarchical strand.  Finally, there 
is no surpassing the humorously iniquitous moment in which Mickey Sabbath, Philip Roth’s protagonist in 
Sabbath’s Theater, visits his divorcee in a rehabilitation center, furtively reads her diaries, which contain 
letters to her deceased father, and writes her a destructive response— as her father!  
193 Very nostalgic, Lily tells George: “In my day thuh vision uh future battle bride envisioned was her table.  
Her place settings was thuh place holders for her company.  Who would come tuh dine throughout her 
generations.  Seeing the vision of her table was thuh most important thing.  Guess it aint like that now.  
Now you got—technology” (The America Play and other Works 142).  Parks’s late, more 
“representational” plays, In the Blood, Fucking A (compiled in one volume and called The Red Letter 
Plays), trace Nathanial Hawthorn’s The Scarlet Letter, both protagonists called Hester, both have children 
and are husbandless), and Topdog Underdog (2001 Pulitzer winner), are disturbing in their depiction of 
characters, who are entrapped within darkly deterministic, below the poverty line existence.  Indeed, 
though alluding to Hawthorn’s Hester Prynne, Hester La Negrita in In the Blood and Hester Smith in 
Fucking A also “allude to Medea who kills her own children as an act of vengeance against their father, and 
to mothers in slave narratives—exemplified by Sethe in Tony Morrison’s Beloved—who kill their children 
to save them from worse fate” (Verna A. Foster, “Nurturing and Murderous Mothers in Suzan-Lori Parks’s 
In the Blood and Fucking A.” American Drama 16.1 (2007): 75-89) p. 75.  Parks’s  Topdog Underdog’s  
deterministic structure stems from Parks’s pathological fascination with the Lincoln assassination.  Two 
brothers, Link (for Lincoln) and Booth share a seedy room without running water, the real, tragic shot at the 
play’s close echoes all the way from The Ford Theater via The America Play to remind audiences of 
violence’s particular white color.    
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lingual investigation.  Hence, on a deconstructive level, no matter the content, revision 
within re-written repetitions occurs through “fragments,” traces, only because they carry 
discontinuous temporalities, a movement that is essential to our understanding of the 
Foundling Father, the dramaturge of the play, and his differential impulse.  
 
Part (C) 
Deconstructing the already performatively deconstructed, I first approach part (C) 
of the quoted passage in attempts to show the self-reflexive supplemental state of the 
Foundling Father.  Moreover, I aim to show how the differential supplemental traces he 
produces create an opening for heterogeneity, which, as I argue, poses viable opening of 
indeterminacy that prohibits any claims to the Foundling Father’s identity.  Hence, unlike 
Elam and Rayner who argue that “. . . . the Foundling Father in the first act seeks 
recovery of an identity through repetition of the Lincoln scene,”194 I argue that 
regenerative differential repetition and revision is exactly the point through which the 
Foundling Father consciously maneuvers away from self-evident, supplemental structures 
of identity.  Radically, self-reflexivity is the turning point of the Foundling Father’s 
vanishing identity.  Though I view the Foundling Father’s conscious loss of identity as 
the point of his impossible empowerment as differance, Brustein, like most critics, 
understands the process of the Foundling Father’s diminishing identity differently:  
The Foundling Father, already a fallen version of the real Lincoln, 
dwindles further over the course of the play, present only as a Lincoln bust 
early in Act II, then a Lincoln penny, then even further reduced to an 
                                                 
194(Harry Elam, Alice Rayner, “Echoes from the Black Whole: An Examination of The America Play by 
Suzan-Lori Parks,” Performing America: Cultural Nationalism in American Theater, Jeffrey D. 
 Mason and J. Ellen Gainor Eds. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1999) p. 181.   
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intangible face on the TV that reruns the play's first act, now, in a final 
diminishment, played in silence. So runs down memory. As Lucy and 
Brazil try to retrieve the past, it dissolves in their hands and before their 
eyes. This erosion of character has its equivalent in just about every Parks 
play.195 
The America Play’s firs act, I argue, shows that dissolution of identity is necessary.  
Indeed, the Foundling Father rejects his identity as a gravedigger, rejects the idealized 
identity of the Great Man that he, as a gravedigger, aspired to, and finally rejects the 
origin of his idealized aspiration, revealing it as a mythologized narrative of a president.  
In examining the Foundling Father’s performance as differance, observing the 
cited passage and the post-structural design in our Appendices, we can readily identify 
the same kind of a treble demarcation of differance and the spatiotemporal perpetuity that 
propagate it deconstructively.  We can, moreover, conceptually and hence textually 
visualize the ways in which the Foundling Father topographically and strategically 
superposes simultaneous intervention in the retentive and protentive traces of a dead 
president, an affected gravedigger, and a mimicking nonself, nonpresence in the elastic 
absent of “the pure actuality of the now.”  Furthermore and if possible at all, to gain a 
status of anthropomorphic differance, the Foundling Father must indicate his signs self-
reflexively, calling attention to his impossible, yet, necessary isolation from temporalities 
of past and future, even as he fissures, on the page, a spatial nonterritory within which he 
rigorously regenerates his signs.  Henceforth, the onto-lingual, non-edifice of 
                                                 
195 “Remarks on Parks: A Symposium on the Work of Suzan-Lori Parks.”  
       Hunter online Theater Review 30 April 2004.  24 September 2006 
       < http://www.hotreview.org/articles/remarksparks2 htm>  
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deconstruction within and through which the Foundling Father functions as differance 
comes to a head when he utters, 
(Rest) 
A  wink  to  Mr. Lincolns  pasteboard  cutout.  (Winks  at Lincoln’s Pasteboard cutout) 
(Rest) 
dislocating his presence as the protagonist of the play therein.  The Foundling Father in 
effect ambiguates his position as the protagonist of the play by displacing his temporality  
(fissuring the space between the proscenium arch and audience through ontic spatiality) 
with the suggested temporality of his formal status as an actor outside the context of the 
illusionist presence of the stage.  Moreover, the Foundling Father’s supplemental and 
anthropomorphic state as differance continuous its exponential signification when we 
consider the fact that by pronouncing the stage directions he becomes the dramaturge of 
the play, privy to the playwright’s designs, which is yet an additional contextual 
temporality to his formal position as an actor.  The plethora, “over abundance of the 
signifier,” increases yet again when we consider the fact that the Foundling Father is the 
protagonist of his own show “out west,” narrating a story about his former self, the 
Lesser Known, even as he impersonates, yet, again someone else altogether.  Parks does 
not end her ambivalent, deconstructive tour-de-force here.  Like Derrida she seems to 
look for an ontological mises-en-abyme196 whereby her consciously, self-reflexive, 
anthropomorphic differance-ial protagonist aptly maneuvers within the multiple, 
repetitious, supplemental contexts he perpetuates.  That is, as he reflexively verbalizes 
                                                 
196 As Shain points out, “Mises-en-abyme is a French heraldic term referring to a coat of arms which 
contains its own image, reduced within itself . . . the reduced image will also contain an image of itself, one 
has a figure of infinite mirroring.  Derrida is constantly on the lookout for the conceptual mises-en-abyme, 
as they illustrate self-reference, not as a kind of harmony or reintegration, but as a kind of infinite 
complication” (“Situating Derrida” 395). 
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the stage directions, he calls the audience’s, the one attending The America Play, 
attention to the possibility that temporally speaking he has recourse to their temporality; 
next, the Foundling Father, as a Lincoln impersonator, is the protagonist  in a show he 
puts on “out west,” reenacting the Lincoln assassination and, as we are about to see the 
Foundling Father has his own audience “out west,” who carry a double duty of audience 
of a play within a play and of characters, who “shoot Mr. Lincoln!”; what is more, the 
Foundling Father’s show is staged in his “replica of The Great Hole of History” within 
which he creates yet another “replica,” The Ford Theater, the fatal space within which 
Abraham Lincoln is murdered; and finally, the Foundling Father reproduces an 
illusionary allusion to what is already illusory: the play staged at the night of the murder, 
Our American Cousin within which retentive temporality the Great Man laughs and 
within which “(Booth shoots. Lincoln “slumps in his chair.” Booth jumps).”197  That the 
supplemental impetus of The America Play can be potentially viewed as a document in 
metatheatrical (metadramatical) analysis is not surprising.198  For indeed, the Foundling 
Father as the dramaturge of the play comments on the medium he creates within the 
Great Hole of History, which is nothing but an receptacle to an absence, revealed, as it 
must be, through the juridical concept of theater and the theatricality marking all of its 
reproductive repetitions.  As it were, in the original Great Hole of History, where the 
Lesser Known and “his Lucy honeymooned,” processes of mimesis, underlying the 
representational impetus of theater, manifest in the dynamic of its repetitious return: 
                                                 
197 (TAP 171) 
198 Elinor Fuchs identifies “theatricalist,” metadramatic, processes in The America Play’s re-inscription  of 
“traditional theatricalism,” through the play’s efforts to “undermine ontological difference between 
theatrical and the real” (“Clown Shows: Anti-Theatricalism in Four Twentieth-Century Playwrights.” 
Modern Drama 44.3 (2001): 337-80) p. 350.  That Parks attempts to question the real through a rigorous 
representational play, it is certain.  The question is, of course, if The America Play affords an opening to 
“the real” altogether.  
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“Cannons wicks were lit and the rockets did blare and the enemy was slain and lay 
stretched out and smoldering for dead and rose up again to take their bows.”199  As we are 
about to see, the (Rest)s and Spells within which Parks situates her “signifyin” signifiers 
are none other than ontological openings to what is ontically differential.  Hence, as we 
consider the again and again of theater, we must consider Parks’s Rep & Rev and its 
textual appearance within the spaces she opens on the page.  Crucially, moreover, we 
must consider how the Foundling Father becomes the locum from and through which 
such repetitious, theatrical and, hence, always already self-reflexive regeneration occurs.  
As I propose, the hyletic absence within the hole is the spatiotemporal environs 
within which the Foundling Father as deconstructive differance propagates repetitious 
traces of history self reflexively, traces which are noticeable through structures of ontic 
Rep & Rev, inscribed within the spatial pathologies of Parks’s (Rest)s.  Hence, the 
Founding Father is slain repetitiously again and again, in a murder reenacted by an actor, 
impersonator, in effect, a simulating “faker”— the Foundling Father, whose name, I 
argue, marks his fluid, changing condition as supplement.200  Mentioned by Brazil as 
“My faux-father,” who, gets “Uh medal for fakin” because “Diggin was his livelihood 
but fakin was his callin,” a phrase revisionally retorted by Lucy as, “faking was your 
Daddy’s callin but diggin was his livelihood,”201  the Foundling Father becomes a 
paradigm of metaphorically hypostatized nonpresence, the faker and hence the actor par-
excellence, who, at every turn, performs the self-reflexivity he owes to his state as 
                                                 
199 (TAP 163) 
200 Most commentators view the term “Foundling” as a form of nominal diminution.  I view it as part of the 
play’s persistent attempt to resist codification of historical norm.     
201 (TAP 179, 181, 184, 186). 
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deconstructive diffarnce.202  It might come to no surprise that at the outset Parks’s 
consciously-performing, deconstructive protagonist is indebted to Bertolt Bercht’s 
alienation affect, verfremdugseffekt, for his consciousness of the medium within which he 
functions.  For as I claim such state of detachment is necessary for the Foundling Father’s 
state as anthropomorphic differance, which demands that he gains a measure of 
spatiotemporal isolation within the ontic signification he differentiates. Henceforth, in 
addition to the repetitiously revised and re-contextualized verbalized stage-directions, 
which, as I argue, lends the Foundling Father a certain detachment from the progressing 
action of the play, his narrative about his former self, the Lesser Known, is done in the 
third person: “There was once a man who was told that he bore a strong resemblance to 
Abraham Lincoln.”203  Talking about himself, while impersonating someone else, even as 
he pronounces his alliances to the playwright by verbalized stage directions, the 
Foundling Father’s position as differance can be traced to Brechtian attempts to 
undermine Aristotelian illusionism and help actors avoid “the idea of total 
transformation”: 
1. Transposition into third person 
2. Transposition into the past 
3. Speaking the stage directions out loud204  
                                                 
202 As I interpret the Foundling Father as a fluid nonpresence, let me present views that politicize him.  For 
example, “Steven Winn reminds us, that the Lesser Known's ‘fleet little glances at the pasteboard-and-
plaster Lincolns are half respectful and half irreverent, signals of the black man’s paradoxical importance 
and invisibility in American history’” (“Instability” 15).  Like wise, Elam and Rayner follow by stating that 
“by ‘being’ a visibly black performer portraying a white figure, the actor demonstrates the performativity 
of race itself” (“Echoes” 181).  
203 (TAP 159).   
204(Bertolt Brecht, “Short Description of a New Technique of Acting which Produces an Alienation Effect,” 
Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, Ed. and Trans. John Willet. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1964) p. 137-8.  Here is how Parks explains her usage of verbalizing stage directions: “the action 
goes in the line of the dialogue instead always in a pissy set of parentheses. How the line should be 
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As the Foundling Father in Hake Frank’s words, “transposes into the past,” becoming 
“the narrator of his self-mediated biography,”205 he deliberates on the viability of his 
fleeting, impossible presence, even as he manipulates repetitious retentional and 
protentional traces.  Further, even as we contemplate the Foundling Father’s prowess as a 
“faker,” that is, his status as one who is self-reflexively aware that he is not what he is, 
and, thus, closely allied to deconstructive differance, we must also take into account his 
retentive, past mastery of “diggin.”   
Hence, as we examine part (C) as underlying our proposition’s claim that we view 
the Foundling Father as inhabiting the interval of differance and as a pathological case in 
point of its self-reflexive state, let us “temporarily” detour in attempts to understand the 
Lesser Known’s penchant for “digging” as such.  Characteristic to Parks and thematically 
speaking, the Foundling Father’s Rep & Rev (ing) in the first act echoes in Lucy and 
Brazil’s discourse in the second act.  In fact, echoing the Foundling Father’s words from 
his chiasmus and specifically from part (A) of our quoted passage, “The Lesser Known 
was a Digger by trade.  From a Family of Diggers.  Digged  graves.  He was known in 
Small Town  to Dig  his  graves  quickly  and   neatly,” Lucy tells Brazil, “back East he 
was always diggin.  Was uh natural.  Could dig uh hole for uh body that passed like no 
one else.  Digged em quick and they looked good too.”206  The fact that in addition to 
“diggin” graves the Lesser Known digs a “Big Hole,” an exact “replica of the Great Hole 
of History,” reveals “diggin’s” unique conceptual designation for Parks.  For indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
delivered is contained in the line itself. Stage directions disappear.  Dialogue becomes rich and strange” 
(“Elements of Style” 15-16).   Liz Diamond explains, “. . . . finding stage directions embedded in the 
writing that is an enormous part of my task and it’s through that process that the actors start to discover the 
code by discovering that (unlike traditional “psychological” American acting training) there is no code 
ouside of what’s on the page” (“Suzan-Lori Parks and Liz Diamond” 70).  
205 (“Instability” 9-10). 
206 (TAP 181) 
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nothing more than digging a Great Hole in stressing the idea of repetitious, reiterative 
historical histrionics, can invoke an allusion to persistent processes of philosophical 
reduction.  Moreover, reproductive, supplemental self-reflexive acting, marking the 
Foundling Father’s unique consciousness, can be viewed as contingent upon the perpetual 
regression, digging, marking his former state as the Lesser Known, who, as the Foundling 
Father tells us, “had dug over 7 hundred and 23 graves . . . . excluding his Big Hole.  
Excluding the hundreds of shallow holes he later digs the hundreds of shallow holes he’ll 
use to bury his faux-historical knickknacks.”207  Even if the Foundling Father’s ontic 
survival as an anthropomorphic differance depends on the spatiotemporal, reproductive 
traces he propagates, his former occupations as a digger reveals him as Greek,208 a 
reducing philosopher, who follows the tradition of “falling back,” “bending back of a 
return,” “regressus ad infinitum . . . . regression to the beginning,” all in an attempt to 
recover “the presence of the present.”209  To be sure and as I read it, Parks introduces 
incessant “diggin,” thus misspelled to accommodate her Lesser-Known-than-a-white-
president, as a pervasive metaphor for processes of phenomenological eidetic reduction, 
intended to reveal structures of origin.  Diggin, moreover, becomes an activity which, as 
we shall see when we treat parts (A) and (B), corresponds to processes of idealization; 
therefore, when the Foundling Father Reps & Revs about the Lesser Known’s “diggin,” 
“falling back,” he engages in narration of retentive, idealizing traces, performing the 
supplemental state of language therein.  And so, if in The America Play’s first act, THE 
LINCOLN ACT, the Lesser Known’s digging is a set in a supplemental binary 
                                                 
207 (ibid. 169) 
208 Parks’s forth act of her first major play, Imperceptible Mutablities in the Third Kingdom, is titled Greeks 
[or The Slugs], satirizing a black sergeant and his family and their attenuated assimilation.    
209 (Dissertational draft, passim).   
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opposition to the Great Mans status as a president, in the second act, THE HALL OF 
WONDERS, “diggin,” according to our playwright, philosopher-queen, Suzan-Lori 
Parks, becomes an intriguing parable to white, occidental analytical epistemology, 
structures of which are readily identifiable in Lucy and Brazil’s dispelling, at this point, 
the so called “black identity.”  Lucy does what we all perpetually do: reduce, reveal, and 
categorize.210  She tells Brazil, “Cant stop diggin till you dig up somethin. You dig that 
something up you brush that something off you give that something a designated place” 
(176); Lucy continues by Rep & Rev (ing) on the inevitable heredity of “diggin,” that is, 
reducing, “Dig on, Brazil.  Cant stop digging till you dig up something.  Your Daddy was 
uh Digger” (174), stressing to Brazil, yet, once more that he will continue his father 
legacy of reduction, “Youre uh Digger.  Youre uh Digger.  Your Daddy was uh Digger 
and so are you” (192).  Nonetheless, Brazil’s “Daddy” is also the Foundling Father, who 
well understood the deconstructive implications of phenomenological reduction and its 
anticipated failure to excavate originary structures through language, within which 
spatiotemporal and reproductive differentials are revealed.  The Foundling Father 
chooses to stop “diggin” and instead become a self-reflexive commentator on the 
impossibilities of revealing, if you will, reducing proto-constitutive structures of  
phenomenon and principle such as history and identity.     
Observing Lucy and Brazil in asking if structures of black metaphysics of identity 
in The America Play are possible, we can readily assert that Lucy’s and Brazil’s 
occidental regressive reduction fails to support them.  Lucy and Brazil, who come to bury 
the Foundling Father in his Great Hole, a replica of The Great Hole of History, are, in 
                                                 
210 We must nod to Foucault here, who identifies activities such as notation, tabulation, and registration as 
substantiating means of investigation, which no longer targets the specie but which manipulates the 
individual through the formation of scientific mechanism.  
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fact, digging for his traces, his, “faux-historical knickknacks,” even as a trace, in the form 
of gunshot-echo of the Foundling Father’s stage, simulate assassination of a president,  
“(. . . . echoes.  Loudly. And echoes).”    Hence, throughout the second act “(A gunshot 
echoes.  Loudly.  And echoes.  Rest.  A gunshot echoes.  Loudly.  And echoes.  Rest)” 
(178), repeatedly, while surrounded by a defining textual space, which Parks accentuates 
with her semantically spatial Rests.  In addition to the traces of replicating-Booth- 
imitators-assassins’ shots, Lucy and Brazil are hard at work in attempting to catch the 
Foundling Father’s “Whispers.”  Echoing gunshots and “Whispers” of the dead are 
examples of the ways through which Parks hypostatizes deconstructive traces, traces, that 
is, which can never substantiate the reality they “echo.”  And, hence, conceptually 
present, that is, empirically absent, traces, nonetheless persist through idealization, which, 
as Derrida proves, is part and parcel of phenomenological reduction.  Absence also marks 
spatiotemporal impossibilities of the return of the trace, whose return, nonetheless, 
depends upon sustained idealization’s ad infinitum return.  So, when Lucy circulates with 
an ear trumpet and in great efforts attempts to listen to the “Whispers” of her dead 
husband, whose death becomes suspect when Lucy remarks “Heresay says he’s past,” 
Lucy hopes to revive the kind of defining idealization, informing his actions: of incessant 
diggin of The Great Hole of History.  Listening and digging for “wonders,” Lucy is 
persistent in telling Brazil to “DIG!”  When Brazil finally “unearths something . . . Uh 
bust,” and identifies it as a “Uh Wonder!,” Lucy reiterates, “Uh Wonder!” and tells him 
to “Dust it off” and store it “with the rest of the Wonders.”  To Lucy’s inquiry as to 
whose bust is it, Brazil self-reflexively reads the bust’s label first: 
Brazil : “‘A. Lincoln.’  A. Lincolns bust. –. Abraham Lincolns bust!!! 
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Lucy :  Howuhboutthat! 
 
     (Rest) 
     (Rest) 
 
     Woah! Woah! 
 
Brazil : Whatchaheard? 
 
Lucy :  Uh –. Cant say.  
 
Brazil :  Whatchaheard?!! 
 
Lucy :  SSShhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhht! 
 
    (Rest)   
 
dig! 
                                          (183) 
 
Brazil excavates the Foundling Father’s Lincoln bust to which he blinks and nods in the 
first and through which blinking and nodding, he makes known his status as a self-
reflexive commentator of his former self, the Lesser Known, narrating the story of his 
former self in performing the differential impulse to the Great Man, through which the 
Lesser Known gains his nonidentity.  Lucy and Brazil continue with the Lesser Known’s 
perpetual idealization of one of “The Greats,” trace of whose materializes through its 
“look-alike” bust.  Crucially, we cannot ignore the textual theatrics Parks stages on the 
page; for indeed, such textual performance, as we shall continue to see, is a reminder that 
the semantics putatively substantiating Lucy’s and Brazil’s repeating idealization is 
absent and that the signification we see on the page is represented by nothing more than 
reproductive signs, which cannot represent their purported signified.  
This is why when Lucy and Brazil come to gather the Foundling Father’s 
whispers and are experiencing difficulties, Lucy explains that “Whispers dont always 
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come up right away . . . . Whispers could travel different out West than they do back East 
. . . .,” suggesting that in addition to certain utility of space and time traces’ context might 
complicate the meaning of the signs they ostensibly represent.  If we argue that in The 
America Play Whispers are another form of the deconstructive trace, then we might argue 
that its emergence is always understood within specific contexts.  And so as we nod to 
Wittgenstein here, the underlying argument might be that as the trace’s contextuality 
changes so does its meaning.  Maybe this is why Parks, much in the spirit of 
Wittgensteinian language games, introduces clichéd idiomatic phrases, in showing that 
authentic, possibly so called “black,” “Whispers” can become just as insignificant as an 
empty idealization such as, “So much to live for [and] look on the bright side.” This 
platitude comes from Lucy while Brazil replies in what we can safely assume is a form of 
exasperation: 
 
Brazil: Look on thuh bright side.  Look on thuh bright side. Loook 
    
      onnnnn thuhhhh briiiiiiiiight siiiiiiiiid!!!! 
 
Lucy dismisses Brazil apparent disgust with “white” banality by reminding him of their mission, 
that is, reduction, which is as rooted in “white” consciousness: 
 
Lucy: DIIIIIIIIIIIIG!   
 
Brazil: Dig.  
                           (178) 
  
And once more, the textual impetus here is unmistakable.  
 
 The self-reflexive vim we identify in part (C) can be traced from protagonist to 
dramatist.  For indeed, why else will Parks title scenes of the second act of the play, Big 
Bang, Echo, Archeology, Echo, Spadework, Echo, The Great Beyond?  Not dwelling 
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here on the implications of suggestive deconstructive “division” of the “primordial”— 
“Big Bang,” and “delay”— “The Great Beyond,” marking the impulse of differance, 
we intend rather concentrate on the echoes Lucy and Brazil hear, which, as I argue, 
mark the repetition of the trace and the idealization that perpetuates it—even as textual 
repetition underpins the play’s unique consciousness to the supplemental state of 
metaphysical language.  We are, moreover, cognizant of the retentive inevitability of 
these traces and the protentive expectancy with which they are defined.  Subsequently, 
Parks’s dramatic rubric can be anticipated when under the heading of B. Echo, the 
echoes, the traces are those of Our American Cousin, the play performed in the Ford 
Theater the night of the murder, recreated and restaged by the Foundling Father in his 
Great Hole of History, traces of which are still echoing indefatigably in the same hole 
after his “hearsayed” death.  In a reflexive, deconstructive mises-en-abyme dynamic, 
the Foundling Father presents traces from the play in constructing trace-retention 
invested temporality, which portends to revivification of the Lincoln narrative as a form 
of idealization.  That is, through the Rep & Rev of the Foundling Father’s chiasmus 
introduced in the first act, we reveal traces of the event of the murder Parks strews in 
the play, effort which underlies Parks’s fundamental understanding of deconstructive 
conception of processes of phenomenological idealization.   Hence, when under the 
heading of scene B. Echo in the second act of The America Play,  the hearsayed dead 
Foundling Father’s announcement, “Our American Cousin, Act III, scene 5” (183), the 
play staged in The Ford Theater on the night of the Lincoln assassination, followed by 
an actual scene from the play, is echoed in his Great Hole, though we lack a clue as to 
what the characters are looking for, we might not be completely surprised to learn that 
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Miss Keen, a character in the play, cannot “find a trace of it” and that Mr. Trenchard, 
the protagonist of the play, declares, “I cannot survive the downfall of my house but 
choose instead to end my life with a pistol to my head!” (ibid). If the first act of The 
America Play presents the Foundling Father’s “show out west,” the second act of the 
play gathers the echoes of the historical traces the Foundling Father propagates and that 
Lucy and Brazil continue to perpetuate.  As Lucy and Brazil circulate, dig, and 
attentively listen for whispers, intent on giving the Foundling Father “proper burial,” 
events in The Ford Theater re-materialize; such hypostatization takes place in the hole 
within which absence, non-original interpreter of originary echoes demonstrated their 
fundamental phenomenological absence.  Nonetheless, their materialization begins with 
the influence the original Great Hole of History had on the Lesser Known and his 
idealization of “the greats” he had seen there.  To that effect Lucy tells Brazil: “Ssonly 
natural that heud come out here tuh dig out one of his own.  He love that Great Hole so.  
He’d stand at thuh lip of that Great Hole: ‘OHWAYOHWHYOHWAYOH!’ . . . . He 
loved that Great Hole so.  Came out here.  Digged this lookuhlike” (181).  In coming 
back to the same Hole, Lucy and Brazil perform “the ‘again and again [immer wieder] 
the iterative ‘over and over again . . . . as fundamental forms of idealization,”211 in 
continued fascination with the same repeating historical traces.  On his part, the 
Foundling Father recreates a retentive space within which one of the founding fathers 
perpetually loses his life to a bullet shot through a pistol; as we examine part (B), we 
shall discover that the Foundling Father’s replica of The Great Hole converges with the 
absent space of The Great Hole of History from which influence the Lesser Known 
never recovers.  For indeed, why else when Lucy and Brazil are listening to the 
                                                 
211 (Origin 135) 
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“Whispers” of the “dead” Foundling Father, he, to the applause of Our American 
Cousin, utters again the phrase he uttered on his honeymoon, standing on the “Lip” of 
The Great Hole, as an idealizing young gravedigger, 
“OHWAYOHWHYOHWAYOH!” and after two consecutive (Rest)s, 
“Helllooooooo!”(ibid)?  In the second act, the ghost of Foundling Father, once again, 
returns to his hole; not as the reflexive, ironic impersonator but rather, once more, as an 
idealizing trace of his former nonself, the Lesser Known.  We intend to prove the lack 
of the Lesser Known’s identity in our examination of part (A).  For now, let us continue 
with part (C) through which examination we hope to show parallel structures of self-
reflexivity and repeatability, defining the Foundling Father’s theater and the 
idealization, which examination, founds it.    
 Propelling the triple Rep & Rev—of Lucy and Brazil’s temporality (revisiting the 
Lesser Known’s replica of the Great Hole), of the echoed temporality of the Foundling 
Father’s, and of the assassination’s repeating temporality within the absent, yet, 
replicated space of The Ford Theater—under Parks’s scene D. Echo in the second act 
of The America Play, the trace of the Foundling Father echoes on his simulated stage of 
The Ford Theater “out west” again: “Ladies and Gentleman:  Our American Cousin, Act 
III, scene 2.”  In this re-visitation of the play within his own play, the Foundling Father 
presents the moment of the murder, and a comic dialogue from Our America Cousin 
which paradoxically underlines the inane, banal nature of its content and the fatal 
moment Booth shoots Lincoln.  The indelible, yet, absent trace is dramatically 
hypostatized when the Foundling Father utters Asa Trenchard’s line, “you 
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sockdologizing212 old man-trap” (188), which is, according to Parks, “A very funny line 
from the play Our American Cousin.  As the audience roared with laughter, Booth 
entered Lincoln’s box and shot him dead” (160).213  In the echoing replica of the Great 
Hole of History, the dead Foundling Father is heard through hunting, absent, yet, 
historicizing traces affecting his former self and which relentlessly continue to affect his 
wife and son.  The supplemental and textual avalanche of retentional traces with which 
the Foundling Father describes the moment of the assassination is unmistakable.  What is 
more, the fact that the Foundling Father manipulates historicizing traces in such textual 
supplemental avalanche, underscores his understanding of the inevitability of 
idealization, the necessary repetition of the trace, and finally the revisionary impulse, 
which underlies the trace’s textual phenomenon in problematizing sustained repetition in 
his own spatiotemporal presence, which can be putative at best:   
Uh Hehm.   The Death of Lincoln!:—.  The watching of the play, the 
laughter, the smiles of Lincoln and Mary Todd, the slipping of Booth into 
the presidential box unseen, the freeing of the slaves, the pulling of the 
trigger, the bullets piercing above the left ear, the bullets entrance into the 
great head, the bullet lodging behind the great right eye, the slumping of 
Lincoln, the leaping onto the stage of Booth, the screaming of Todd, the 
                                                 
212 Kubiak explains the expression as “a deliverer of heavy blows, one who gives ideology a public 
berating, one who wears the sock or buskin” (Agitated States  201).   Interestingly, Kubiak claims that 
there’s a connection between the semantic value of the term and Booth’s historical utterance, “Thus to the 
tyrants.”  Nonetheless, I agree with Parks that Booth anticipates the laughter in reaction to a common joke 
and uses it to conceal the noise of his “derringer.”  The Founding Father’s laughter repeats throughout the 
play, in emphasizing Abraham Lincoln’s penchant for “thin jokes.”   
213 Parks’s claim is well documented and is in fact mentioned in Ken Burns’ The Civil War.  The Lincolns 
came to see Ms. Laura Kin and as Asa Trenchard utters the lines, “Don’t know the manners of good 
society, eh?  Wal, I guess I know well enough to turn you inside out, old gal—you sockdologizing old man-
trap” John Wilkes Booth anticipates the audience’s and the president’s laughter and shoots.  (The Better 
Angels of Our nature: The Civil War, Dir. Ken Burns. DVD. PBS, 2004).    
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screaming of Todd, the screaming of Keene, the leaping onto the stage of 
Booth; the screaming of Todd, the screaming of Keene, the shouting of 
Booth “Thus to the tyrants!,” the death of Lincoln!    
                                                                                            (189) 
Booth’s gunshot is still heard when in scene F. Echo of the second act “A 
gunshot echoes.  Loudly.  And echoes” (194).  Nonetheless, when the Foundling 
Father’s image appears on a television screen, in reenactment of his own Lincoln 
Act (which is the first act of The America Play an effect which once again is an 
intervening dynamic of Parks’s Brechtian design) and he is gunned down again, 
the assassination’s historical veracity is undermined.214  Indeed, Parks’s 
deconstruction of the possible tenability of phenomenal value of historical event 
is revealed when Lucy and Brazil view “a replay of ‘The Lincoln Act,’” wherein 
the Foundling Father is gunned down again.  Here the reductiveness of “the again 
and again” is being questioned, whereby a phenomenon’s origin is concealed by 
its own absence and the uninterrupted double absence of the murder’s actual event 
and the Foundling Father’s actual performance.  Therefore, the only opening to 
the possibility of the trace’s return is invested a revision, a qualified return.  
Maybe that is why in particularly metaphysical titled scene, G. The Great 
Beyond, Parks’s deconstructive qualification is further elucidated; that is, Lucy 
                                                 
214 I disagree therefore with Marc Robinson who argues that “Every time the Foundling Father sits in 
'Lincoln's Chair' at 'Ford's Theater' and 'dies,' he is doing more than merely returning to a legendary 
moment. He is also forcing the past back into the present, and thus enabling himself to revise history” 
(“Four Writers,” Theater 24.1 (1993): 31-42) p. 39.  The Foundling Father’s intent is not re-presence the 
past, nor is intent is to revise history per se.  Rather, the Foundling Father manipulates revision as a means 
of disquieting the notion that historical truth as such is viable altogether.  
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and Brazil watch the Foundling Father reenact the murder again and again, not 
grasping the scope of the ebbing reality his historical reenactment represents.  
Parks, I argue, shows how idealization of an absent, dead president is buttressed 
by yet another absence, the Foundling Father’s, and how the latter’s ability to 
“fake,” that is to supplement, functions as, yet, continues reemergence of the trace 
as ideal:  
Lucy  :  Howuhboutthat! 
Brazil :  He’s dead but not really.  
Lucy  :  Howuhboutthat! 
Brazil :  Only fakin.  Only fakin.  See?  Hesupuhgain.  
(195) 
 
Lucy’s exclamatory expression “echoes” the Foundling Father’s in his Lincoln Act, which is, in 
effect, the first act of The America Play; Brazil reassures her that “Hesupuhgain” and in so doing 
reminds us of Parks’s deconstructive design in the play—the play on idealized absences and their 
spatiotemporal repetitions as they reemerge through conceptual reproductivity of language.  
Hence, to end our examination of diggin as a trope for the whole undertaking of 
phenomenological reduction, I suggest that we look at an example of Parks’s textual subversion 
in communicating the deconstructive discontent: 
 
(A gunshot echoes.  Loudly.  And echoes) 
 
LUCY 
BRAZIL 
THE FOUNDLING FATHER 
LUCY 
BRAZIL 
THE FOUNDLING FATHER 
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LUCY :  That gunplay.  Wierdiduhntit.215  Comes.  And goze.  
    (196) 
  The textual impetus persists through Parks’s silent spaces, which manifest through her 
conceptual “Spell,” a metaphor, I argue, for the spatiotemporal state of her figures.  In 
this case, spatiotemporal structures are defined, as they must be, by suggested repetition 
of stage directions of “A gunshot echoes,” and Lucy’s remark of its return.  In a nutshell, 
the repetition of the trace occurs in an impossible spatiotemporal none-region; yet, in The 
America Play, Parks seems to suggest, echoed idealization will continue to come and go.  
 It is precisely within spatiotemporal incertitude that the Foundling Father utters 
his inverted stage directions in a Parksian Rep & Rev structure, whose ontic supplemental 
inscription of repetition with revision, spatially defined by the conspicuously absent 
presence of her (Rest)s, underpins the reproductive reemergence of metaphysical, as it 
must be, ideal discourse.  It is the metaphysic of the Lesser Knowns idealization that the 
Foundling Father wishes to reveal.  He gains such an impossible ontological detachment 
from his former self by anthropomorphicizing the deconstructive differance, a state of 
tenable self-reflexivity.  As we still dwell on part (C), our examination as to how the 
Foundling Father establishes himself as a deconstructive, supplementing differential, 
who, above all, forgoes any conception of self-identity and in so doing, assures an 
opening of indeterminate heterogeneity, let us delineate his self-reflexive perpetuity with 
which he gains such diaphanous indeterminacy.   Re-inscribing part (C) here,  
(Rest) 
A  wink  to  Mr. Lincolns  pasteboard  cutout.  (Winks  at Lincoln’s Pasteboard cutout) 
(Rest) 
                                                 
215 I think that I am correct in translating this expression as “Weird isn’t it.”  I follow Parks’s own glossary 
of neologisms: “iduhnt  /íd-ənt/, a variant of is not or isn’t” (“Elements” 17).  
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we persist with our reading of the Foundling Father as function of metadramatic, 
theatrical consciousness, which ultimately substantiates a reading of The America Play as 
a drama of deconstructive undecidablity.  Henceforth, when the Foundling inverts stage 
directions, addresses an audience within an audience on his stage, uses third person in 
discussing his idealizing former self, whose self definition is begotten through iconic 
American ideal, he self-reflexively interrogates his status as a “figure,” character in the 
play.  Realizing that Parks subverts traditional theater and makes theater part of her 
supplemental play is not surprising; nonetheless, realizing that uncertainty is the 
interlacing differential, defining her supplemental design is strictly speaking 
deconstructive.    
  Deconstructive in its more complicated sense, we might not be surprised that 
when narrating the story of his former self, the Foundling Father “falls back” onto his 
nonoriginary original trace, the interjected phrase within his chiasmus, “Goatee.  Goatee.  
What  he  sported  when  he  died.  Its  not  my  favorite.”  For indeed Parks’s Rep & Rev 
here is deconstructively dramatic when the Foundling Father’s intricately transforms 
Lincoln’s iconic beard to a metaphor for historical stasis, complicating conception of 
self-evident recognition of the famous beard by subverting it to an hypostatized 
deconstructive trace; that is, by ambiuating its origin, by showing how its repetitious 
retelling metaphorically underlines infinite reproductivity inherent in signification, by, 
finally, showing how deferred temporality fissures a spatial, ontic opening for such 
signification at which bottom ideality, outmost and foremost, resides.   
For this reason, when the Foundling Father tells the story of how the Lesser 
Known, enthralled by the Great Man, acquires beards, looking like those of the dead 
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president’s and are in effect worn by the Foundling Father, the temporal ambiguity is 
unmistakable.  If our current concern is deconstructive heterogeneity, resulting from 
inherent state of uncertainty, deviation from unified notion of factual historicity begins 
with  plurality of Lincoln “fake” beards, which announce the absent presence of their 
original wearer.  In addition, tangible objects such as beards, fake as they maybe, attest to 
the ease with which any conception of origin can be invariably substantiated with 
substitution, replica as such.  And so, in third person the Foundling Father tells of how he 
(no longer he) acquired his(not really his) beards: “The beards were his although he 
himself had not grown them on his face but since he’d secretly bought the hairs from his 
barber and arranged their beard shapes and since the procurement and the upkeep of his 
beards took so much work he figured that the beards were completely his.  Were as 
authentic as he was, so to speak” (159-60).   Origin, authenticity, “so to speak,” is 
substituted by “upkeep,” taken on by the Lesser Known, whose idealization of the Great 
Man and his “. . . . strong resemblance to Abraham Lincoln” (159) propels him to a life 
as a Lincoln impersonator.  Impersonating, “fakin,” and, hence, deviating in The America 
Play begins with inauthentic Lincoln beards.  As self-reflexive differance, the Foundling 
Father proactively detaches himself from the Lesser Known not only by telling his story 
in the third person but by also addressing the audience, on his stage and in the theater 
directly: “This is my fancy beard.  Yellow.  Mr. Lincolns was dark so I dont were it 
much.  If you deviate too much they wont get their pleasure . . . . some inconsistencies 
are perpetuatable because theyre good for business” (160).  The Foundling Father in fact 
never lets us forget that his “business” is to inhabit the differential cusp of the theatrical 
dichotomy of illusion and reality, whence repeating signification marks the impossibility 
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of reality within the illusory repetition of theatrical representation.  What makes 
“inconsistencies,” blatantly differentiating under the care of our anthropomorphic 
difference, is the ontic value of his hypostatized traces and the self-reflexive mode with 
which he introduces them.  The repetitiously indelible, yet, absent trace in the play is the 
Lincoln assassination, enthralling the Lesser Know and, at the same time, reemerging ad 
infinitum through the Foundling Father’s impersonation.  Though absent, the tenacity 
with which John Wilkes Booth assassins Abraham Lincoln becomes exponential, when 
audience members in the Foundling Father’s show “out west . . . . choose a pistol . . . . 
and shoot Mr. Lincoln . . . . for a penny” (passim) again and again.   Since, as I argue, 
that the assassination is introduced as a deconstructive trace, we can expect that revisions, 
“inconsistencies,” or, if you will, supplementation will be indeed part of its return.  “In 
drama changes is the thing,” says Parks and as the Foundling Father shows us, re-
contextualizing Lincoln’s “blond” beard after the event, one of many “fake” 
assassinations, effectuates impersonating murderer and murdered, ontic, “real” as they 
are, in underlying the impossibility of full hypostatization of traces to their retentive 
presences.  When “B Woman as Booth” shoots the president, she decries the Foundling 
Father’s impersonation of Lincoln as “L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ES!” 216 
Deviations, “inconsistencies” as such abound here: first, Booth is re-genderized; second, 
through suggested textual performance on the page, B Woman as Booth seem to express 
the same conviction marking Booth at the time of the shooting—“Thus to the tyrants!,” 
Booth’s cry after he shoots Abraham Lincoln, which is, again, readily interchangeable 
with B Woman’s expression.  Not surprisingly, the Foundling Father’s reaction to B 
                                                 
216 “One of the eeriest moments of The America Play is when a black woman shoots Lincoln, leaps from 
the booth, and screams in prolonged syllables,” this from critic David J. DeRose, who reviewed the play’s 
premier at the Yale Repertory Theater in January of 1994. (Theater Journal 46 (1994): 409-12) p. 410. 
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Woman’s accusation is to Rep & Rev the yellow beard motif, which indeed puts into 
question the viability of re-phenomenalizing the event of the murder altogether:    
THE FOUNDLING FATHER (Rest): I think I’ll wear the yellow  
one.  Variety.  Works like tonic. 
 
(Rest) 
 
Some inaccuracies are good for business.  Take the stovepipe hat!  
Never really worn indoors but people dont like their Lincoln 
hatless.  
 
(Rest)  
 
Mr. Lincoln my apologies. (Nods to the bust and winks to the cutout) 
 
(Rest) 
 
[Blonde.  Not bad if you like a stretch.  Hmmm.  Let us pretend for  
a moment that our beloved Mr. Lincoln was a blonde.  “The sun  
on his fair hair looked like the sun itself.”217  
 
The intended spatiotemporality of Parks’s “(Rests)s,” within which traces appear in 
iterative reemergence, create, I argue, a convincing metaphorical design of fundamental 
ontological structures, paradoxically marking a deferred temporality.  Moreover, the 
bizarrely subversive deferred temporality is that of a murdered president, whose ontic 
artifacts, “fake” as it were — yellow beard, stovepipe hat, shoes, bust and a cutout—are 
nothing more than signifiers, which mark absences, their signified, in form of returning 
traces.  Crucially, regenerative, ontically historicizing metaphoric signifiers are the tools 
of the Foundling Father’s trade, who through differential self-reflexivity re-pronounces 
the inaccuracies inherent in processes of re-historicizing, that is, re-presencing.  He in 
                                                 
217 Parks n11 as this quote as “From ‘The Sun,’ a composition by the Foundling Father, unpublished” (168). 
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effect satirizes the idealization that forces such attempts in the first place by composing 
“The Sun,” which description is implausibly absurd.   Maybe this is why Parks keeps 
Reps & Revs, in staging, once and again, an inscription on the page of the Foundling 
Father’s self reflexive intervention:  
  (Rest) 
 
This beard I wear for the holidays.  I got shoes to match.  Rarely wear them together.  It’s 
a little much. 
 
(Rest)  
                 (161) 
 
And once again, 
 
(Rest) 
 
Sunday.  Always slow on Sundays.  I’ll get thuh shoes.  Youll see.  A wink to Mr. 
Lincolns pasteboard cutout.  (Winks at Lincoln’s cutout) 
 
(Rest)  
                                                                                       (162) 
 
Here, the textual play is clear.  The deconstructive conception of the textual is essential in 
understanding that as the Foundling Father addresses the audience here, he dramatically, 
in this case visually on the page, fissures a spatial opening through which temporalities of 
returning idealities maybe interrogated.  That the textual for deconstruction belongs to the 
conceptual realm may support our argument that the Foundling Father can be understood 
as anthropomorphic differance.   
 Thus, when the Foundling Father in an obvious Parksian Rep & Rev conjoins a 
seemingly ontic trace, a beard, to uncertainty, his ultimate raison d’être as differance, the 
effect is distinctively deconstructive: 
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I’ll wear this one.  He sported this style in the early war years.  Years of 
uncertainty.  When he didnt know if the war was right when it could be 
said he didnt always know which side he was on not because he was a 
stupid man but because it was sometimes not 2 different sides at all but 
one great side surging toward something beyond either Northern or 
Southern.  A beard of uncertainty. (166) 
Ambiguous at best, the Great Man’s retentive Civil War temporality is reproduced and 
invested in a specific “style,” commenting on a possibility beyond two possibilities, 
which is altogether impossible; for indeed, deconstructively speaking the “beyond” of 
two sides is differentiation, which is absent and which without, no sides as such are 
viable.  Decisively, what makes “uncertainty” function as the locum of differentiality is 
the Foundling Father’s persistent reflexive acknowledgement that the signs with which he 
manipulates the narrative about the Great Mans “years of uncertainty,” are reproduction 
of yet inexcisable reproducing signifiers.  Hence and first of all, the Foundling Father as 
differance must treat the Lincoln beard for what it is: an idealized American icon. 
Nevertheless, as differance he must show that idealization is intrinsic to reproductivity of 
signification, through which regeneration it must exist.  To demonstrate the inherent 
reproductive nature of his signifiers, the Foundling Father substitutes, even as he 
supplenets, the self-evident idealization invested in Lincoln’s famous beard as signified 
with “uncertainty,” which is intentionally scare-quoted here, in announcing its 
interrogatory affect on idealized icon.  The primary intent is to opens any form of 
idealization to heterogeneity of possibilities.  Thenceforth, deconstructive manifold, the 
underlying impulse of its adherence to a philosophy of undecidability, marks Parks’s 
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play.  For when after the first shooting the Foundling Father addresses us (characters as 
audience/and attending audience),218 we are no longer spectators; rather, we are actively 
implicated in processes of historicizing evolving on the stage, even as we repetitiously 
view simulacrum array of Booths “Shoot the president!”  Parks’s postmodern irony is 
clear: she represents a historic reenactment, which according to the Foundling Father 
occurs “By the book,” while undercutting its suggested archival accuracy by repeatedly 
restaging the event, revising its account each time, and inviting us to partake in its 
revision.  In fact, the Foundling Father talks to us about The America Play’s first shooter: 
“The ones who choose the Derringer are the ones for History.  As it Used to Be.  Never wavers.  
No frills.  By the book.  Nothing excessive. 
 
(Rest) 
 
A nod to Mr. Lincolns bust.  (Nods to Lincoln’s bust) 
 
(Rest)    
                                                                        (167) 
 
By addressing us and by telling us that he is nodding “to Mr. Lincolns bust,” the 
Foundling Father allows for a conceptual opening through which the preservation of the 
event’s temporal purity, presence as such is questioned.  As I have stressed, I see part (C) 
and its persistent emergence as Parks’s commentary on her own medium.  As differance 
then, the Foundling Father’s self-reflexivity becomes a trace through which playwright 
and protagonist both, again and again, comment on the impossible temporality of theater 
and the fact that its temporal impossibility is mediated only by the spatial opening of the 
inscription of its dramatic texts.    
                                                 
218 Parks implication of spectators is more prominent in her play Venus.  Hence, Greg Miller is correct in 
stating that drawing audiences as accomplices “posits an additional subject beyond Baartman, and this 
subject is that of the spectator in all its guises” (“The Bottom of Desire in Suzan-Lori Parks's Venus.” 
Modern Drama 45.1 (2002): 125-37) p. 128. 
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 As we still reference part (C), let us contemplate on the textual value of the 
Foundling Father’s singular line as ontic spatiality.  As a former gravedigger, the 
Foundling Father well understands measurements of space.  He repetitiously tells us in 
fact that “What interested the Lesser Known most about the Great Mans murder was the 
20 feet which separated the presidents box from the stage” (167).  By regenerating signs 
textually on the page, the Foundling Father also indicates his manipulation of the 
theatrical spatial divide when, while verbalizing his state directions throughout The 
America Play’s first act, he winks, nods to Lincoln’s pasteboard cutout and to Lincoln’s 
bust parenthetically; in this way, he creates a topographical distance within which he is 
able to assert his positions as a performer, a “faker.”  We soon discover that 
performances in the play are not restricted to our differentiating impersonator alone, 
rather, it is a family business: “Lucy kept secrets for the dead.  And they figured what 
with his digging and her Confidence work they could build a mourning business.  The 
son would be a weeper” (162).   “Mourning business” here underscores the exponential 
force of theater in The America Play through which latent deconstructive traces are 
hypostatized in a form of authentic, possibly black, practices of “mourning,” which are, 
in effect, just another version of “fakin.”  We here follow Parks in “signifying on the 
signifin” of African American fluid vernacular and manipulate “fakin” as an ethnic-
group-specific term, suggesting that when in The America Play theatrical mimesis is self-
reflexive, it does problematize a forms of “fakin.”  Brazil continues the narrative of how 
he was introduced to performances of mourning: “. . . . the Father showed the Son ‘the 
Weep’ ‘the Sob’ and ‘the Moan.’  How to stand just so what to do with the hands and feet 
(to capitalize on what we in the business call ‘the Mourning Moment’)  Formal stances 
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the Fatherd picked up at the History Hole” (182).   The History Hole is the receptacle 
within which definitions of historicizing and historicized absences may occur.  Lucy as a 
“whatcha call uh Confidence” (179), then, is a performer whose performance is defined 
by yet another historically known and absent performer.  In other words, if as Confidence 
Lucy listens to the last words of the dying, in The America Play, no other last words of 
the dead are more prominent than those of John Wilkes Booth’s, an actor from a well-
known family of actors.  As an array of Booth imitators “Shoot the President!,” they 
methodically utter Booth’s “purportedly” last words.  As absent traces, Booth’s last 
words, materialize dramatically every time “(Booth shoots. Lincoln ‘slumps in his chair.’ 
Booth jumps)” and one of the consecutive shooters says, “(Theatrically):  ‘Thus to the 
tyrants!’”219  However, when Parks masterfully parallels Booth’s historically familiar 
utterances to those of a “Con-fidence” woman, any conceptual materialization of 
historicized traces is soon sapped out of its status as codified history.  Parks, in effect, 
parodies, even as she undermines, the significance attributed to Booth’s last words by 
bringing Bram Price’s last words: “Lifts.”  Now, Bram Price Senior was Lucy’s first 
client whose word, “‘Lifts’ [really meant that] He wore lifts in his shoes [and hence] he 
was not the man he claimed to be” (176).   In The America Play, no one is who they are 
claiming to be.  The only one who perpetually dramatizes such intersubjective absence 
though is the Foundling Father.  As he nods and blinks to simulating traces of the absent 
Great Man, he consciously supplements as he regenerates supplemented signs, traces, 
which perform economies of differentiation and idealization.  
                                                 
219 Parks’s n8: “Or ‘Sic Semper tyrannis.’  Purportedly, Booth’s words after he slew Lincoln and leapt from 
the presidential box to the state of Ford’s Theatre in Washington, D. C. on 14 April 1865, not only killing 
the President but also interrupting a performance of Our American Cousin, starring Miss Laura Keene” 
(165).  
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Part (A) 
 
 In referencing part (A) of our passage, we aim to show how its overtly, seemingly 
playful, differential play calls attention to a juridical spatiotemporal definition in 
conjointly permitting and problematizing processes of idealization.  We intend to show 
how differance is contributing to the constitution of its own impossible status of 
importunate, persistent repetition.  We mean to suggest that as anthropomorphic 
differance, the Foundling Father manipulates repeating traces, always already 
spatiotemporal as they must be, in showing the impossibility of their complete and hence 
idealized presences. The Foundling Father as differance inhabits the nexus from which 
reproductive signifiers, through structures of Parksian Rep & Rev, represent possible 
differential trace fragments of history and identity therein.   Moreover, we realize by now 
that these so called “trace fragments” are metaphysical, for indeed we here dwell on the 
conceptual realm; nonetheless, we must determine if Parks’s traces are presented as 
conceptual whole, and are therefore idealities, while at the same time, we must discern if, 
as I argue, Parks’s traces are perpetual deconstructive depositories, which interrogate the 
idealities they propagate.   
First off let us, on the one hand, identify the spatial ambit within which the 
Foundling Father as differance operates, while on the other, let us reveal the temporal 
absence through which such spatial opening becomes viable; crucially, we must 
remember that this is the opening through which all traces hypostatize as metaphysical 
signification.  Hence, metaphysic, conceptual absences as such are propelled through the 
conspicuous temporal absence underlying history in The America Play, The Great Hole 
of History.   
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Although most critics trace Parks’s Great Hole to Beckettian barren settings, none 
connect it to deconstructive spatiotemporal absence.  Whereas I argue that Parks’s Great 
Hole is a deconstructivly defining absence, Una Chaduri views it as “a postapocalyptic 
no-place, a Beckettian void where meaning stubbornly refuses to arrive or rise,” while, at 
the same time, ascribing it significant meaning when she identifies it as “the great hole of 
racism.” 220  David Richards follows suit by contending that Parks’s Great Hole is a 
“Beckettian wasteland par excellence.  But also represents the absence of black history in 
a society that has long defined itself by the exploits of a few select white men.”221  
Similarly, assigning The Great Hole the trauma of “the disentitled,” Joseph Roach argues 
that “The Great Hole of History and its replicas . . . . dominate the scene of The America 
Play . . . . it is the place where deep silences can either follow significant revelations or 
create the emotional space into which revelations  can enter.”  Those silences, Roach 
argues, are fashioned on Beckett’s paradigmatic silences in Godot whereby, “Silences 
follow catastrophes that occur to the disentitled.”222  All of her figures being black, 
arguing that Parks’s “silences” within The Great Hole of History discount black 
historicity and its supplemental metaphysic might be problematic.223  Nonetheless, I 
believe that interpreting The America Play as revealing intent to “rewrite history”224 and 
by so doing rekindled black metaphysics is just as problematic.  Elam and Rayner in fact 
                                                 
220 (Staging Place 263, 265). 
221 Name of article, date New York Times p. 86 
222 (“The Great Hole of History: Liturgical Silence in Beckett, Osofisan, and Parks.” The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 100.1 (2001): 307-17) p. 307-8.  In his interview with Parks and Diamond, Drukman also says 
that he views Liz Diamond staging as “somehow, Godot-like . . . . [also reminding him] of the mound in 
Happy Days, sort of the inverse of it” (“Parks Diamond” 72). 
223 Mary F. Brewer goes as far as identifying Parks’s play as “intervening in the process by which history is 
created” (Staging Whiteness.  Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2005) p. 167 
224 (“Echoes” 181). 
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claim that the theatricality of Parks’s representation of the assassination “points to 
Parks’s commitment to right and rewrite history.”225  If theatricality as such is meant self-
reflexivity, then Parks is, indeed, intent on rewriting history.  In an interview she asks, 
“Where is history? I take issue with history because it doesn’t serve me—it doesn’t serve 
me because there isn’t enough of it.  In this play I am simply asking, ‘Where is history?’, 
because I don't see it. I don't see any history out there, so I’ve made some up.”226  Making 
“some up,” is a form of performance, a reflexive mimesis that is self-differentiating; in 
fact, the stress on reflexivity is crucial here because, as I persistently argue, in The 
America Play Parks reject the acceptance of metaphysics—black or white.  Rather, she 
effects a deconstructive, self-mimetic differential, the Foundling Father, our 
anthropomorphic differance, who will textually perform for us the double absence of the 
Hole within the Whole of which traces, as “neither hyle nor object [but] language in its 
possibility, language as a fundamental ontological structure,”227 Rep & Rev (v.) in 
distinctive Parksian poetics.    
We discuss holes, we discuss absences; we discuss absences, we discuss temporal 
deferral and the idealities that seemingly complete it—always already through signs, 
always already through absent traces.  The upshot is that when the Foundling Father tells 
us about The Great Hole of History and the affect it had on the Lesser Known, he is 
discussing the pervasive phenomenal absence of historical events.  What is more, as 
anthropomorphic differance, the Foundling Father performs the fundamental, yet, 
paradoxically, differentiating absences of the signs he promulgates by self-reflexively 
repeating and revising them textually.  Hence, discussing the Hole, Bernard Louis 
                                                 
225 (ibid.) 
226 (“Alien Nation” 26). 
227 (“Seam” 75). 
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observes that Parks “excavates the great hole of history and thus produces an 
‘archaeology of knowledge’ wherein the gaps and fissures that rupture the dominant 
record are parodied and laid bare . . . . Parks ‘writes over’ the palimpsest of Western 
though and discipline.”228  Rather than functioning a-deconstructively by “writing over,” 
I argue, the Foundling Father deconstructs the palimpsest of Western metaphysics by 
showing the absent idealities which define them.   
In The America Play the absent locum of all idealities is indeed The Great Hole of 
History.  For now, we choose to concentrate on the “original” Great Hole, “back East,” 
and its lasting affect on the Lesser Known, well realizing that its origin is regenerated 
replica of re-signified absent traces.229  Deconstructively, then, absent traces indicate and 
are being indicated by the spatiotemporal state of a concept, which, may be understood 
through Heidegger’s ontological/ontic differential—for Derrida, the liminal differential 
which within traces spatially fracture the temporal totality of their concepts.  Thus, rather 
than viewing the Great Hole as restricted to an absence that is substantiated by the lack of 
black history, I see it as a mold, affecting hyletic absence, which indicates, just like the 
Idea in the Kantian sense, its traces as supplementing idealities.  And so although absent, 
ideal historical traces, specifically those of the Great Mans, “give shape” to the life of the 
Lesser Known, which he “could never shake.”  Thus, falling back on his own chiasmus 
utterance, “He digged the hole and the whole held him” (159), the Foundling Father tells 
us how absent idealities influenced the Lesser Known within the Hole, which continued 
to “hold” him “whol”ly.  Fluid anthropomorphic differance, the Foundling Father 
promulgates his narrative about the Lesser Known with the performing lingual 
                                                 
228 (“Musicality” 687)  
229 Katy Ryan note, “This simulacrum has been variously interpreted as the absence of African-American 
history, a theme park, and a hole in Lincoln’s head” (“No Less Human” 83). 
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differentials he introduces in part (A) of our passage.  Hence, setting the Great Mans “log 
cabin” in binary opposition, the Foundling Father tells us that unlike the  
Great Mans log cabin  . . . . The Lesser Known had a favorite hole.  When 
he and his Lucy were newly wedded and looking for some postnuptial 
excitement: A Big Hole. A theme park.  With historical parades.  The size 
of the hole itself was enough to impress any Digger but it was the 
Historicity of the place the order and beauty of the pageants which 
marched by them the Greats on parade in front of them . . . . The Hole and 
its Historicity and the part he played in it all gave a shape to the life and 
posterity of the Lesser Known he could never shake. (162) 
The Great Hole of History is an accumulation of temporal deferrals, absent, yet, 
indicating traces, which propel absent historical idealities that assure their return 
deconstructively.  Therefore, in analyzing processes through which supplemental 
idealization defines the Lesser Known’s identity, we must follow the Foundling Father’s 
lead in investigating the historicizing effect of The Great Hole, the “original back east” 
and the replica “out west” both.  First off, when the Foundling Father tells us of the 
idealities— “the historicity” “the Greats on parade,” “pageants”—he emphasizes the fact 
that the “original” Hole was substantiated by replicating, regenerated absences and is, 
therefore, itself a replica.  So, when the Foundling Father narrates the story of the Lesser 
Known and his fascination with The Great Hole of History, he shows us, as differance, 
the absent, yet, influencing environs from which the Lesser Known’s idealization of 
Lincolnesque historicity grew.  The Lesser Known’s intense idealization of the Great 
Hole pervades the play; so much so that, as Lucy tells Brazil, “Ssonly natural that heud 
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come out here tuh dig out one of his own.  He loved that Great Hole so.  He’d stand at 
thuh lip of that Great Hole: ‘OHWAYOHWHYOHWAYOH!’ . . . . He loved that Great 
Hole so.  Came out here.  Digged this lookuhlike” (181).  What is more, the Lesser 
Known’s “lookuhlike,” “replica of The Great Hole of History,” is a reproductive 
absence—of conceptual history and of ontic historicity, both underlying processes of 
idealization.  Reproduction of absences, Parks persistently shows us through her Rep & 
Rev, are staged through textual repetition so as to attest to the reproductive nature of 
signs; such reproductive energy, moreover,  underlies deconstructive spatiotemporal 
traces, which supplement absent idealities.  Further, when he repeats his narrative about 
the Lesser Known’s indelible visit to The Great Hole of History, using “echoes,” of 
retentive temporality, the Foundling Father divulges the absent, idealized traces 
comprising the Lesser Knowns nonself:  
“Traveling home again from the honeymoon at the Big Hole . . . . the 
Reconstituted Historicities he has witnessed continue to march before him 
in his minds eye as they had at the Hole . . . . On the way home again the 
histories paraded again on past him although it wasnt on past him at all it 
wasnt something he could expect but again like Lincolns’ life not ‘on past’ 
but past.  Behind him.   Like an echo in his head.” (163)   
The “echoes,” as idealized traces in the Lesser Known’s head never pass him, they are 
never restrictively observed as in “the past,” rather they become potent Husserlian 
protentive traces, which “continue to march before him” and which indeed “give shape” 
to his life.  Parks’s Rep & Rev here is a textual affirmation of performing historicist 
traces molding the Lesser Known’s perception. 
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Anthropomorphic differance, assuring idealities’ return, even as he interrogates 
them, the Foundling Father dispossesses his own identity as a way of showing its 
conceptual nature; at the same time, the Foundling father perfoms the inherently absent 
state of identity as a from of presence.  In so doing, the Foundling Father 
deconstructively, that is, self-reflexively, questions the viability of identity.  As he 
“fakes” someone else’s identity, the Foundling Father, as differance, traces the ways in 
which the Great Mans idealization affects the Lesser Known, manipulating the process 
paradigmatically, as a way of showing how historicity as idealization dislocates identity.  
Henceforth, we intent to treat the Great Hole as a vacuity of historical and historicizing 
deferred, repeating absences; in addition, we plan to show how differential, repetitious 
traces become a primordial “nonpresence,” that is, the Lesser Knowns other, in 
qualifying any opening for phenomenological reduction of identity and its constitutive 
origin.  Here, we are of course very much involved in Parks’s deconstruction of origin.  
Thus, through a juridical absence, the history of The Great Hole and absent identity of a 
gravedigger, I shall attempt to show how Parks interrogates metaphysical concepts such 
as history and identity, revealing them as supplemented idealities.  Parks’s collaborator in 
the first act is the Foundling Father, who, to obtain his position as differance, disavowals 
his identity as a gravedigger, while “fakin,” performing the identity of a president, in both 
cases problematizing the idea of the tenable state of identity.  Therefore, I agree with 
Robert Baker-White who argues that in The America Play, “American identity (racial or 
otherwise)—the grounding of personal and national purpose in a solid idea of self and 
community—is agonizingly absent.”230  However, as far as The America Play is 
concerned, the question is not that of agony over a loss of identity; rather, the question 
                                                 
230 (“Questioning the Grounds” 83).   
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seems to be of the need to deconstruct the viability of identity.   Malkin follows Baker-
White by observing that the play conveys, “a grievous sense of rupture from a grounded 
past . . . . and postmodern dramaturgy that summons the past(s) and seeks identity, 
through an appeal to memory and its erasure.”231  Elam and Rayner also follow by stating 
that “In his search, the Foundling Father seeks an identify, a meaning and an 
understanding of his significance within the (w)hole of American history.”232  On the 
other hand, Drukman’s view is somewhat of a departure when he contends that Parks’s 
figures tell these stories to speak their way into history “In the telling, identities 
(including but not limited to racial) are performed, reinhabited, reimprinted . . . but never 
for the first time”233  Kerstin Schmidt also examines the significance of repetition in the 
play, seeing it as a theater of transformation.  Schmidt is closer to deconstructive 
understanding when she argues that in The America Play, “the process of the constitution 
of self and identity is consequently turned into a playful exercise in transformation.  And 
since transformation delineates a movement of continually designing, decomposing, and 
redesigning representations of the alleged self, postmodern drama no longer presents 
unmistakably identifiable characters”234   
As concerning our proposition, we are following Parks’s “playfulness” in 
undermining openings for substantive structures of identity.  Nevertheless, as we attempt 
to deconstruct the Idea of identity, revealing its constitutive elements as ideal, we must 
call attention to the fact that we are involved in processes of self-censured idealization—
that is, deconstruction.  In marking our investigation as ideal, we indeed follow Parks, 
                                                 
231 (Memory Theater 155).   
232 (“Echoes” 180).   
233 (“Suzan-Lori Parks” 57).   
234 (The Theater of Transformation: Postmodernism in American Drama. Amsterdam: Rodopi  2005) p. 49.    
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who, as I argue, does away with accepting idealization as self-evident while, at the same 
time, confirming that such idealization is inescapable.  We can readily discern such 
degree of inescapability in the Foundling Father’s declaration that “Everyone who has 
ever walked the earth has a shape around which their entire lives and their posterity 
shapes itself” (162).  To be sure, contextual embeddedness here marks the impossibility 
of authentic structures of identity.  What is more, according to the Foundling Father and 
as it concerns the Lesser Known, such contextuality effectuates ideality through 
protentive traces in the form of projected, anticipated temporality; we follow Derrida in 
asserting that such anticipated temporality partakes in constituting subjective identity in 
the form of protentive constituents, which are differentiated by identity’s retentive 
constituents in revealing subjective identity as constitutively differentiated through 
temporalities other than its “presence.”  The Foundling Father as the Derridian 
differance, although already a supplement, for he cannot be identified outside the 
reproductive signs he regenerates, narrates as he self-reflexively performs the temporal 
impossibility of Lesser Known as a “subject.” Reading the following lines, the 
deconstructive ethos is unmistakable: “the subject and first of all the conscious and 
speaking subject, depends upon the system of differences and the movement of differance 
. . . . [and] is not present, nor above all present to itself before differance.”235  When, as 
an anthropomorphic metaphor for a temporal differentiating locum, the Foundling Father 
makes the point about differentiated, temporally constitutive, subjectivity, the temporal 
absence of the Lesser Known’s nonpresence is unmistakable; moreover, the idealized 
supplementation with which such deconstructive absence is substantiated is sufficiently 
apparent:  
                                                 
235 (Positions 9). 
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The Lesser Known living his lifelong after all this had happened . . . . 
knew only that he was a dead ringer in a family of Diggers and that he 
wanted to grow and have others think of him and remove their hats and 
touch their hearts and look up into the heavens and say something about 
the freeing of the slaves.  That is, he wanted to make a great impression as 
he understood Mr. Lincoln to have made. (166) 
Here, the Foundling Father explicates on processes of idealization as manifesting through 
differentiated historicity, that is, historically and temporally defined “traced” (of the 
trace) subjectivity, whereby a past that no longer exists is overtaken by a future.236  
Specifically, the Lesser Known lives “long after” the Great Man; yet, the Great Man’s 
memorialized past, although no longer in existence, manifests through the Lesser 
Known’s idealization of the Great Man’s legacy—defining idealization, which overtakes 
the Lesser Known’s future and always already substantiates his past. Thus, the Lesser 
Known’s temporality is marked by differentiated, idealized (other-than-his-own), 
retentive and protentive traces, which reveal his identity as absent, supplemented 
idealization—an anticipated, defining manifestation within which he might be perceived 
as slave emancipator.   
Crucially, when we reference idealizing traces as historicist, we mean, indeed, to 
say that the Lesser Known’s temporality is defined by differentiating, supplementing 
signs of retentive and protentive traces.  Here, however, rather than following Husserl’s 
understanding of historicity,237 we choose to apply Heidegger’s, who complicates it.  
                                                 
236 We must node to Beckett, who well understood dynamics of projected temporality.  In Endgame, Clov 
asks Hamm if he “believed in the life to come?” to which Hamm answers: “Mine was always that” (1934).  
237 Husserl’s is a transcendental subject, having constitutive mastery over the meaning of the history and 
historicity [s]he affects.  Yet, as Derrida argues, one must assume “historical teleology” in any analysis of 
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Heideggerian ontological sensibilities seem to underscore Parks’s treatment of the Lesser 
Known’s historicist temporality.  I maintain, in fact, that Parks follows Heidegger by 
demarcating the Lesser Known’s identity as historicist, whereby Heideggerian 
historicism means that Dasein, the subject, “being of the there” and hence always 
culturally contextualized, is temporally defined by a past, which, in effect, materializes in 
its future and is defined by it.  Says Heidegger: “Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own 
Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historicizes’ out of its future on each occasion . . . . Its 
own past—and this always means the past of its ‘generations’ is not something which 
follows along after [Heidegger’s emphasis] Dasein, but something which already goes 
ahead of it.”238  Heideggerian historicity of the subject is marked by a dialectic of 
temporal fluctuation and historically determining past, defining the ways “Dasein has 
grown up both i n t o and i n a traditional way of interpreting itself.”239  Relating 
Heideggerian historicity of the subject to the Foundling Father’s narrative about the 
Lesser Known, we can evince, on the one hand, the temporal succession of future 
defining the past, while on the other, the ways in which the same self past as 
supplemental idealization become the constitutive element through which the Lesser 
Known gains his nonidentity.     
                                                                                                                                                 
historicity.  In Positions Derrida remarks: “Of course, the critique of historicism in all its forms seems to 
me indispensable. What I first learned about this critique in Husserl . . . . seems valid to me in its historical 
teleology of truth.  On this last question the issue is to be reopened. The issue would be: can one criticize 
historicism in the name of something other than truth or science” (58n32).  Deconstructively speaking, one 
must always assume a “truth,” a meaning; nevertheless, one must be persistently mindful of problematic 
undercurrents constructing so called “truths” as such.  
238 (Being and Time 41).    
239 (ibid.) It might be necessary to clarify here that if we are to relate tradition in the Heideggerian sense to 
idealization the way we have been reading it, it might be through what he claims to be tradition’s “mastery” 
in “taking what has come down to us and deliver it over to self-evidence” (43).  That is, we must make 
clear that tradition for Heidegger means the baseless assumptions that come down to us and that we 
mindlessly enact.  Necessarily, I relate this kind of indiscriminate practices to processes of idealization in 
general and, in our case, to the Lesser Known in particular.  
 
 153
In The America Play, the theme of identity as nonpresence, as temporally deferred 
absence, affected through idealization, is as omnipresent as the reproductive, differential 
signifiers that perpetuate it.  Henceforth, differentiating the temporalities of Derrida’s 
retentive and protentive traces, in addition to utilizing Heidegger’s decisive temporal 
picture, the Foundling Father manipulates the Lesser Known’s conception of his own 
temporality, past and future, in showing how idealization of the past becomes a defining 
future.  Through double self-reflexive verve, telling of his former self and of his former 
self’s attainment of self-reflexivity, the Foundling Father reveals the temporal, absent 
structure underlying the Lesser Known’s Heideggerian historicity: “Much much later the 
Lesser Known had made a name for himself he began to record his own movements.  He 
hoped hed be of interest to posterity .  As in the Great Mans footsteps” (162).  In a 
thematically significant Parksian Rep & Rev, the Foundling Father differentiates 
“posterity” as defining a future element and “footsteps” as defining a past element.  I read 
“posterity” and “footsteps” as part of the retentive and protentive temporal machinations 
of the trace’s “primordial division and delay,” whereby the trace “retains the mark of a 
past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future 
element.”240  Such temporal trace machinations become essential in understanding the 
Lesser Known’s fragmented agency.  Furthermore, the constituted state of the Lesser 
Known’s identity is evident when in addition to trace differentiated temporalities, which 
achieve their perpetuity through returning idealities, we factor, as we must, the idea of 
deconstructive ontic, spatial sign supplement—in The America Play, traces of the life and 
particularly the death of idealized president.  Spatiotemporal traces distinctively mark the 
following Rep & Rev, wherein the Foundling Father locates the Lesser Known’s 
                                                 
240 (“Diffèrance” 142) 
 154
historicizing and historicized binary of footstep/posterity within the differential structure, 
indicating his narration in part (A) of our cited passage.  At the outset, when the 
Foundling Father connects elements of “time” and “space” to the Lesser Known’s 
idealized and historicized state, the suggestiveness of the trace’s spatiotemporal 
structures seem perceptible:    
The passage of time.  The crossing of space. [The Lesser Known recorded his every 
movement.]  He’d hoped he’d be of interest in his posterity.  [Once again riding in the 
Great Mans footsteps.]  A nod to the presidents bust. (Nods) 
(Rest) 
(Rest)  
The Great Man lived in the past that is was inhabitant of time immemorial and the 
Lesser Known out West alive a resident of the present.  And the Great Man’s deeds had 
transpired during the life of the Great Man somewhere in past-land that is somewhere 
“back there” and all this while the Lesser Known digging his holes bearing the burden of 
his resemblance all the while trying somehow to catch to equal the Great Man in stature, 
word and deed going forward with his lesser life trying somehow to follow in the Great 
Mans footsteps footsteps that were of course behind him…. 
(Rest) 
A wink to Mr. Lincolns pasteboard cutout.  A nod to Mr. Lincolns bust.   
(Rest. Time passes. Rest) 
When someone remarked that he played Lincoln so well that he ought  
to be shot it was as if the Great Mans footsteps had been suddenly revealed.241                                                            
To emphasize his state as differance and the fact that he is dealing with differentiating 
and differentiated deferred temporalities, the Foundling Father mentions metaphysically 
and ontologically fecund signifiers such as time and space.  Further, to attest to the 
                                                 
241  (170-1). So as to accentuate the persistence with which Parks consciously “constructs” a deconstructive 
textual design, I once and again present her repeating expressions and the (Rest)s defining them, which 
help, of course, to deconstruct the concepts they represent.  When passages are particularly lengthy, I 
choose to alter the size of font and spacing.  Again, I bold-face repeating motifs in attempts to emphasize 
Parks’s Rep & Rev.    
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inherent supplemental state which such metaphysical terms carry, Suzan-Lori Parks 
reflexively and therefore textually performs repeating words, phrases, passages, which 
comment on her suspicion of such supplemental, unchecked conceptual fecundity.  
Moreover, such supplemental progression is complicated by the idea of the reproductive, 
morphemic ideality Husserl identifies language as carrying and which Derrida renames as 
“protowriting.”  Henceforth, I relate idealities of concepts and the ideality invested in 
infinitely anticipated reproductive repetition of signs to the textual repetition apparent in 
Parks’s dramatic text.  More to the point, I maintain that the Foundling Father, as 
differance, is cognizant of idealities defining his former self as the Lesser Known and of 
the deconstructive processes through which such idealization displaces the Lesser 
Known’s identity; as to the question of the reproductive ideality invested in language, the 
Foundling Father’s overt performance of differentiating signifiers seem to suggest a 
promise of infinite repetition.   
 As we examine the Foundling Father’s lines, we address the question of identities 
and their definition through processes of idealization.  Furthermore, we adhere to 
Derrida’s onto-lingual scheme and its distinctive denotations of Husserlian 
intersubjective temporality and Heideggerian historicist narrative.  In so doing, we must 
follow Derrida in relating the trace to structures of repetitious idealization characteristic 
to it.  In fact, repetition, as in Parksian Rep & Rev, tenaciously forces examination of 
idealization as fundamentally spatiotemporal and, for our purposes, as textual and thus as 
ontic simulation of the supplement as writing on the page.  For this reason, the Foundling 
Father repeats even as he ambiguates the seemingly discrete temporal footsteps/posterity 
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design underlying the Lesser Known’s historicized, always- already- other- than- his, 
identity:  
Little ringing in the ears. Slight deafness. 
 (Rest) 
Little ringing in the ears. 
Rest) 
A wink to the Great Mans cutout.  A nod to the Great Mans bust.  (Winks and nods) 
Once again striding in the Great Mans footsteps.  Riding on in. Riding to the rescue the 
way they do. They both had such long legs.  Such big feet. And the Greater Man had 
such a lead although of course somehow still “back there.” If the Lesser Known had 
slowed down stopped moving completely gone in reverse died maybe the Greater Man 
could have caught up. Woulda had a chance, Woulda sneaked up behind the Lesser 
Known unbeknownst and wrestled him to the ground. Stabbed him in the back. In 
revenge. “Thus to the tyrants!” Shot him maybe. The Lesser Known forgets who he is 
and just crumples. His bones cannot be found. The Greater Man continues on. 
(Rest) 
“Emergency, oh Emergency, please put the Great Man in the ground.” 
(Rest) 
Only a little ringing in the ears. That’s all. Slight deafness.  
(Rest) 
Huh.  Whatdoyou say I wear the blonde. 
(Rest) 
(A gunshot echoes. Softly. And echoes)242      
                                                                                                                                                
Looking at both passages, the spatiotemporal perpetuity of traces is instantly 
recognizable.  We first must call attention to the copious usage of Parksian (Rest)s, 
impossible spatial structures, which denote unempirical “passage of time . . . . crossing of 
space.”  For indeed, it is within such absence that traces hypostatize through what they no 
longer are, that is, retentive and protentive temporalities.  Here, past and future elements 
are not limited to the definition of the trace’s temporal nature; they are, in effect, 
temporally absent and hence temporally defining the impetus underlying the repetitious 
                                                 
242 (172-73) 
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movement of idealization, which overtakes the subject, defining its already absent 
identity as supplementing trace-signification.  As “echoes,” traces of gun-shots simulacra 
of the fatal shooting still ring in the Foundling Father’s ears—the “little ringing in the 
ear” never diminishes—he self-reflexively nods and wink “to the presidents bust and to 
the Great Mans pasteboard cutout,” verbalizing his stage directions so as to territorialize a 
differential, impossible space.  In The America Play, the idea of impossible space, that is, 
the deconstructive topos, maybe traced to a movement of replication rather than a source 
of origination, a movement which underlies the structure that permeates the play.  
Therefore, every time someone “shoots the president!” in the Foundling Father’s show 
out west using blank (replicating) bullets, simulated gun-shots echo repeatedly.  It is 
within such supplemented repetition that signifiers, presented as unconventional, un-
parenthesized stage directions, are manipulated by the Foundling Father as self-reflexive 
deconstructive devices with which he announces his state as differance and calls attention 
to the reproductive nature of Lincolnesque signified idealities he differentiates.  It is, 
moreover, within such regenerative atmosphere that the Foundling Fathers narrates the 
story of the ways through which the Lesser Known’s identity is displaced, substituted, 
and supplemented with that of an idealized president.  Any structure of idealization 
begins with temporality and the spatial opening of its traces through ontic signification.  
Idealized past in The America Play is invested in one signifier: “footsteps.”  
Paradoxically and as the Foundling Father intends it to be, “footsteps” are all but tangible 
historical factuality.  Therefore, when the Foundling Father tells us that the Lesser 
Known is, “once again [my emphasis] riding in the Great Mans footsteps,” we might 
restrictedly surmise that his repeated ride, the again and again, traces a changing 
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historical economy, which, at every turn, is projected onto the future, that is, the “hope 
hed be of interest to his posterity,” in defining and shaping the Lesser Known historicity.  
What is fascinating about Parks’s manipulation of historicist structures is her profound 
understanding of the interchangeable, shifting values of past and future, as she questions 
the legacy of Lincoln’s historic grip on the nation’s “time immemorial . . . . somewhere in 
past-land”; in so doing, Parks agitates calcified, unquestioned conceptualization of 
idealized president.  In her examination of temporality, Parks manipulates conception of 
Heideggerian historicity as necessarily dialectically temporal and hence malleable.  Such 
malleability, I contain, disallows an argument that in The America Play, “Parks enters the 
skin of American history through a black door—and tries to revision it, to remake 
“history.”243  There is no evidence of “remaking history,’” or “dream [ing] of solutions 
[and] healing cures”244 in the play; rather, Parks partakes in deconstructive processes in 
showing history as ontology that never stops and, therefore, cannot be remade in any 
controllable, definitive fashion.245  Her consciousness to Heideggerian historicist 
ontology, for Heidegger always already structurally temporal, is blatantly apparent in 
BLACK MAN WITH WATERMELON’s “signifyin lingo” from Parks’s The Last Dead 
Black Man in the Whole Entire World:  
There is uh Now and there is uh Then.  Ssall there is.  (I bein in uh Now: 
uh Now bein in uh Then: I bein, in Now in Then, in I will be.  I was be too 
but thats uh Then thats past.  That me that was-be in uh me-has-been.  
Thuh Then that was-be is uh has-been-Then too.  Thus me-has-been sits in 
                                                 
243 (“Echoes” 177). 
244 (Todd London, “Epic-cure History that Heals,” American Theater 11.6 (1994): 43-5) p. 43. 
245 Says Parks: “history is time that won’t quit” (“Elements” 15).  
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thuh be-me . . . . Thuh Then thats been somehow sits in thuh Then that 
will be . . . . (126) 
Falling back regressively and self-reflexively in examining the Foundling Father’s 
lines about the Lesser Known’s temporally historicized idealization, even as we read 
Parks’s lines from TLDBMWEW, it is not surprising that Heideggerian uncanny 
historicist fluidity marks the Lesser Known’s differentiated, deconstructive temporality.  
Furthermore, although Heidegger rejects investigations of intersubjective temporal 
epistemologies and concentrate on the intricacies of Dasein’s cultural contextualization, 
his temporal historicist design aids in elucidating the use Derrida makes of Husserlian 
intersubjective temporality and its retentive and protentive traces.  The Lesser Known’s 
historicity is defined by idealization of the Great Man, whose historical past as retentive 
traces become the Lesser Known’s protentive, idealized traces in his attempts to “equal 
the Great Man in stature, word and deed.”  Specifically, the Lesser Known, is “trying 
somehow to follow in the Great Mans footsteps,” internalizing, the Great Mans 
temporality.  It is here that we may propound Husserlian intersubjective temporality, 
which in The America Play occurs through processes of Derridean examination of 
idealization, that is, metaphysics.  We must of course begin with repetition, that is, the 
opening for idealization that assures the trace’s ad infinitum return. We find it in the 
Foundling Father’s self-reflexive narration of the Lesser Known’s obsession with the 
Great Man, which stages the supplemental state of idealization through textual 
repetitions.  For indeed, the Foundling Father’s repeating trace-signification becomes the 
matrix for a deconstructive examination of the Lesser Known’s loss of subjectivity and 
attainment of idealized identity of a president.  We here emphasize ideality as underlying 
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displacement of subjective temporality, for Husserl the locum of all intersubjective 
temporality.  We follow Derrida in arguing that temporality is at bottom of deferred 
retentive and protentive traces, which, in the Lesser Known’s case, substantiate his 
identity.  Crucially, we must understand that the Foundling Father’s staged assassination 
of Abraham Lincoln is a methodical, repeated assassination of the idealization marking 
Lincoln’s valorized retentive, memorialized traces.  So when we discuss the Lesser 
Known’s idealized retention of the Great Man, we reveal “footsteps” as Lincolnesque, 
temporal traces, “deeds [which] transpired during the life of the Great Man”; these trace 
retentions, become the Lesser Known’s design for his “posterity,” projection of which 
underscores the dynamic of protentive traces.  As idealized retentive and protentive traces 
re-temporalize the gravedigger’s identity, “the Greater Man continues on” while “the 
Lesser Known forgets who he is and just crumples”; in fact, although temporally the 
Great Man is located “somewhere in past-land,” Mary Todd’s urgent request to “please 
put the Great Man in the ground,” echoing throughout The America Play, is never 
fulfilled—the Great Mans output of historicizing metaphysic is interminable.      
Reading the Foundling Father’s lines about the unrelenting influence the Great Man had 
on the Lesser Known, for indeed he never stop to “Once again [stride] in the Great Mans 
footsteps,” we discover that temporality of retention becomes the temporality of 
protention, subjective temporality is all but present while identities are never what they 
are.  In describing the Lesser Known’s historicized and hence diminishing identity, the 
Foundling Father deconstructively shows how processes underlying supplementation of 
the Lesser Known’s temporal “presence” as such are metaphysical and, as they must be, 
ideal.  As we deal with Derrida’s concept of the trace, we look for those instances in 
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which traces hypostatize through the supplemental signifying ideality they help 
perpetuate.  At the outset, defining idealization begins with the Lesser Known’s 
fascination with the Great Man, “. . . . in his youth the Lesser Known familiarize himself 
with all aspects of the Great Mans existence.  What interested the Lesser Known most 
was the murder and what was most captivating about the murder was the 20 feet—” 
(166).  Retentive traces here rise from the Lesser Known’s generic introduction to the 
Lincoln narrative; interestingly, what makes the narrative attractive, however, is the 
murder, which, as Lucy points out, the Lesser Known “couldnt get that story out of his 
head: Mr. Lincolns great head.  And thuh hole thuh fatal bullet bored . . . . Changed your 
Fathuhs life . . . . (Rest) . . . . Couldn’t get that story out of his head” (190).   The 
historically absent event of the murder is substantiated by the Lesser Known’s 
idealization of the “hole,” yet another absence, whereby absences both represent retentive 
traces that assure the return of the Lesser Known’s idealization ad infinitum within The 
Great Hole—the one replicated, the “original,” and the one replicating, the one he “dug 
up.”  Energy of replication, or if you will, deconstructive supplementation prompted by 
the trace begins with the Lesser Known’s uncanny resemblance to the Great Man.  We 
treat resemblance here as one of the supplementing signs pronouncing the hypostatization 
of the trace. In setting the tones for a continuously performing textual differential, 
noticeable in part (A), the Foundling Father’s trace supplements are noticeable through 
the Great Mans ineffaceable images, which describe his former self: “He was tall and 
thinly built just like the Great Man.  His legs were the longer part just like the Great 
Mans legs.  His hands and feet were large as the Great Mans were large” (159).  
Supplementary traces here underscore entrenched images of the Great Man.  Still, and as 
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Derrida tells us, “effacement must overtake the trace,” treating images of Lincoln as an 
indelible eponym of American self-image therefore might be problematic. Rather, Parks 
and her dramaturge deconstructure par excellence qualify images of Lincoln, showing 
that in the act of discursive supplementation, specifically in relating historicized traces, 
calcified, immutability is unlikely; thus, as trace images of Lincoln repeat, they must 
perform their deconstructive dissent by showing that identities and the histories that 
recount them are volatile.  When the Lesser Known travels west, “As it had been back 
East everywhere . . . . people remarked on his likeness to Lincoln.  How, in a limited sort 
of way, taking into account of course his natural God-given limitations, how he was 
identical to the Great Man in gait and manner how his legs were long and torso short [he 
is also] taken to wearing a false wart on his cheek in remembrance of the Great Mans 
wart” (163).  This likeness, these trace-images from “gait” to “false wart,” which 
overtake the Lesser Known, are manipulated by the Foundling Father in evidencing their 
“effaced” qualities.  In this case, effaced traces are apparent when the Foundling Father 
deconstructs his own claim by telling us that accepting the Lesser Known’s “likeness to 
Lincoln” might be problematic since we must take into account “his natural God-given 
limitations.”  Here, Parks’s reflexivity is invested in specific dramaturgical heterogeneity, 
which locates the Foundling Father as differance on a topography within which Lincoln’s 
idealized trace-images satirize the viability of black identity, even as they protentively 
accommodate an opening for a black Lincoln.  Here dramaturgical plurality is noticeable 
when the Foundling Father pronounces the processes through which he becomes a black 
impersonator of Abraham Lincoln, commenting on the Lesser Known’s transformation 
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into a black replica of the Founding Father and consequently on the inexorably alterable 
state of history and the metaphysical supplement that defines it.    
 The deconstructive economies of the Derridean trace gain greater eminence in the 
play when trace-images are inverted from inane, benign “likeness,” the Lesser Known 
being “in virtual twinship” with the Great Man, to the malignant, fatal shots echoing still 
in American collective memory.  When the Lesser Known stages a show in his Hole, it 
consists of Lincoln “speeching” whereby “the Lesser Known was a curiosity at best”; 
however, “when someone remarked that he played Lincoln so well that he ought to be 
shot, it was as if the Great Mans footsteps had been suddenly revealed” (164).  The 
“Great Mans footsteps,” through which traces the Lesser Known perception of Lincoln 
become idealized, gain certain sanguinity and hence suggested hypostatization when:  
The Lesser Known returns to this hole and, instead of speeching, his act 
would now consist of a single chair, a rocker, in a dark box.  The public 
was invited to pay a penny, choose from the selection of provided pistols, 
enter the darkened box and “Shoot Mr. Lincoln.”  The Lesser Known 
became famous overnight. (164) 
 Not only do retentive traces repeatedly return in idealized infinite multiplicity, marking 
the again and again of the assassination in the Foundling Father’s show, the simulation 
of the murder is absurdly staged within the simulated space of The Great Hole of History.  
The mimetic moment is augmented by the fact that the Foundling Father is the one 
staging the assassination, even as he manipulates the story of the Lesser Known’s 
idealization of Lincoln as self-reflexive deconstructive intervention, in qualifying merits 
of historical factuality and its supplemented re-narrativization as a form of idealization.   
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To be sure, as we discuss historical factuality, we must consider its topographical genesis, 
which in The America Play seems to be the source of its metaphysical state on the whole.    
 Deconstructively speaking, we mention topos as the impossible spatial plan 
through which concepts lose the status of their temporality as transcendent purity when 
sign traces transform their retentive and protentive elements to metaphysical, 
supplemental language.  In The America Play, Parks shows that the topographical locum 
within which concepts such as history actualize is the source of their indeterminate, 
irreducible origin and protoconstitution.  In other words, the Lesser Known’s The Great 
Hole of History as “Uh exact Replica of thuh Great Hole of History” (179), Brazil Re & 
Revs the play’s setting here, is a replica of a theme park, in and of itself constituted by 
substituting simulations:  
Thuh original ssback East.  He and Lucy they honeymooned there. At thuh 
original Great Hole. Its uh popular spot. He and her would sit on thuh lip 
and watch everybody who was ever anybody parade on by. Daily parades! 
Just like thuh Tee Vee. Mr. George Washington, for example, thuh Fathuh 
of our County hisself, would rise up from thuh dead and walk uhround and 
cross thuh Delaware and say stuff!!  Right before their very eyes!!!!  
                                                                                                             (ibid.) 
                                                                                                                
Like his father, as the Lesser Known, Brazil’s understanding of history is idealized, his 
discourse distinctively metaphysical.  Standing in his father’s replica of the “original” 
hole, Brazil’s historicity is marked by an “overabundance” of signifier supplementing 
traces, which carry a returning, reproductive idealization of American past.  Ludicrously, 
Brazil’s idealization, in believing that Washington “would rise up from thuh dead,” is 
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similar to his father’s, who was convinced that Mary Todd’s summoning to bury, to “put 
the Great Man in the ground” was addressed to him.  Brazil’s idealization locates its 
fecund lifeline in “thuh original” Hole within which constitutionality of historical events 
can be traced to an origin, to protoconstitutive structures of temporal presence within 
which presidents, although long dead, still come to life.  It is exactly such naiveté, 
marking metaphysical thinking, which never self-reflexively interrogates its self-assured 
and hence dogmatic assumptions that Parks reveals and problematizes.  Retentive, ideal 
traces may become potent tools in the construction of nationalistic discourse, which is 
historically metaphysical, and monolithically white.  Elam, Rayner view Parks’s effort in 
the play as politically defining.  They claim in fact that The America Play is an attempt to 
“‘implant’ a different memory of America’s past, restoring a black presence.” I fail to see 
Parks’s attempts as that of restoring presence; rather, I see her efforts as deconstructing 
any viability of presence.246  Maybe this is why Lucy is quick to contest Brazil’s 
hitoricized idealization through Parksian textual performance, accentuated by Beckettian 
spaces and spare dialogue:  
Lucy :  Son? 
 
Brazil :  Huh? 
 
Lucy :  That iduhnt247 how it went. 
 
Brazil :  Oh. 
 
Lucy :  Thuh Mr. Washington me and your Daddy seen was uh lookuhlike of  
             thuh Mr. Washington of history fame, son. 
 
Brazil :  Oh. 
 
Lucy :  Thuh original Mr. Washingtonssbeen long dead. 
                                                 
246 (“Echoes” 177). 
247 For Parks, a neologized morphemic combination for “is not.”  
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Brazil :  O. 
 
Lucy :  That Hole back East was a theme park son. Keep your story to scale. (ibid) 
Narrations must be kept up to scale and the scale is always already metaphysical because 
revealing, that is reducing history to its empirical originary constitution will always 
involve ontic, supplemental signs, which will always account for absent constitutionality 
of a concept.  From first to last, the discourses of the Foundling Father, Brazil, and Lucy, 
are deferred temporal traces auto-affectively hypostatize through the supplemental textual 
vigor in The America Play.  The grand deferral in the play is The Great Hole of History, 
origin of which, according to Brazil, is similar to another constitutive absence: “thuh 
creation of thuh world . . . . In thuh beginning there was one of those voids here and then 
‘bang’ and then voila!” (184).  For Parks deconstructive nonpresence is primordial, its 
presence always already an absence, that is, a “present” in form of supplemental 
conceptuality.  That the supplementary agency in the play is represented through the 
differentiating mimeses of a hole maker, impersonator, and “faux-father,” who, in effect, 
represents the absent double of pro-constitutive-genitor, it is not surprising.  At the outset, 
the Foundling Father as a digger, a hole maker, who “was known [my emphasis] in Small 
Town to Dig his graves quickly and neatly” (160), goes off “out west” to dig a 
“lookuhlike of the Great Hole,” creating an ineradicable absent within which he performs 
its hypostatized traces as supplemental, idealized historicity.   When our absence maker 
becomes a dramaturge of his own theater in staging multiple retentive traces of the 
Lincoln assassination and their protentive affect on his retentive self, he repetitiously 
revisions his fractured, affected, idealizing self to become a deconstructive entity.  
Nonetheless, before his “death” as anthropomorphic differance, the Foundling Father 
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continues to dig multitude of holes, “hundreds of shallow holes he’ll use to bury his faux-
historical” (169) Americana artifacts, “a bag of pennies, Linconl’s bust, Washington’s 
wooden teeth (nibblers), peace pacts, writs, bills of sale [the list goes on ending with] 
medal for fakin” (185-6), possibly demonstrating processes within which absences gain 
definition through historical detritus as supplemental traces.248  Deconstructively 
speaking, supplemented primordial absences constitute origin of historical recollection, 
which is, as The America Play shows, open to economies of idealization and 
metaphysics.  Furthermore, metaphysicalized history is possible only because identities 
are fundamentally historicist in gaining their definition by falling back to what they no 
longer historically are, while supplementing their protractedly infinite deferred historical 
absence, a deconstructive primordial nonpresence, with what they always already are not.  
Historical identities, Parks suggests, are never traceable to presences as such.  For indeed, 
the Foundling Father’s retentive, supplemental traces overtake Brazil in defining his 
identity through the reproductive impulse of concept and discourse, invested in the play’s 
representation of a digger and a faker both.  Brazil gets his “Daddys digging spade” and 
tells his mother, “We could say I’m his spittin image . . . . We could say I just may follow 
in thuh footsteps of my foe-father” (191).  Protentively following the past, Brazil will 
also incur his “foe-father’s fakin”; Lucy tells Brazil, “Oh, he was uh faker. Uh greaaaat 
biiiiig faker too.  He was your fathuh.  Thats thuh connection.  You take after him” (181).  
Sounding somewhat naturalistic, Lucy goes beyond deconstruction in telling Brazil, 
“Youre uh Digger.  Youre uh Digger.  Your Daddy was uh Digger and so are you” (192). 
                                                 
248 Kubiak claims that such historical detritus in The America Play displaces the trauma that is at the heart 
of the play and “the history that hurts” (Agitated 197).  History hurts, no doubt; as a deconstructive play, 
nonetheless, I interpret The America Play as a play about the unlimited openings of possibilities through 
which practices, one might prepare the ground for checked, reflexive metaphysical thinking.  Though 
metaphysical in and of itself, such thinking I argue may eventually stave actions “that hurt.”   
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 If structures of authentic identities are viable at all, Brazil fails to reveal them.  Brazil 
becomes the proprietor of The Great Hole, renaming it “The Hall of Wonders,” wherein 
besides the Foundling Father’s archival traces, he presents: 
The newest Wonder: One of thuh greats Hisself.  Note: thuh body sitting  
propped upright in our Great Hole. . . . Note the top hat and frock coat, 
just like the greats.  Note the death wound: thuh great black hole—thuh 
great black hole in thuh great head. –And how this great head is bleeding.  
Note: thuh last words.  –And the last breathes. –And thuh nation mourns.    
                                                                                                                     (199) 
Mourning an assassination of a president The America Play seems to suggest, becomes a 
metaphysic which ceases to recognize the sources of its own absences and, hence, the 
problematic origin of its own idealization.  For indeed, its supplemental vigor no longer 
carries absent spatiotemporal traces, repeating in a nation’s historical narrative; rather, 
traces seem to hypostatize in outlandish Disnesque images.  
 
Part (B) 
Suzan-Lori Parks’s supplemental virtuosity is most noticeable in our treatment of 
part (B) of the cited passage.  Parks’s Rep & Rev emerges through textual performance, 
which supplements subjective temporality as nonpresence and absences that emerge from 
inherent temporal deferral of objective idealities.  In part (B), the Foundling Father, as 
anthropomorphic differance, shows us in fact how returning sign traces ambiguate the 
deferred temporalities of their concepts, even as they ontically supplement their concepts’ 
absent presences.  Heideggerian ontology/ontic dichotomy, viewed by Derrida as crucial 
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in understanding the structure of the sign as trace, becomes fundamental in reading 
Parks’s deconstructively histrionic strife on the page.   Retentive overabundance of 
differentiating traces is marked by temporal, lingering absence of a president, his wife, 
and his assassin.  These absences, nonetheless, are hypostatized through trace phrases, 
which become the supplemental matrices of the Lesser Known’s idealization and also the 
Foundling Father’s tool of his trade—showing the impossibility of substantive states of 
identity and history in The America Play.  What the Foundling Father as differance stages 
for us, however, are the processes through which signification becomes the supplemental 
performative nexus of idealization, which is always empirically absent.  More to the 
point, absences mark both phenomenon and concept—historical assassination and a 
murdered president’s identity.  In repetitiously assassinating Abraham Lincoln, on his 
stage, the Foundling Father presents tenacious retentive traces while narrating their 
idealized protentive affect on the Lesser Known on his stage and on the page.  The fact 
that the Foundling Father repeats and revises the assassination again and again is due to 
Parks’s textual sensibilities in underlying the Lesser Known’s undying idealization of the 
Great Man.  Therefore, idealization, as that of the unsubstantiated form of the Great 
Man’s historicity and identity, materializes through inexorable textual Parksian Rep & 
Rev, which performatively announce idealization’s impossible lexicological and temporal 
repetition through its ontic sign-traces.  Significant to a deconstructive reading of The 
America Play is a realization that such lexicological and temporal absences inaugurate an 
opening for interrogatory economies, initiated by the indecipherable state of concepts’ 
origin, that is, their presence as such.  So, as I argue, supplemental signification, that is, 
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metaphysical language in The America Play warrants deconstructive questioning in 
interrogating its performative state as self-evident.   
When we carefully examine part (B), the supplemental historicist fabric [textum] 
of The America Play is apparent.  Mary Todd urgent “possible,” summoning, 
“Emergency oh Emergency, please put the Great Man in the ground,” is used to introduce 
the Lesser Known to the temporality of the murder and, although impossible, suggest his 
viable participation in the Great Man’s burial.  Textually, Mary Todd’s urgent cry ends 
part (B), hinting, I contend, to its anticipated, continual affect on the Lesser Known in 
precipitating his idealization of the Great Man.  Noticeably parenthesized are historically 
documented phrases such as “the brother against brother: a new nation all conceived and 
ready to be hatched [and] Play Dixie for me I always liked that song,” footnoted as 
“President Lincoln’s” request to pay tribute to the Confederacy after the war; we have a 
“very funny line from Our American Cousin” and “John Wilkes Booth last words . . . . 
Useless, Useless.”249  As Lincoln’s and Booth’s sign traces repeat, within the Foundling 
Father’s narrative in showing their indelible affect on the Lesser Know, the Foundling 
Father teases Lincoln’s iconic hold on the Lesser Known’s and American consciousness 
by claiming that “the Great Man takes to guffawing guffawing at thin jokes at bad plays . 
. . . haw haw haw and one moment guffawing and the next moment the Great Man is 
gunned down in his rocker” (160).   In differentiating Abraham Lincoln’s memorable 
lines with disagreeable “guffawing,” the Foundling Father as differance exposes the 
                                                 
249 According to Ken Burns’ The Civil War, when John Wilkes Booth was caught and shot, he looked at his 
hands and uttered “Useless, Useless” (“The Better Angels of Our nature”).  Kurt Bullock argues that Parks 
manipulates last words in the play as an oral and textual tool, which aids in filling the silenced gap left after 
Lincoln’s death.  He identifies these last words as historical markers and claims that Parks “tinkers with the 
stability of those markers . . . . and leads readers to question the markers’ role in establishing a ‘history’” 
(Bullock, Kurt. “Famous Last Words: The Disruptive Rhetoric of Historico—Narrative ‘Finality in Suzan 
Lori Parks’s The America Play.” American Drama 10.2 (2001): 69-87) p. 72. 
 171
idealistic nature of metaphysical language, deflating the identity of its originator.  In so 
doing, the Foundling Father undercuts the Great Man’s historically constituted identity by 
showing its narration as idealization, which persistently reemerges in the Lesser Known’s 
conceptualization of Abraham Lincoln.  The defining, historicizing trace is the 
assassination from which the Lesser Known could never recover.  Its hypostatization, 
continuous and unrelenting, is staged in the Foundling Father’s show “out west.”  
Although repetitious, the assassination’s idealization is questioned by the Foundling 
Father’s self-reflexivity as well as that of his shooters “as John Wilkes Booth.”  As we 
are about to see, the repetitious textual impulse is inseparable from the dramatized 
staging, again and again, of the absent assassination it is supplementing:   
(A Man, as John Wilkes Booth, enters.  He takes a gun and "stands in position": at the 
left side of the Foundling Father, as Abraham Lincoln, pointing the gun at the Foundling 
Father's head) 
 
A MAN: Ready. 
 
THE FOUNDLING FATHER: Haw Haw Haw 
     
(Rest) 
 
HAW HAW HAW HAW 
 
(Booth shoots.  Lincoln "slumps in his chair." Booth jumps) 
 
A MAN (Theatrically): “Thus to the tyrants!”250 
 
     (Rest) 
 
Hhhh.  (Exit)   
                               (164)                                                                                                                                      
                           
 
“Thus to the tyrants!” is footnoted as, “Or ‘Sic semper tyrannis.’ Purportedly, Booth’s 
words after he slew Lincoln and leapt from the presidential box to the stage of Ford's 
                                                 
250 According to Ken Burns’ The Civil War, audience members attending Our American Cousin were 
divided on what specifically John Wilkes Booth uttered after he shot the president, some heard “Sic semper 
tyrannis!” while other heard “The south is avenged!” 
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Theatre in Washington, D.C. on 14 April 1865, not only killing the President but also 
interrupting a performance of Our American Cousin, starring Miss. Laura Keene” (ibid).  
Parks’s footnoting is essential in understanding her dramatization of the deconstructive 
supplement.251   The “purported” nature of Booth’s famous words affects Abraham 
Lincoln’s historically documented words by their sheer metonymic association.  The 
textually distinct “guffaw” reasserts the Great Man’s penchant for bad jokes, 
problematizing idealization of his historically known252 life.  Moreover, the fact that the 
Foundling Father’s participating actors are from his audience “out west,” makes them 
historicizing accomplices of the Foundling Father’s interrogation of the Great Man’s past 
as an ideal.  As a matter of fact, the “theatricality” with which they execute their shots 
testifies to their self-reflexivity, which is always already deconstructive.   
In the Lincoln Act, the Foundling Father’s shooters “as John Wilkes Booth” are A 
MAN, A WOMAN, B WOMAN, B MAN, C MAN and C WOMAN respectively.  These 
are figures who have no names, no identities, and who partake in historicity that conjoins 
their temporality to that of Abraham Lincoln’s assassin.253  Every time the Foundling 
Father as Abraham Lincoln is shot, the trace as “Uh echo . . . .  Of gunplay . . . . goes on 
playing KER-BANG!   KERBANG-Kerbang-kerbang-(kerbing)-((kerbing))” (186), an 
echo of an absent event, gaining materiality through retentive, deferred temporality, 
whose purity of presence is put to question by the dramatization of supplementation 
                                                 
251 According to Innes, “As with all Parks’ techniques, the footnoting offers multi-layered meanings.  On 
the surface, as an academic trope, it substantiates the historicity of what is being presented on the stage” 
(“Staging” 24). 
252 Lucy is idealistic and ironic, the emphasis on “Known,” however, is Parks’s: “At thuh Great Hole . . . . 
at thuh Original Great Hole, you could see thuh whole world without going too far . . . . you could see 
someone who’s done somethin of note . . . . You know: Known” (197). 
253 That the actors on the Foundling Father’s stage are all black, assuming the role of one of America’s 
most notorious assassin who was white, is to say the least intriguing.    
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through signification.  Not surprisingly and as, yet, another construct of Parksian Rep & 
Rev, textually dramatizing the repetition of the Derridean trace, A MAN comes back: 
(A Man, as John Wilkes Booth, enters.  He takes a gun and “stands in position”: at the left side of the 
Foundling Father, as Abraham Lincoln, pointing the gun at the Foundling Father’s head) 
 
THE  FOUNDLING  FATHER : Like clockwork. 
 
A  MAN : Ready. 
 
THE  FOUDNLING  FATHER :  Haw Haw Haw Haw 
 
(Rest) 
 
HAW HAW HAW HAW 
 
(Booth shoots. Lincoln “slumps in his chair.” Booth jumps) 
 
A  MAN (Theatrically) :  “Thus to the tyrants!” 
 
(Rest) 
 
Hhhh. 
 
LINCOLN 
 
BOOTH 
 
LINCOLN 
 
BOOTH 
 
LINCOLN 
 
BOOTH 
 
LINCOLN 
 
BOOTH 
 
LINCOLN254 
 
(Booth jumps)  
 
A  MAN (Theatrically) :  “The South is avenged!” 
     
 (Rest) 
 
  Hhhh. 
       
  (Rest) 
                                                 
254 Running figures’ names here is an example of Parks’s “Spell.” 
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 Thank you.  
 
THE  FOUNDLING  FATHER :  Pleasure is mine. 
 
A  MAN :  Next week then.  (Exit)  
                                                             (171-72) 
 
In this “shooting,” the only significant change is Booth’s other historically documented 
cry: “The south is avenged!,” footnoted by Parks as, “Allegedly Booth’s words.”  Here 
we may find deconstructive interrogatory openings in The America Play; whereby 
referencing historically documented words, Parks undermines their historical, archival 
quality by inserting words such “purportedly” and “allegedly.”   Fascinatingly and, as I 
argue, deconstructively suggestive qualification of historical factuality is itself qualified  
again and again by the inevitable occurrence of repeating traces—noted by the fact that 
A MAN and the Foundling Father both anticipate continued shooting “Like clockwork.”  
Nevertheless, deconstructive reflexivity is accentuated by the small talk whereby basic 
niceties of “thank you [and] the pleasure is mine” together with the president’s guffawing 
deflate, even as they question the historic poignancy of the event.  What contributes to 
such questionability, moreover, is the fact that Parks perpetually substitutes, even as she 
supplements Booth’s historically documented last words.  Hence, when shooters as Booth 
continue their interactively historicized performances on the Foundling Father’s stage, 
their interjected cries uttered “theatrically” as Booth’s are: “Strike the tent,” which is 
footnoted as, “The last words of General Robert E. Lee, Commander of the Confederate 
Army” (167); “Now he belongs to the ages,” which is footnoted by Parks as, “The words 
of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, as Lincoln died” (169);255 “Theyve killed the 
president!,” footnoted by Parks as, “The words of Mary Todd, just after Lincoln was 
                                                 
255 Secretary of War Edwin Stanton’s words are documented and mentioned in Burns’s The Civil War. 
 175
shot” (170).  Parks’s deconstructive historicized drama textualizes on the page the 
absences underlying historical events and the supplemental, substitutive signs that 
reconstitute it.  There is no finitude to deconstructive thinking.  This is why Parks’s 
deconstruction of metaphysics is followed by yet, another deconstructive effort through 
which the practice of qualifying metaphysics, that is, deconstruction, is interrogated.  In 
fact, B WOMAN disparages the Foundling Father’s self-reflexive “inaccuracies” and his 
attempts to modify Civil War era hegemonic historical narrative.  Once again, Parks’s 
Rep & Rev is unmistakable in tenaciously, although impossibly, substantiating the 
spatiotemporal state of absent traces—here, textual dramatization of the strife between 
ideologies of historic orthodoxy and de-constructivist tendencies:     
(B Woman, as Booth, enters. She "stands in position") 
 
B  WOMAN: Go ahead. 
 
THE FOUNDLING FATHER:  Haw Haw Haw Haw  
 
(Rest) 
 
HAW HAW HAW HAW 
 
(Booth shoots. Lincoln "slumps in his chair." Booth jumps) 
 
B  WOMAN (Rest): LIES!  
 
(Rest) 
 
L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ES! 
 
(Rest) 
 
L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I A R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R S! 
 
(Rest) 
 
Lies. 
 
(Rest. Exits. Reenters. Steps downstage. Rest) 
 
L I E S! 
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(Rest) 
 
L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I E S 
 
(Rest) 
 
L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I A R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R S! 
 
(Rest) 
 
Lies. 
 
(Rest. Exit)                                                                                                       
                       (168) 
 
Although through B WOMAN Parks seems to question the merits of deconstructing 
metaphysics as history, the fact that she chooses a woman as Booth seems to put her back 
on a deconstructive path.  
Deconstructing metaphysics as the metaphysics of presence, we continue by 
looking at the ways the Lesser Known’s idealization of the Great Man propels a state in 
which subjective ideality as presence is not viable.  As differance, the Foundling Father 
begins by ambiguating the temporality of the assassination, presenting the temporal 
improbability in which a meeting between the Lesser Known and the Great Man might 
take place.  Temporally speaking, and although he could have not experience it, initiating 
part (B) is a word that resonates, ‘echoes’ in the Lesser Known’s memory.  The 
Foundling Father tells us that after visiting the Great Hole, the Lesser Known, “began to 
hear the summoning.  At first they thought it only an echo. . . . it became louder . . . . as 
if he were moving toward it” (163).  The protentively temporal nature of the trace 
revealed through the term summoning, gains greater definition when the Foundling 
Father contextualizes it within Marry Todd’s exigent cry, “Emergency oh Emergency, 
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please put the Great Man in the ground.”  The following passage describes how the 
Lesser Known’s ideality of the Great Man overtakes him:  
Emergency ho Emergency please put the Great Man in the ground. 
(Rest)  
It is said that the Great Mans wife did call out and it is said that the Lesser Known would 
. . . .leave his wife and child . . . . it is said that he would leave his wife and his child and 
after the blessing had been said and [the meat carved during the distribution of the 
vegetables] . . . stand out there where he couldnt be seen standing with his ear cocked. 
Emergency, oh Emergency, please put the Great Man in the ground. 
(Rest) 
It would be helpful if she had called out and if he had been summoned been given a 
ticket . . .boarded the train . . . If he had been summoned. [Been summoned between the 
meat and the vegetables and boarded the train . . . 
(Rest) 
A nod to the bust of Mr. Lincoln. (Nods to the bust of Lincoln) But none of this was 
meant to be.  For the Great Man had been murdered long before the Lesser Known had 
been born. Howuhboutthat . . . . So any calling that had been done he couldnt hear, any 
summoning he had hoped for he couldnt answer . . . . although you should note that he 
talked about the murder and the mourning that followed as if hed been away on business 
at the time and because of business has missed it.  Living regretting he hadnt arrive 
sooner.  (161)                       
 
For the Lesser Known as a skilled gravedigger, the Great Man’s death becomes a potent 
trace, idealized and hence infinitely repetitious; it is this relentless, differentiating 
repetition which, through phenomenological and deconstructive understanding of 
intersubjective temporality, dislocates the Lesser Known’s presence—first, with a vision 
of interring the Great Man and second as someone, who can potentially become as 
important.  Following Derrida, Parks takes summoning as an example of the dwelling of 
a concept upon its projected temporal infinitude.  Summoning as a trace becomes a 
temporal signifier, phonemically, yet, impossibly heard from Marry Todd all the way to 
the Lesser Known, who “talked about the murder and the mourning that followed as if 
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hed been away on business at the time and because of business has missed it.”  Mary 
Todd’s summons repetitiously continues at the end of the play’s second act when the 
Foundling Father finally climbs to his grave.  Here, the metaphysics of supplementation, 
that is, idealization is revealed through processes of retention, the summons, and 
protention, the Lesser Known’s continually affected response, in creating repeating, 
infinite blink of an eye beyond Marry Todd’s finitude.  Nevertheless, empirical continuity 
of historical events is not viable, even if signification reproductively sustains them 
through processes of idealization; for indeed, Mary Todd’s summons can be rewritten 
again and again.  In my view, The America Play holds such a process suspect.  
Furthermore, such suspicion becomes amply noticeable when as anthropomorphic 
differance the Foundling Father reveals the unsubstantiated nature of the Lesser Known’s 
claims to the Great Man’s temporality in life and in death.  Obvious Parksian Rep & Rev 
demonstrates the rigor with which signification, itself an ideal, supplements past 
historicity that is all but available to the Lesser Known.  Although idealized traces of the 
Great Man “march before his mind’s eye,” the Lesser Known’s borrowed temporality is 
spatially stretched all the way “back then,” displaced by idealized conceptuality through 
which he is convinced that he can hear Marry Todd.  Of course, Mary Todd’s identity, as 
a wife to the Great Man, already a nonpresence defined by her position, is shuttered.  
According to the Foundling Father, “On that sad night she begged her servant: ‘Bring in 
Taddy, Father will speak to Taddy’256 But Father died instead unconscious.  And she 
went mad from grief . . . . Mad Mary claims she hears her dead man . . . . Summoning . . 
. . . Emergency, oh, Emergency please put the Great Man in the ground” (168).  
                                                 
256 Parks’s n12 reads: “Mary Todd Lincoln, wanting her dying husband to speak to their son Tad, might 
have said this that night” (168).  The inconsolable state of Mary Todd is corroborated by Ken Burns’ The 
Civil War. 
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Looking at part (B) once again, we immediately notice that the trace supplementation of 
Mary Todd’s temporality, represented by the fact that “she was given to hysterics,” is 
added to metonymically supplemented temporalities of a president and his assassin.   
The suggestion in The America Play seems to be that historically originary, pure 
temporalities, presences as such, are not available.  What is available are supplementing, 
reproductive signs, which are metaphysical because they supplement substance-less 
temporalities and because their ontic state is conceptual and they are, therefore, 
inherently absent.  Even as the Foundling Father’s phonemic, morphemic, and syntactic 
differentiated, spatiotemporal trace-signification show how absent semantics of 
idealization repetitiously overtakes the temporality of the Lesser Known, his own self-
reflexive, Brechtian intervention only aids in emphasizing the untenable nature of his 
own temporality.  As differance the Foundling Father’s requiem sounds like the 
supplemented narrative he used to describe his former, idealizing self, with, I argue, 
certain suggestion of parody:    
“Uh henm: I was born in a log cabin of humble parentage.  But picked up 
few things.  Uh Hehm: 4score and 7 years ago our fathers—you know the 
rest.  Lets see now.  Yes.  Uh house divided cannot stand!  You can fool 
some of thuh people some of thuh time!  Of thuh people by thuh people 
and for thuh people!  Malice toward none and charity toward all!  Ha!  
The Death of Lincoln! (Highlights):  Haw Haw Haw Haw 
            (Rest) 
        
            HAW HAW HAW HAW 
 
            (A gunshot echoes.  Loudly.  And echoes.  The Foundling father 
“slumps in his chair”)    
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                                                                                       (198)                                             
Mounting his coffin, the Foundling Father’s re-staging of “The Death of Lincoln!” co 
insides with his own.  If, however, we view the Foundling Father as differance, how can 
we reconcile differance, a metaphysic of differing, yet, uninterrupted nonconceptuality, 
with mortality?  Claiming that we have manipulated the Foundling Father as an ontic, 
and, hence anthropomorphic metaphor might be the easy way out.  Deconstructively 
speaking, nonetheless, we know that a so called way out is untenable.257  To be sure, 
Parks does not offer resolutions, “ways-out.”  Maybe this is why Brazil continues his 
father’s enterprise in The Great Hole—regressively, again and again.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
257 I follow John Caputo in finding affirmation in the impossibility of deconstructive conceptual 
containment.  He argues that “Deconstruction is structured by a movement ‘beyond,’ über or au-delà, 
which is itself the precisely undeconstructible element in deconstruction, what it always affirms” (“Looking 
the Impossible in the Eye: Kierkegaard, Derrida, and the Repetition of Religion,” Kierkegaard-Studies.  
Yearbook (2002): 1-25) p. 3.    
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Conclusion 
Suzan-Lori Parks’s The America Play adheres to the deconstructive project by 
dramatizing conditions of relentless, interrogatory opening, going beyond limited 
postmodern jargon, in indeed readying the ground for postmodern rethinking the 
philosophical status-quo, whose metaphysical hold we may never escape.  Parks’s play 
gives opening to questioning, accompanied by a simultaneous realization and acceptance 
that in our attempts to attain substantive responses, we are sure to face mounting 
difficulties.  Still, anticipating difficulties is fundamental to structures of postmodern 
suspicion, which mark contemporary drama and philosophy.  In this way, Parksian 
sensibilities are necessarily postmodern.  Parks’s suspicion is most noticeable in her self-
reflexive, referential theater.  Parks’s theater can be identified as preparing the 
groundwork for a drama which self-reflexively allies itself with ontology, theatricalizing 
its mimetic moment as a disquieting comment on representational theater.  I view in fact 
subversion of illusionist, representational theater as going hand in hand with subversion 
of the metaphysics of certitude.  It is within such subversive turn that we may reveal the 
deconstructive undecidable and its applicability to Parksian theater.  Undecidability for 
Parks does not mean indecisiveness.  Rather, I interpret Parks’s drama as consciously 
questioning the merits of a theater that is race specific, even as she participates in its 
making.  Although I have examined The America Play as a deconstructive case in point, 
arguing that Parks’s design is predominantly onto-lingual, we can hardly avoid the fact 
that actors on Parks’s stage are black—in The America Play, the Foundling Father and 
those who shoot Booth are all without exception black.  The political implications of a 
color specific cast are significant.  In this respect, interrogation of occidental philosophy 
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might pursue a compulsory self-analysis of its history as a production of hegemonic 
ideologies on a grand scale.  Here, postmodern investigation targets concealed ideologies 
and their metaphysical discursive matrices, which are informed by insidious will to 
control in the guise of humanistic ideal of progress.  Investigating humanistic thought as 
the product of white patriarchal metaphysic does begin with postmodern suspicion.258  
For example, and as mentioned above, Parks’s Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third 
Kingdom documents changes imposed on the black minority; whereby the man of 
science, The Naturalist, a white man in a cockroach guise comes “to teach, enlighten, and 
tame . . . .creatures from the jungle,” and “observes”259 the naturalization of three black 
women.  Conversely, when Molly, one of the women, says, “Once there was uh me 
named Mona who wondered what she’d talk like if no one was listenin” (28), one is 
immediately compelled to think of Husserl’s relational and Derrida’s differential 
structures of the ego, defined through a constitutive other.  As we can see, Parks 
consciousness to African-American plight is interlaced with philosophical aporias, 
locating Parks on the cusp of philosophical inquiry and black sensibilities.   
A combined dramatic effort in conjointly revealing philosophical questions and 
representing black historicity may prove to be the absent locum of yet another 
deconstructive trace investigation.  For such deconstructive strife, we may find the 
unsettling affects of the Derridean trace in his later aporias.  Specifically, Derrida point to 
inherent paradoxical states in acts of gift giving, hospitality, forgiving, and mourning, 
                                                 
258 Historically, we could trace origin of postmodern suspicion to Nietzsche’s prespectivism, Husserl’s 
epoche, Heidegger’s destruktion of onto-theology, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.  I think that 
Michael Frayn’s Niels Bohr explains the source of postmodern suspicion best when he says, “there is no 
precisely determinable objective universe . . . . the universe exist only as a series of approximations. Only 
within the limits determined by our relationship with it” (Copenhagen, New York: Anchor Books, 1998) p. 
72. 
259 (The America Play and Other Works 29).  
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whereby complete, unmitigated fulfillment of each is impossible, even if their fulfillment 
in the generic sense makes them possible.  In showing potentially continued applicability 
of deconstructive concepts to Parks’s drama, let us examine the aporetic state of 
mourning.  The components of the binary, which underlie the aporetic state of mourning 
are on the one hand, “incorporation,” in which the mourner retains the memory of the 
other, the deceased, as a foreign entity; while on the other, Derrida identifies 
“introjection” as that movement through which one preserves the memory of the other as 
a Husserlian already-other- within-one’s self.  Although introjection may be seen as a 
comprehensive way to mourn, Derrida problematizes it by pointing to the fact that such 
internalization of the deceased may not “be a normal response and instead becomes 
pathological.”260  Through process of introjection, moreover, the mourner might 
interiorize the mourned to such a degree, whereby metaphorically “cannibalizing” its 
memory.  In this way, incorporation, as conscious none-assimilation, might leave room 
for differentiation, which always carries opportunities for heterogeneity.  The aporetic 
state of true mourning then is a reality within which one’s complete, uninterrupted 
mourning may result in the obliteration of the memory of the mourned; whereas a 
processes of mourning in which remembrance of the mourned is consciously held at 
some distance, may result in mourning that can be seen as inadequate.   
Although I think that the applicability of the trace in its deconstructively onto-
lingual form applies to all of Suzan-Lori Parks’s early plays, I present the concept of 
mourning in attempts to show the inherent heterogeneity marking deconstructive 
thinking.  For example, in Park’s The Last Dead Black Man in the Whole Entire World, 
                                                 
260 I here use notes that I have taken sometimes ago.  I regret to say that my efforts to find the South 
African website I have used failed.  Derrida’s observations of mourning appear for the most part in his 
Memoires: for  Paul De Man.  
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examination of deconstructive understanding of mourning may help accentuate Parks’s 
own metaphysical strife in treating the black past.  In some respects, I view, 
TLDBMWEW as anguishly longing for African past.  The aporia for Parks is how to 
uphold a continual interrogatory philosophical inquiry while, at the same time, represent 
the viability of a retrievable, African history, which carries a metaphysic of valorization.  
Here the concept of mourning may apply to the figures in TLDBMWEW, manipulated by 
Parks as allegories of the African and African American dead extend all the way to 
“QUEEN – THEN – PHARAOH – HATSHEPSUT.”  I see Parks as attempting to situate 
her figures on a liminal space within which they might be tenably mourned without being 
“cannibalized.”  Nevertheless, successful mourning as such is not viable.  For indeed, the 
ultimate question for Parks is how to preserve the black past in ways through which total 
“introjection” does not occur and practices of “incorporation,” metaphysical as they must 
be, leave an opening for reflexive contemplation.  Yet, again, issues of history and 
identity prevail and in interchangeably maneuvering toward and away from a kind of 
metaphysic, which performatively assures the propagation of such concepts as a 
metaphysic, Parks might be successful in sustaining a memory of black historicity.  
Moreover, in sustaining black historicity, Parks must assure a condition in which the 
black entity avoids constructing its identity by internalizing, “cannibalizing,” its own 
memory.  Moreover, and as it touches my proposition, Parks’s innovative language 
stages, even as it dramatizes, the supplemental structures of the substanceless, absent 
state of its concepts.  Parks’s theater is located on the cusp of a concept and its impossible 
materialization in the theatrical space.  Actors performing in Parks’s productions digest 
their signifiers, forced to emit phonemes that proclaim the temporal, deferred absent state 
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of the concepts they fail to represent.  For Suzan-Lori Parks, “theater is the site of 
embodied uncertainty . . . . because theater is a site for the temporal disjunction between 
the present of performance, the inheritance of the past, and the future of its remains in 
memory and reproductions.”261   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
261 (Rayner Alice, “Rude mechanicals and the Specters of Marx” Theatre Journal. 54.4 (2000): 535-55) p. 
551. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the absent locale of the onto-lingual, spatiotemporal movement of differanc within and through which the 
Foundling Father operates. This great hole, dug by the Foundling Father, is a replica of “The Great Hole of 
History,” a “theme park,” itself a supplemented space, parading “the fathers of our country” daily.  I view the 
great hole as a differentiating and hence defining historicized and historicizing absence.  No presences here, just 
supplementing spatiotemporal traces that as part of the movement of differance, attest to the impossibility of 
substantive notions of history and identity.  The Foundling Father, immersed in his self-created hyletic absence, 
narrates the story of the Lesser Known’s developing nonself; that is, a nonself supplemented by white historicity 
against which definition of blackness evaporates in the echoed hole.  I intend to show how, through a self-
reflexive economy, the Foundling Father is successful in revealing the “Great Hole of History’s” gossamer 
historicizing influences on the Lesser Known. 
The Great Hole of History 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Foundling Father’s Treble Temporal 
Scheme  
 
 
 
 
THE LESSER KNOWN 
[[with whose retentive traces the Foundling Father indicates “past-present”]] 
 
The gravedigger, the Foundling Father’s former self, his vicarious past is self-reflexively examined 
in differentiation to the Great Man’s, whose “footsteps” the Lesser Known is compelled to follow.  
The Foundling Father shows that the Lesser Known’s identity as a black gravedigger is fractured 
through    historicized idealization of the Great Man, even as he demonstrates that conceptualization 
of identity as such is problematic.  
 
 
Values of differing: stress on spatial, 
textual processes of signifiers as they 
perform their reproductive regeneration, 
adding to what is already there. 
Values of deferring: stress on temporal 
movement, materialized by falling 
back of signifiers, supplementing an 
absent, missing signified. 
The Onto-lingual turn of Difference 
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THE FOUNDLING FATHER 
[[a blink of an eye, “the pure actuality of the now”—“presence”]] 
  As anthropomorphic differance, the Foundling Father differentiates past and future, as 
supplemented absences, in showing that  original structures of historicity, as that of the Great 
Man’s, cannot be recounted in their completion and that the Lesser Known’s aspiration for a 
presidential identity will be indeed ad-infinitum idealized and delayed.  Significantly, the 
Foundling Father as differance partakes in the play’s dramaturgy by self-reflexively performing the 
trace’s status as “protowriting”; that is, the regenerative ideality of writing, preceding all “real” 
significations.  
 
 
 
 
 
THE GREAT MAN 
[[future present as historicizing ideality through which  
opening the trace repetitiously returns]] 
The perennial American signified, Abraham Lincoln, whose idealized historicity underlies the 
possibility of an opening of “presence,” accumulation of primordial trace absences, which fail to 
represent [vorstellung] his signified history and identity in their substantive totality.  As the Great 
Man’s retentive, “effaced” traces collapse in a movement of division and delay, their protentive 
dynamic in the play indicates their idealized form through their anticipated reemergence in the 
future.  Hence, although he lives “in time immemorial,” his effaced traces are revivified through 
the Foundling Father’s historically systemic discourse and impersonation, which specifically target 
the Lesser Known’s historicized, idealized identity. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable 
 
The History of an Error 
 
    1. The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he 
is it (Nietzsche’s emphasis here and throughout).  
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive.  A 
circumlocution for the sentence, “I Plato, am the truth.”)262 
 
    2. The true world—unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the 
virtuous man (“for the sinner who repents”).   
      (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible—it 
becomes female, Christian.) 
 
   3. The true world—unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of 
it—a consolation, and obligation, an imperative. 
    (At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism.  The idea as become 
elusive, pale, Nordic, (Königsbergain.263) 
 
   4. The true world—unattainable?  At any rate, unattained.  And being unattained, also 
unknown.  Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something 
unknown obligate us? 
   (Gray morning.  The first yawn of reason.  The cockcrow of positivism.) 
 
   5. The “true” world—an idea which no longer good for anything, not even obligating—
an idea which has become useless and superfluous—consequently, a refuted idea: let us 
abolish it! 
   (Bright day; breakfast, return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato’s embarrassed blush; 
pandemonium of all free spirits.) 
 
   6. The true world—we have abolished.  What world has remained?  The apparent one 
perhaps?  But no!  With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.    
   (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of 
humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA264 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
262 Either by choice or error, periods in this “fable” are inserted within and out of quotation marks. 
263 Nietzsche end notes it as “That is, Kantian.” 
264 “Zarathustra begins.” (The Portable Nietzsche, Ed., Trans. Walter Kaufmann New York: Penguin 
Books, 1982) pp. 485-86. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Excerpt from Derrida’s “Signature Event Context”  
 
There’s no concept that is metaphysical in itself.  There is a labor – 
metaphysical or not – performed on a conceptual systems.  Deconstruction 
does not consist in moving from one concept to another, but in reversing 
and displacing a conceptual order as well as the nonconceptual order with 
which its is articulated.  For example, writing, as a classical concept, 
entails predicates that have been subordinated, excluded, or held in 
abeyance by forces and according to necessities to be analyzed.  It is those 
predicates (I have recalled several of them) whose forces of generality, 
generalization, and generativity is liberated, grafted onto a “new” concept 
of writing that corresponds as well to what has always resisted the prior 
organization of forces, always constituted the residue irreducible to the 
dominant force organizing the hierarchy that we may refer to, in brief, as 
logocentric.  To leave to this new concept the old name of writing is 
tantamount to maintaining the structure of the graft, the transition and 
indispensable adherence to an effective intervention in the constituted 
historical field.  It is to give everything at stake in the operations of 
deconstruction the chance and the force, the power of communication [LI, 
21, Derrida’s emphasis throughout]. 
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Appendix D 
New black math  
Suzan-Lori Parks   
10 years after writing the essay "the equation for black people on stage" Im 
standing at the same crossroads asking the same questions. No sweat. 
Sometimes you can walk a hundred miles and end up in the same spot. The 
world ain't round for nothing, right? What is a black play? The definition is 
housed in the reality of two things that occurred recently and almost 
simultaneously: 26 August 05, playwright scholar poet-king August Wilson 
announces he is dying of cancer, and hurricane Katrina devastates the Gulf 
Coast. It feels like judgment day. What Im talking about today is the same and 
different. I was tidy back then. And now Im tidier. Tidier today like a tidal wave.  
What is a black play?  
A black play is angry.  
A black play is fierce.  
A black play is double voiced but rarely confused.  
A black play got style.  
A black play is of the people by the people and for the people.  
A black play is smooth but not slick, heavy but not thick, cant be tamed, often 
does not comb its hair, wipes its mouth with the back of its black hand or with a 
linen napkin whichever is more readily available.  
A black play is late.  
A black play is RIGHT ON and RIGHT ON TIME.  
A black play is deep.  
A black play is armed / to the teeth.  
A black play bows to god then rows the boat ashore.  
A black play makes do if it got to / fights / screams / sings / dreams / WORKS IT / 
talks in code and tells it like it is ALL UP IN YA FACE.  
A black play gives you five. [End Page 576]  
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A black play is robust and alive.  
A black play is in the house and looking good, too.  
A black play is bad motherfucker.  
 
A black play does not exist.  
Every play is a black play.  
SAY WHAT?  
 
A black play is a white play when the lights go out.  
A black play is a white play when you read between the lines.  
A black play got its picture on the wall of your local post office.  
A black play got its butt on death row for a crime it perhaps did not commit.  
A black play got its black butt in the whitehouse, seated at the right hand of the 
man.  
A black play keeps you up at night.  
A black play is awake.  
A black play gonna kick your ass.  
A black play has genitals that people think about long after curtain comes down.  
A black play is running for president.  
A black play gotta get out the vote.  
A black play is a leader, but seldom an elected official.  
A black play as a child wondered why, if Jesse Owens won all them gold medals, 
then how come a black man couldn't beat a white man in a presidential race?  
A black play is in the streets.  
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A black play aint no negro.  
A black play is a nigger.  
A black play is buck wild.  
A black play is mixed.  
A black play is on broadway, the great white way.  
A black play is not on broadway, and furthermore, aint studying no broadway.  
A black play is coming soon to a theatre near you.  
A black play got a fro.  
A black play know the know.  
A black play go toe to toe, all the way out the do. [End Page 577]  
A black play gonna burn that m-f down, Monday-Friday and twice on the 
weekends.  
A black play is chronic.  
A black play takes into account that pollsters have found that black folks dont 
attend the theatres in numbers large enough to influence the selection of plays 
produced.  
A black play is very intellectual.  
A black play has studied, conducts discourse, and, on certain days of the week, 
can be found living in the big house of tradition.  
A black play got a mission.  
A black play dreams the impossible dream.  
A black play is such things as dreams are made on.  
A black play was the first black play ever to be written and will be the last black 
play standing.  
A black play takes shape just outside the reaches of your white understanding, 
no matter what your color, baby.  
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A black play aint for you.  
A black play aint about you.  
A black play aint integrated and don't want to be.  
A black play aint playing.  
A black play knows that when audiences read it primarily through the rubric of 
"race relations," that those audiences are suffering from an acute attack of white 
narcissism. (If you have a need to see yourself reflected in things that are not 
directly about you, then you are one of the afflicted.)  
A black play dont give a shit what you think.  
A black play knows all about the black hole and the great hole of history and aint 
afraid of going there.  
A black play sometimes puts its foot in its mouth, but, hell, a black play 
sometimes gots mouths to feed and shoe leather tastes like chicken when yr 
HONGRY.  
A black play wants to know where HARRIET TUBMAN stay at?  
A black play fights the power.  
A black play wants to uplift the race.  
A black play just might set the race back 10 years.  
A black play is not political—that term don't even begin to approach its 
complexity, especially these days, dog.  
A black play knows how to play the game.  
A black play IZ. [End Page 578]  
A black play in the united states of america was ripped from the bosom of its 
motherland, caught by the man or sold down river by its brothers, crossed the 
atlantic in chains, had its gods smashed to bits and pieces, was handed Jesus as 
a pacifier (later, when Jesus wasn't working so good, welfare came into play), 
had its language ripped out its mouth, its family torn asunder—all this and more 
and a black play is still expected to play by the rules, is still expected to be 
interested in what the other deems interesting and valid and valued. HOW MUCH 
OF THAT SHIT CAN I BUY WITH FOODSTAMPS? Or, said another way: I PAY 
FIRST CLASS TAXES HOW COME I GET SECOND CLASS SERVICE? A black 
 205
play aint playing your game, it might look like it's playing your game, but if it looks 
like that to you, then that just means you been played, honey.  
A black play KNOWS what time it is.  
A black play aint gonna give you the time of day.  
A black play kicks a man when he's down, eats its own, has a faith in the system 
which is less a function of trust than confusion and fatigue, waits for the man to 
shape up his ship, in short makes all the mistakes of a great people fallen on 
hard times and working on getting they game back.  
A black play is the feel good show of the century.  
A black play is the blues.  
A black play dont forget that in the 1980s mtv didnt want colored faces on its 
airwaves.  
A black play dont forget the numerous hard times back in the olden days and the 
numerous hard times going on right now.  
A black play keeps on keeping on.  
A black play asks, where Martin and Malcolm stay at?  
A black play gets down.  
A black play is old.  
A black play is just getting started.  
A black play asks, where Mr. James Baldwin stay at?  
A black play asks, where Satchel Paige and Son House and Memphis Minnie 
and George Washington Carver and all them stay at?  
A black play is often characterized by healthy doses of word play such as 
"snaps" and "yo Mamma" jokes.  
A black play takes you to the bridge.  
The Bridge. A black play by Suzan-Lori Parks  
Characters: MOMMA, an older woman, and YO, her husband.  
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Setting: they sit atop their house which is under 20 feet of water. Helicopters from 
the National Guard in the near distance are about to perform a heroic rescue of 
our characters, but first: [End Page 579]  
YO: We just made the last payment on this house, too.  
MOMMA: Yo, sometimes it be's that way sometimes.  
YO: Everything we own is washed away.  
MOMMA: Bank owned the house, then us.  
YO: Now the flood owns everything, looks like.  
MAMMA: You know it, Yo.  
YO  
MAMMA  
(rest)  
YO: How can you tell a nigger thats crazy from a nigger that aint crazy?  
MAMMA: I don't know. How can you tell a nigger that's crazy from a nigger that 
aint crazy?  
YO: The crazy nigger is the nigger that aint crazy.  
Curtain.  
A black play is black.  
A black play is asked to explain itself.  
A black play is tempted to expose itself.  
The black play got a message.  
A black play knows the real deal.  
A black play is told that it is about race and a black play knows it's really about 
other shit.  
A black play knows that racerelations sell.  
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A black play knows that racerelations are a holding cell.  
A black play is blacker than my new black cat, Houndog, named after Houndog 
Taylor, the blues guitarist, who is also a polydactyl brother.  
A black play is blacker than black.  
A black play is written by a black person.  
A black play has black actors.  
A black play is written by a white person and has white actors.  
A black play doesnt have anything to do with black people. Im saying The Glass 
Menagerie is a black play.  
SAY WHAT?  
EXCUSE ME?!?!  
Cause the presence of the white suggests the presence of the black. Every play 
that is born of the united states of america is a black play because we all exist in 
the shadow of slavery. All of us. The Iceman Cometh is a black play. Angels in 
America is a black play and Kushner knows he's a brother. Its all black. [End 
Page 580]  
The Intermission  
What in God's name are we gonna do to help our brothers and sisters get to 
the promised land in this lifetime? I know it's not fashionable to ask these 
questions. I know it's not fashionable to suggest that we have some 
housekeeping to do. I know it's uncool to suggest that we got to do something 
other than lay our problems on the doorstep of the man. I know it's unhip to 
confront our own trip but what should we do? Wait for the man to clean HIS 
house? Oh please.  
Sister on the Street: How did this essay about black theatre turn into a diatribe?  
Brother on the Corner (shouting from the sidelines): What you know about 
diatribe? You don' know what a diatribe is, yr just talking "diatribe" so she'll put 
you in her essay.  
Sister on the Street: And me being in her essay's gonna be the end of your 
world? Sides, she's got a point. We gotta take more responsibility. We gotta quit 
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waiting on the man. Tomorrow is always a new day dawning, but dont it often 
smell of the Same Old Shit?  
Brother on the Corner: SOS! Im with you on that!  
Sister on the Street: If you waiting on the man you gonna be waiting all your life.  
Brother on the Corner: Plus in your next life too, dont forget about karma and 
shit.  
Sister on the Street: People wanna be free but they spend their entire existence 
waiting on the man.  
Brother on the Corner: Instead of breaking FREE and leading a whole lot of 
people to FREEDOM with them.  
Sister on the Street: Damn right.  
Black Playwright: Either of you two got some change? My cellphone dont work 
around here and I need to use the payphone. Im putting in a call to Harriet 
Tubman. Im putting in a call to Nat Turner. Im calling up John Brown and 
Fredrick Douglass and Ms. Sojourner Truth. They are still here. Cause when they 
died they MULTIPLIED. Operator? We gotta crack the heart wide open cause 
when it healed up last time it healed up wrong, crack it open and reset it, heal it 
right. Crack the mind wide open cause when it healed up, our thoughts healed up 
wrong.  
Brother on the Corner (rest): Do she know that pay phone don't work?  
Sister on the Street: Yeah, she knows.  
Black Playwright: Audiences still ask "what do black people think about such and 
such?" Black people think the world is fucked. Thats what black people think. 
Black people dont always use apostrophes neither. Black people took the rallying 
cry "burn baby burn" and turned it into the chorus of "Disco Inferno" and some of 
us danced all the way to the bank, thats what black people think. Black people 
know there is a war going on against our blackness and somehow we've been 
enlisted to fight on the front lines.  
Brother on the Corner: Whats she talking about now? [End Page 581]  
Sister on the Street: A black play.  
Brother on the Corner: Go ahead, girl.  
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End of Intermission  
A black play fights the power.  
A black play sometimes does not make it to the page or stage and consists of 
just some high-powered thoughts going on inside the bright blackness of yr head.  
A black play is doctor heal-good cause theatre is a healing thing.  
A black play gives us a role to play and, when someone steps into that role, the 
rest of us got someone like us to look at. Seeing yrself mirrored is a basic 
component of healthy psychological development. Im not talking about creating a 
series of model behaviors, but roles, like the roles in the passion play—you know 
what a passion play is—like when they reenact the journey of Christ on easter 
and the town gathers to watch an actor go through his moments as he carries his 
cross up the hill & c. So the black playwright gives us a role. Because it is in 
having a role that we have an opportunity to imaginatively participate. And it is 
through participation that we work out the demons.  
A black play is a poem, like a life is a poem, like the bible is a poem, like the 
bhagavad-gita is a poem, a "song of god," "no effort is ever wasted," it says and 
"you have rights to your actions but not rights to the fruits of your actions," it 
says. The charioteer opens his mouth and shows us that he is the infinite.  
A black play embraces the infinite.  
A black play is . . . August Wilson. 2 Oct 2005: He died today.  
A black play asks, where Mr. AUGUST WILSON stay at?  
A black play is not ignorant of history, but neither is the play history's slave.  
A black play is tragic.  
A black play is funny as hell.  
A black play has contempt for the other. And love too.  
A black play is currently studying how such a love and such a contempt can 
coexist in the same heart, in the same breath.  
A black play plays well in countries where there are no "black" people—and yet, 
helps those in those countries to identify themselves as "black."  
A black play employs the black not just as a subject, but as a platform, eye and 
telescope through which it intercourses with the cosmos.  
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A black play has at least one panther in it.  
A black play recognizes the importance of the evidence of things unseen.  
A black play is too much.  
A black play can take you there. [End Page 582]  
A black play is simple.  
A black play is COMPLICATED.  
A black play is ALL THAT.  
A black play is a piece of work.  
A black play is worth the price of admission.  
A black play is free.  
PEACE  
And  
POWER  
To the PEOPLE.265  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
265 Theatre Journal 57.4 (2005) 576-583. 
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